

## ABSTRACT

The Research Project is influenced by scholar's intellectual interest in the subject of Power and Security as a primary concerns of states. The quest for knowledge motivated to visit different institutes at Qatar, Bahrain, China, Russia and Japan where interaction was arranged with a number of scholars and think tanks and gathered their valuable input on the research project. Additionally, the opportunity of faculty member at National Defense University Islamabad was availed in interacting with senior military officers from UK, USA, Australia, Saudi Arabia, China, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Palestine. Their input was very valuable and succinct towards the conduct of research.

The location of Gulf Region is in Asian Continent and it characterizes one of the ocean arms that extended in the *Strait of Hormuz*, the gate of Gulf. However the *Strait of Hormuz* has base in Iran. Kuwait and Iraq also share its coasts. West coast of the Gulf covers the eastern bounds of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman. *Strait of Hormuz* in the south of Gulf is considered to be controlling strategic position. The contemporary phase of international politics and its economic reflections have been crafted by international events such as 9/11 that had particularly changed the dynamics of Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain from religious orientation to the democratic side. The importance of the region can be understood by its long lasting international headlines that had made its place for many decades. Despite its traditional security environment, the region has developed a fresh impetus immediately after the 9/11 incident along with Iraqi invasion by the US forces.

The post 9/11 international order is affecting the gulf in many ways. The mechanism of Collective Security by GCC countries, the presence of Extra Regional Forces (ERF) in the Gulf, the interests of great and regional powers, mature political institutions of gulf countries is providing stability to the region. However, same stability is paradoxical as it contains potential instability as the often conflicting interests of great powers like USA, Russia and China and regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia, vulnerable political institutions in the backdrop of

evolving Arab Spring with simmering effects in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the public discontentment with presence of foreign forces in the region and looming crisis over Iran's nuclear programme are potential destabilising factors.

The research project has been viewed from the lens of Power. The concept of Power Beyond State (IR-Realism) and the concept of Power Within State (Political Science-Three Dimensions of Power). No one theory deals with both dimensions of power concurrently, therefore, the scholar has proposed a new theory by joining both the aspects of Power. The proposed theory is "Stability-Instability Regime Theory".



## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Statement of the Problem

In IR Power and security are primary concerns of states. This project, in large part contains examination of the Gulf Region as a whole from its strategic, political, economic and security dimensions to establish the factors that are providing stability to the region. Critical evaluation of underlying causes of instability have also be undertaken to establish paradoxical situation prevailing in the Gulf region. Pakistan is located in the immediate neighbourhood of the Gulf with enormous stakes in its stability, therefore, cannot afford to overlook the developments in the Gulf. The likely impact of evolving situation in the Gulf region on Pakistan have also been examined in detail with suggested course of action in last part of the research.

### 1.2 Introducing the Gulf Region

"Bordering Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and the Gulf of Oman. In Western countries it is called the Persian Gulf and in most Arab countries, it is referred as the Arabian Gulf. It is very controversial and not in common use outside the Arab world, nor is it recognized by the United Nations and other international organizations."<sup>1</sup> Its map is given at annexure A. With due respect to stated positions and to avoid ambiguity, the word **Gulf** has been used in this project. The detailed description of both connotations of Gulf are explained below:

#### **The Arabian Gulf**

The term "Arabian Gulf" has been in use in Arab countries, for decades now. But the debate seems to have gained new momentum, when US Assistant Secretary Political-Military Affairs, Andrew Shapiro, made specific use of the term during sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.<sup>2</sup> There is a water body already existent in area known as Persian Gulf on map , in literature and official use, for more than thousand years. Following rationale makes naming the Gulf more explicit: -

<sup>1</sup> [http://www.youchoose.net/campaign/persian\\_gulf\\_or\\_arabian\\_gulf](http://www.youchoose.net/campaign/persian_gulf_or_arabian_gulf), viewed on 11 June 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Aljazeera Blogs, <http://blogs.aljazeera.net/blog/middle-east/persian-gulf-or-arabian-gulf>, accessed on 11 June 2012.

1. "Wave of Arab public opinion on this issue is just a transfer of the 1960s; once Arabs conceived Iran, compelled by United States; as supporter of Israel during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973."<sup>3</sup>
2. Name used by "League of Arab States" or the Arab League.
3. Used by Arabas in their documents in Arabic and Arabic is used as one of the official languages by the United Nations.
4. The Name" Persian Gulf "is linked to the Persian Empire which is not there anymore. As the Mediterranean was once known as the sea of Rome."<sup>4</sup>
5. "Iran does not mean Persia, the Iranian people are categorized into Persians, Arabs, Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Kurds, Gilakis, Mazandaran and Baloch people."<sup>5</sup>
6. Who lived nearby in the Gulf region were mostly Arabs, and therefore it should be called the Arabian Gulf by demographics.
7. "There are around six Arab countries surrounding Gulf occupying an area of 70 percent coastline. Iran is alone against six Arab countries."<sup>6</sup>

### **The Persian Gulf**

Even after the emergence of Islam, the Arab world knew it as the "Bahr e Faris", the Persian Sea. Its map is given at annexure C and United Nations verdict at annexure D. Following rationale is forwarded by those calling it as Persian Gulf:-

1. United Nations used it as such in its documents.
2. In almost all maps printed before 1960, the most modern international treaties, documents and maps, this body of water was known as the "Persian Gulf."
3. "The National Geographic Society uses the name Persian Gulf while referring to this body of water."<sup>7</sup>
4. The International Hydrographic Organization, an international body for provision of hydrographic information for world-wide marine navigation and other purposes

<sup>3</sup>United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names, 23rd Session, Vienna, 28 March – 4 April 2006, Accessed 10 June, 2010.

<sup>4</sup>Mahan Abedin (Dec. 9th 2004), "All at sea over 'the Gulf'". Asia Times. Accessed on 30 Nov 2013.

<sup>5</sup>Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. Eisenbrauns, 2006.

<sup>6</sup><http://persianorabiangulf.com/>, accessed on 11 June 10, 2013.

<sup>7</sup>[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian\\_Gulf\\_naming\\_dispute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Gulf_naming_dispute), Accessed on 11 June , 2012.

uses the name "Gulf of Iran (Persian Gulf)". This is outlined in reference S-23 (Limits of Oceans and Seas), section 41.

5. Interestingly historical maps also suggest to call it Persian Gulf, Waldseemuller map shows the same.

### 1.3 Nature of the Research Project

The underlying nature of this project is comparative study of countries in the Gulf Region in the political and security dimensions. The scholar's interest was generated in the Gulf due to Great and Regional Power's politics which has been shaping the strategic environment in the Gulf. The Gulf countries share defence and security concerns with each other and the adjoining areas particularly as these concerns arise from security relations with other Gulf States. In the post 9/11 scenario, factors of more immediate focus like strategic and security concerns came to attract the attention. For example, competitive polar power, actual war and intra-state threats in the Gulf have made the project more contemporary and original in exploring the prevalent and emerging trends shaping the strategic environment. These new forms of regional security environment have been conceptually developed in the theory and analysis of "Stability-Instability Regime Theory" which is scholar's own Theory whereby Power within State and Power Beyond State have been examined in the later chapters to arrive at the findings and conclusions set forth for the project. The detailed explanation of proposed theory has been covered in Theoretical Framework.

### 1.4 Significance and Relevance of Research Project

The research project is very relevant to the contemporary and emerging international order affecting the stability and security matrix of the Gulf Region. Pakistan is in the immediate neighbourhood with historical, cultural and religious ties, therefore has huge stakes in its stability. The available literature review has helped in identifying different approaches and dimensions in which Gulf has been covered. However, this Research Project focuses on the identified gap on *Stability-Instability Paradox in the Gulf Region with its implications on Pakistan*. The stability and instability has been viewed in political and security dimensions within state and beyond state. The thesis critically reflects on the processes of change sweeping across the Middle East and its long-term impact upon

political, economic and security structures in the Gulf States. This is very important research project as it touches important dimensions of stability and instability having direct influence on Pakistan, therefore, its analysis and recommendations have been accordingly proposed as an input to help the policy making and implementation with respect to Gulf region.

### 1.5 Geographical, Social-Cultural and Economic Settings of the Gulf

This part briefly examines the physical, social and cultural, and economic features of the Gulf, which provide basic setting in which security is pursued.

**Geography.** “The Gulf region, as defined by the six-state membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Iraq and Iran, is situated within parallels latitude N 38° / N12° and longitude E34° / E64°.”<sup>8</sup> “The Gulf region is fairly contained as two great land masses with a waterway (the Gulf proper) largely divides the area. The main southern ocean water way provides necessary export channels of international trade.” The states lie on a continuous littoral along the major the Gulf international waterway, which also possesses vital energy (oil and gas) resources. “The Saudi Kingdom covers over three-quarters of the Gulf land mass, some 2.2 million kilometres ”<sup>2</sup> also is littoral on the Red Sea to the west and has westward territorial borders and a troubled boundary with Yemen to the south. “These present Saudi Arabia with additional strategic dimensions.”<sup>9</sup> Iraq lies at the northern end of the Gulf, bordering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. Its several violations of these borders have been proof of the country’s strategic importance in the Gulf. “Iran lies along the eastern shore of the Gulf through to the outer Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Iran, some 1.65 million kilometres ”<sup>2</sup> in area, (three quarters of Saudi Arabia’s area but nearly four times that of Iraq), with population greater than all the Gulf States (including Iraq) together is the sole non-Arabian member of the Gulf. Three smaller states, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, lie along the southern end of the Gulf. “Iran has a commanding position around the Strait of Hormuz at the southern end of the Gulf.”<sup>10</sup> The Strait is the sole entry-exit point to the Gulf and therefore, it is of

<sup>8</sup>“The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf” available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/> accessed on 26 June 2013.

<sup>9</sup>“Saudi Arabia the country in Brief”. [www.saudia-online.com](http://www.saudia-online.com). Accessed on 3 March 2013.

<sup>10</sup>Alsawaidi Jamal S., “Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability”, Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, (1996).

vital economic and strategic interest for all the Gulf States as well as international commerce. The narrow Strait (some twenty kilometres at its narrowest) makes Oman and Iran the closest neighbours across the Gulf. Oman and Yemen are littoral along outer seas and international waterways to the south. These are also of strategic and security concerns in the Gulf as the passage-ways for piracy and illegal immigration.

**Society and Culture.** The populations of the GCC states are small, Saudi Arabia only exceeding ten million. Iraq's population (2007) was 27.5 million while Iran's population of 72.5 million in the same year was greater than all the other Gulf States together. The Gulf is relatively free of the deep and affective ethnic cleavages. In the Gulf, ethnic and cultural linkages are widespread among the Arab people who enjoy general cultural commonality. Peaceful relations between the peoples of the states are based on widely shared modes of livelihood, systems of government, ethnic and cultural identities of language and religion, which also shape contemporary politics.

**Disputes and Conflict.** "The Gulf has been the extensive zone of competition and conflict. Intra-regional disputes among the Gulf States, mainly around borders, but have generally been contained. The 'Gulf Arab way' is sometimes not to allow grievances to disturb unity, especially as this serves to maintain a united defensive front. The most dangerous border issues are at the boundaries of the present Arabian security community.

The border disputes that have most seriously challenged the stability and security of the Gulf to the north have been between Iraq and Iran and between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Lying south in the peninsula, the ancient lands of Yemen and Oman remained intact; but in one's case it remained deeply embroiled in internal tribal (1962) and political ideological attachments alien to the Arabian ethos and in the other challenged in its unity by the tribal-sectarian Dhofar Rebellion (1965-75). "Saudi Arabia's southern border with Yemen has been subject to recurrent armed clashes."<sup>11</sup>

In the processes of regional developments, conflicts of national interest have to be negotiated and balanced. Nevertheless, national security issues remain primary and will be the major focus later in the research project. Saudi Arabia in particular had to put down violent challenges to the stability of the state. The Gulf contains a security

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<sup>11</sup>FurtigHenner, "Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy," Middle East Journal, 61 (4), (2007).

configuration of small powers and competitive great powers, which have been real and persistent threats to regional stability. Security concerns about domestic cleavages, dissidence and insurgency have increased towards the end of the twentieth century. Social groups, sectarian and economic, that see themselves as discriminated have become increasingly restive, notably in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. Internal dispute and conflict have become dominant security concerns. Intrusive destabilizing influences have come to be more enlivened, especially as nationals have returned from the Afghanistan war zone and as Al Qaida or lately the ISIS and ISIL phenomenon have become increasingly effective in penetrating the social and political systems of the Gulf. Non-state groups and individual actors have increasingly become securitizing elements. The boundary between the domestic and the external factors has become uncertain, making the framework of security matrix more complex.

**Polarity and Hegemonic Claims.** “An important factor in the overall security configuration of the Gulf is the hegemonic aspirations of its three largest members: Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Owing to its greater size, its resources and military weight, Saudi Arabia enjoys greater influence over its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council and authority within the organization. Perceptions of Saudi pre-eminence can be obstructive in matters of command and logistics in regional defence and in matters of distribution in regional economic development. Hegemonic ambitions have been active in the wider Gulf region and main cause of conflict in 1980s between Iraq and Iran. Projection of Iraq’s military power in the Gulf after the 1980s conflict was put down by war and foreign occupation in 2003. But assuming the restoration of national unity, economic reconstruction and restored sovereign defence capabilities, regional tri-polarity will re-emerge. This is a critical strategically defining aspect in the Gulf security complex. Iranian hegemonic pretensions within the Gulf continue to be a major source of security anxiety among the Gulf states, and in the twenty-first century Iranian ambition is the critical aspect of the Gulf security complex. “Nuclear developments in Iran are considered as major threat to regional security.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>ValdaniAsgarJafari, “Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf Security”, International Journal of West Asian Studies Vol. 3 No. 1, 2011 at [www.journalarticle.ukm.my/2036/1/index.pdf](http://www.journalarticle.ukm.my/2036/1/index.pdf), accessed on 28 Jan 13.

**Economy.** The national policies of Gulf countries are directed towards increasing their productive capacities and domestic ‘welfare’ capabilities, strengthening economic and trading competitiveness in the global economy. The Gulf (including Iraq) see regional association as essential to achieving this objective. On a global scale, the Gulf States are middle-ranking and by orientation they are states of relative low-level development. Oil has been the base from which traditional rural and sea-resourced low income economies have been transformed into wealthy modern economies and societies. However the petro-economy is intensely specialised and has developed in isolation from other forms of production and wealth creation. Development is increasingly directed to ‘diversification’ away from this concentrated resource base, which in the meantime provides the vital capital input for development. The oil-gas economy produces a global income base and generates much external sovereign investment. But their substantial control of the world’s most wanted energy resources, oil and gas, place the Gulf States in a unique position in the global economy. This economy, however, also creates a regional profile of international strategic significance and recurring security uncertainty. The economies of the Gulf member states’ are state-dominated, excessively protective and non-complementary between the states. A halting approach to economic liberalization within the six states is under way. They have been tentative in admitting increased foreign participation and domestically are reluctant to envisage extensive privatisation. Integration of the state’s economies into a wider Gulf regional economic framework is still limited and of uncertain commitment. “The states are, however, members of the World Trade Organization.”<sup>13</sup>

## 1.6 A Brief Survey of the Modern Histories of the Gulf Region


### The Gulf States

The Gulf states are post-traditional, post-imperial restructured and modernizing political units with relatively clear separate sovereign identities. On the Arabian side of the Gulf, the process of release from imperial control was brief in time, brought about by a series of Treaties of Understanding with Britain, first with Kuwait in June 1961 followed by understandings with the smaller states of Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates

<sup>13</sup>Wikipedia,[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy\\_of\\_the\\_Middle\\_East#cite\\_note-WEF-11](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Middle_East#cite_note-WEF-11), accessed 31 Jan 2013.

(U.A.E.) and Oman in the early sixties. The experience of the eight Gulf States was of various impacts of imperial control rather than of direct colonial occupation. The removal of imperial “overlay” in the Gulf left behind many ingredients of regional insecurity. Notable among these have been border disputes, incompatible regimes and ideological characteristics among the states, conflicts of state ambitions and varying strategic interests across the region. Saudi Arabia had been recognized as an independent Kingdom from 1927. Over the course of the twentieth century Saudi Arabia has secured a standing of pre-eminence in the Gulf and the status of a Gulf polar power. The Kingdom has, however, been subject to challenges to the regime, such as by violence brought to the annual Hajj at Mecca (1979) and other anti-regime/anti-US violence within the country through the 1990s and thereafter. The six littoral states on the western side of the Gulf formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to promote regional development and also as a local security umbrella. The strategic vision of these states has been one of defence and deterrence. Cautious moves have been made in recent years to draw Yemen into the organization. The modern state of Iraq emerged first as a Hashemite Kingdom in the 1920s and later as a republic by military coup in 1958. On its northerly flank the Arabian Peninsula had been left with an area predisposed to the enticements of Arab Nationalism and other ‘leftist’ conceptions, and later for associations and alliances based on these. As Peterson put the matter in 1987:

“The real threat to the Arab littoral came not from potential invasion but from the ideology of radical Arab nationalism, with (Ba’athist) Iraq (after revolutions in 1958, 1963 and 1968) serving as a source of worry. As long as the British remained in the Gulf, the Arab monarchies seemed to have little reason to fear external threats. The Gulf states and regimes have found generalist political conceptions in the Arab World menacing to the relative passive ideological coherence of the Gulf – its open economy, regime stability and its socially conservative character. Iraq’s later hegemonic pretensions in the Gulf have been dissipated by futile conflict and lost wars, notably against Iran through the 1980s and a failed campaign of invasion and occupation by Iraq for absorption of Kuwait in 1990-1991. A general confrontational and aggressive stance in the region and uncertainties about Saddam Hussein’s weapons development programs led to an attack



and occupation of Iraq by international forces in 2003. Later in this decade Iraq has been undergoing processes of sovereign political and economic restoration.”<sup>14</sup>

### **Iran**

“In the identification of the strategic and security configuration of Iran is a core element. The modern state of Iran emerged first from the installation of Reza Shah Pahlavi as ruler in 1925 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) as a result of revolution.”<sup>15</sup> Iran has cultural identities that distinguish it from its Arab neighbours. A basic shared Islamic identity is aggravated by a Sunni-Shia sectarian divide which resonates hostilities across the Gulf and domestically among the Gulf states. The historic effect has been to create a cultural, political and security fault-lines between Iran and the Arabian side of the Gulf. Since the fall of Iraq in 2003 an effective Iran-Saudi Arabia bipolar situation has risen and Iran has been widely perceived as the principal element of threat in the security complexity of the Gulf. Iran with its national interests and ambitions in the Gulf presents itself as a strategic and security interface with the Gulf States. Iran also presents a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminence. The tri-polarity of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq is a core defining factor in the security complexity of the Gulf.

### **Cold War**

The Cold War ended in 1989 and lifted the Soviet ‘arc of crises’. The menace of Iraq’s links with the Soviets was removed. The nearest implant of communism or rather Marxist influence was in South Yemen. The Cold War was not otherwise territorially active within the Gulf, but was prosecuted ideologically and diplomatically. What menaced the Gulf most were happenings internal and particular to the area. “The 1970s and 1980s were a time of considerable disturbance within the Gulf.”<sup>16</sup> The Gulf was subjected to a proliferation in its neighbourhood of military coups and revolutions, leaders and regimes producing soldier-politicians frequently of leftist and secular authoritarian leaning. The revolution that was to exercise the Gulf States, occurred in Iran in 1979. The ‘Islamic Revolution’ was trumpeted as exportable. From the end of the Cold War the Gulf states

<sup>14</sup> Mahan Abedin, Op. Cit.

<sup>15</sup><http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/09/13/iran-ranks-69th-out-of-139-in-global-competitiveness-world-economic-forum/>.

<sup>16</sup>Valbjorn Morten and Andre Bank, “Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi’i Divide”. Middle East Report 242. 37 (1), (2007).

have been led to be more introspective about their several and collective affairs and attentive to the distribution of power at their own level and so to their security. The Gulf politics have turned on local and regional issues and events. These were pragmatic and opportunistic more than ideologically informed, as this was shown in the founding Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council of 1981.

### **The United States**

The United States, nonetheless, has been building an increasing strategic interest and presence in the Gulf. Subversive rather than directly combative was the general mode of influence of external Cold War conflict and intervention. To counter Iran's revolutionary influence in the Gulf after 1979, American military presence around the Gulf was so firmly implanted that it was to be a principal actor in the maintenance of stability in the Gulf. How successful it has been in this, or how much a factor in instability in the Gulf will be debated in ensuing chapters of research project Events over the last quarter of the twentieth century have created in the Gulf a scene of reciprocal deterrent and combative securitising activity, notably between the three polar powers.

### **1.7 The Prevailing Gulf's Security Paradigm**

Main factors that affect the security paradigm in the region specifically revolve around its boundary disputes and conflicts arising due to mistrust, political instability and inevitable social transformations, further disturb the economic landscape of the region which invite great powers influence.

“The political developments of the region had indirectly lagged behind the socio-economic progress of the region. Such intensive and realistic changes have invited dictatorships to grip the process of decision-making into their favour by incorporating feudal approach towards their people”.<sup>17</sup> Keeping in view the deteriorating situation in the region, we can easily observe the “uncontrolled flow of migrants to many smaller Gulf States where the native population is decreasing and becoming minorities.”<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>Gregory F. Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1994, p. 75.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

The succession issues further highlight the regional demography as a challenge to its international importance such as issues like Kurd movement and its alliance within regional countries like Iran and Syria had a different face of problems. The region is in state of uncertainty and the changing scenarios need consideration on immediate basis. If such a situation in-terms of “political instability, economic vulnerability, and strategic manoeuvrability prevails; then the role of international actors would further penetrate deep into the veins of strategic rivalries.”<sup>19</sup>

“The conventional regional rivalry between Iran and Iraq on the concept of regional imperialism under the pan Islamism and pan Arabism banners divided the region into two different blocs on a permanent bases.”<sup>20</sup> Because of such rivalry, tendency among two leading military powers throughout in the eighties had affected “Turkey, Yemen and Israel who changed their foreign policies to counter such an enormous threat coming towards them.”<sup>21</sup> It erupted visible and invisible differences and political disputes among them. One of the important developments in-terms of insecurity was fresh competition in-context of arms race. “Almost every state in the region started securing its political and strategic interests by jumping into the wells of armaments by providing long-lasting opportunity to great powers that started feeding their security requirements by providing them the military equipment.”<sup>22</sup>

The economic interest of the great powers in-terms of their vast oil resources had converted by making these states parasites to their military superiority. Gulf State’s military ventures minimized their independent decision-making by increasing the influence of international actors towards regional security mechanisms. Among all international actors, the United States of America is the most dominating player that has improved its energy relations with gulf states and informally materialized its security pacts with in the region. “Such an arrangement has made the US as one of the most influential partner against the emerging blocs like Iran is being snubbed on regular bases

<sup>19</sup> For more details please see, Main Factors Affecting Gulf, <http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1600380-main-factors-affecting-gulf-security/#ixzz1IU5YU2Wa>, Accessed March 20, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Kuniholm Bruce R., “Retrospect and Prospects: Forty Years of US Middle East Policy,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter 1987), p. 35.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>22</sup> Lake Anthony, “Confronting Backlash States,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2, (March/April 1994), p. 47.

by the US to satisfy its regional allies. That is why until today the country is changing Gulf regimes for its own strategic benefits and to achieve Washington's future strategic priorities."<sup>23</sup>

### 1.8 Defining Stability-Instability Paradox in the Gulf Region

Although, the contemporary phase of international politics and its economic reflections have been crafted by international events such as 9/11 that had particularly changed the dynamics of the Gulf region. However, Gulf region due to its demography, is one of the most engaged and prominent area of great power's competitions not only to feed their economic needs but strategic interests where oil plays an important role in managing all affairs of the region. "The absorption of oil resources by the world powers that Gulf is known for, also helped the regional monarchies to prolong their rule mainly because of foreign reliance on them for their interests."<sup>24</sup> Gulf is prominent location for the world's most attractive strategic resource. Is a Bay Port where the world's largest oil, and also gas resources are concentrated, resulting in the world's major centers of extraction, processing and transport of oil resources. Energy experts and economic analysts had concentrated on the future role of oil in fulfilling the demands of major energy consumers as a main resource of strategic gambling, whereas the political pundits had sketched great game scenarios involving religion and culture of the main monarchies as threats to international order. Furthermore, due to instability, if the West becomes unsuccessful in meeting its oil specific energy needs from the region; countries from the Asian continent would also become vulnerable, who require huge resources to feed their economic needs and are also dependent on the Gulf region.


Such demand and supply gap will further create an energy risk for great powers that at the moment do not focus on alternative sources of energy. Gulf region and its resourceful importance will shape the future of international relations along with the great powers rivalries. In simple words, the oil-strategic-resource nature of the Gulf region had influenced the political thinking and strategic planning of the USA and other powers,

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>24</sup>United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names, Op. cit.

which had influenced, controlled, and affected the political, economic, and strategic dimensions of the area.

The gulf stability is not only defined by a number of different policy issues; energy security, terrorism, weapons proliferation, border disputes etc., but is also determined by several regional and international actors from the region itself (the six GCC states, Iran, Iraq and Yemen), to the immediate neighbourhood (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Syria, Turkey, Israel) to rest of the world (USA, Europe, Russia, China and Japan). Furthermore, the Iranian nuclear standoff and security situation in Iraq, Bahrain's recent political instability, Saudi Arabia's soft revolution and the presence of the United State's CENTCOM Headquarters and Extra Regional Forces in the gulf will have far reaching implications on the region for a foreseeable future. Pakistan has stakes in the stability in the Gulf, therefore, the evolving situation will have an impact on Pakistan.



The post 9/11 international order is affecting the gulf in many ways. The mechanism of Collective Security by GCC countries, the presence of Extra Regional Forces in the Gulf, the interests of great and regional powers, mature political institutions of gulf countries are providing stability to the region. However, this stability is paradoxical as it contains potential instability as the competing often conflicting interests of great powers like USA, Russia and China and regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia, vulnerable political institutions in the backdrop of evolving Arab Spring with simmering effects in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the public discontentment with presence of foreign forces in the region and looming crisis over Iran's nuclear programme are potential destabilising factors. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pointed out the same fact while saying that, "The presence of foreign forces is creating instability in the Gulf Region".<sup>25</sup>

## 1.9 Hypothesis

The purpose of this research project will be completed through testing following hypotheses:-

**H 1.** The stability regime established in the Gulf Region in post 9/11 International Order is unstable with serious implications on Pakistan.

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<sup>25</sup>NejadAhmedi, Iranian President's Statement on Military Parade on 17 April 2013.

**H 2.** After 9/11 the emerging political order in the Gulf region is stable and without serious implications on Pakistan.

### 1.10 Scope of the Study

The focus of research will be post 9/11 international order, its impacts on the Gulf Region and the implications of Stability and Instability in the Gulf on Pakistan. The research project is an effort to understand the historical discourse of the regional rivalries and to predict the future scenario that will have implications on the prevailing landscape of the Gulf region. “Global and regional power political syndrome have made the Gulf region an important hot spot for the rest of the world, particularly energy hungry countries. So, at this stage of time, this research would be highly beneficial to strategic, political and economic stakeholders to better drive and formulate their policies to protect their national security objectives”.<sup>26</sup>

### 1.11 Research Questions

The analyses connected to Gulf security in post 9/11 International order, strategic, political and economic and security dimensions will be investigated through an academic approach that addresses the following questions:

1. How the international order in the contemporary Gulf is shaping its domestic, regional, and international environment making it relevant for the great power politics?
2. How the concept of Collective Security (under GCC Peninsula Shield Force) and competing interests of regional powers are shaping the security environment of the Gulf region?
3. What is the political structure and system of governance of Gulf countries, their vulnerabilities with reference to evolving Arab Spring and how it shapes the security environment in the region?

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<sup>26</sup>Yaphe Judith S., “Challenges to Gulf Security: How Should the United States Respond?,” *Strategic Forum No.* 237 (November 2008) p. 5.

4. What are the potential implications of nuclearization in the Gulf and how it will shape the future security environment of the Gulf Region?
5. How historical and contemporary Arab and Non-Arab (Ajam) concept is shaping the Gulf Security Paradigm?
6. What will be the potential implications of stability and instability of Gulf region on Pakistan?

### 1.12 Theoretical Framework

The research project will be viewed from the lens of Power. The concept of Power Beyond State (IR-Realism) and the concept of Power within State (Political Science-Three Dimensions of Power). No one theory deals with both dimensions of power concurrently, therefore, the scholar has proposed a new theory by joining both the aspects of Power. The proposed theory is “Stability-Instability Regime Theory”. The academic description of above referred theory is explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### **Explanation and Relevance of the Stability-Instability Regime Theory (SIRT)<sup>27</sup>**

The concepts of stability and instability are much elaborated under the mainstream connotations of real politics particularly the security paradox. It is important to mention here that the researcher is not willing to incorporate the conceptual understanding of the stability-instability paradox traditionally used in security politics with balance of power phenomenon; whereas, he proposes a fresh idea to deal with complex issues of political science where a state deals its domestic affairs under the umbrella of ‘power’. “Power, as an issue of internal politics within a state has been explained by Steven Lukes in 1947. In his book entitled *Power: A Radical View*, he provides three approaches to the concept of power with relevance to issues pertaining to a state? These approaches to power include one-dimensional behaviourist view pioneered by Robert Dahl (1957, 1958, 1961), a slightly more critical two-dimensional view championed by Peter Bachrach and Morton

<sup>27</sup>The theory is based on author’s own illustrations and understanding about the contemporary political issues pertaining to modern nation states. He has proposed the ‘stability-instability regime theory’ to deal with issues of domestic politics and its direct influence on international politics. For the relevance of this research project, the theory has incorporated limited connotations and explanations particular in-context to Gulf regional and international politics and implications for Pakistan; whereas, the theory has its global interpretation and relevance.

S. Baratz (1970) and Lukes' own three-dimensional view, which criticizes the behavioural focus of the first two dimensions".<sup>28</sup>

The matter of the fact is that Bachrach, Baratz and Lukes, despite different emphases, are all subjectivists and concentrate on interrelationships to the exclusion of other aspects of power that the researcher in his research does not see relevant keeping in view the contemporary international political environment. The key question in researcher's view for all three proponents of classic concept of power is the study of power 'in' society rather than power 'over' or 'beyond' society. They, in researcher's view, want to know who governs society, whether it is an elite or competing leadership groups, and how stable such groupings are. What they have been debating is whether there is an interpersonal relation between the different moments of power in society; According to Therborn, there is a cohesive elite which unites the different exercises of power by making the decisions in different areas. The missing link here in researchers' findings suggest that the concept of power discussed earlier should explain the intra-state affairs of power politics. To connect such a cleavage with international affairs of security and strategic politics, researchers see 'realism theory' the only string dealing with such complex challenges of contemporary affairs.

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~~"Realists are the power theorists in IR. When realists talk of power, what they really mean a military power, the ability of the state to achieve its objectives and ensure its survival because it has the military capability to do so. Clearly, power is not evenly distributed and states will be involved in an ongoing competition for greater power. Pecking orders are established and either accepted or contested based on power distribution. States are 'powerful to the extent that they affect others more than others affect them'. Realists expect the states to behave in certain ways based on their interpretation of human nature, which Hans Morgenthau, describes as 'the desire to live,~~

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<sup>28</sup> For more details please see Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (1947)

to propagate, and to dominate'. Powerful states in such thinking are obliged to act in such a way that maximizes their power and prevents challenges emerging.”<sup>29</sup>

“If we return for a moment to Lukes’ three dimensions of power, that a realist understanding of power in its various classical, defensive and offensive structural guises lies within the approach adopted by Robert Dahl: power and security maximization both involve state A persuading state B to do what it would not otherwise do. The extent to which it is successful in doing so indicates the power that the state has within the international system. We can know this takes place based upon our observation of behaviour of political actors.”<sup>30</sup>

Realists argue that there are fundamental differences between hierarchical domestic politics, where the state imposes order on its citizens, and anarchical international politics, where there is survival of the fittest or most powerful. As a result, realists argue that domestic and international politics need to be considered independently. Realists are largely unconcerned with politics at the domestic level, considering that they have little bearing on decisions taken at the international level. Given the dominance of realism in IR in the post-war era, we can perhaps also understand why within IR it sees itself as distinct from the remit of Political Science

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Through connecting both domains of powers (within society and beyond), the researcher proposes a new dimension of theoretical approach under ‘stability-instability regime theory’. In his view, the political science connotation of power and international relations mainstream theory of power politics (realism) would altogether form a new approach. The fundamental assumptions of the proposed theoretical lense would explain the Gulf political, security and strategic dimensions through a reliable explanations by identifying variables of possible influence. To create a relevance of the stability-instability regime theory, it is important to first highlight the basic assumption that researcher extract from dimensions of power from political science and theory of realism from international relations.

<sup>29</sup>Waltz Kenneth N., Robert J. Art, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman& Littlefield, 2004, p. 136.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 137.

**Assumptions:** “States (Gulf) having weak or mature internal political institutions with divergent interest vis-à-vis dominant international actors will be vulnerable and may face challenges to their national security within state and in the region”.<sup>31</sup> The theory considers the internal system of a state (whether it is weak or mature) as a ‘single most rational variable’ for its politics. Therefore the decisions taken by the state have to be based on its professed ‘interests’ which are being crafted through the mainstream political process. In this backdrop, ‘survival’, which is an international relations phenomenon dealt under the umbrella of realism in an anarchical international system becomes a vital formative factor in state’s struggle for assuming power. It can therefore be concluded that every political leader has to make all out efforts to ensure that his country’s interests will best be served under any circumstances; conditional to internal political system if it is controlled and working in line with elitist version of national interest. The fundamental question arises that whether the theory of realism deal with the complexities of domestic politics within a state? The answer obviously is ‘NO’. The theory of realism considers a state as main international actor for power politics but does not pay much attention towards the internal political order neither its configuration.

To solve such a puzzle, the author strongly believes the core concepts of political science dealing the concept of ‘power’ and state as the main actor of international politics under ‘realism’ should be merged together. To materialize such a theoretical approach, he proposes ‘stability-instability regime theory’. The formative conceptions of the theory would highlight the assumptions that weak or a strong internal political process is conditional to the successful orientation of state’s national interest. A weak political system of a state may compromise its sovereignty in international politics; whereas, the strong political system within a state will make the country more confident to achieve national security objectives.

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<sup>31</sup>The scenario would be made available in-context to each country discussed in the thesis under different chapters- For instance, Saudi Arabia with mature political system and international convergence is relevant to international politics. At the same time Iran with mature political system and international divergences is facing challenges while dealing at international level. The matter of the fact is that countries even with mature political system along with converged interests at international system are still vulnerable to serious challenges. The only key to help them sustain and find international endorsement to their political system is transformative attitude that is visible in Saudi Arabia-opening women’s participation in the legislation)

Countries of weak political system with strong strategic interests in their regions find regular backlash because of great power politics, who enjoy strong political institutions back at home. Here the ‘Stability Instability Regime Theory’ applies its fundamental assumptions that countries with strong political institutions are playing their cards better as compared to those who experience weak political institutions. According to researcher’s observation, it is inevitable for a state even with strong political institutions to confront great power interest in its country and strategic politics in the region. But the opportunity for a state with strong political institution arises to bargain its national interest better as compared to a state with weak political institutions. Furthermore, this altogether provides an opportunity to a state to introduce transformation in the country that makes the internal system more acceptable to external actors. In reversal to such an approach, those states who think not to transform their system keeping in view the great power pressure are prone to instability and anarchy.

Here the inter-state dealings and insecurity also play an important role in the greater stability or instability. The prevailing regimes in different countries of the region are potential variables of stability or instability, altogether. Trust is not in the set of choices of inter-states dealings. Every leader tends to believe that only interests are constant and everything else is temporal.

“In the Gulf region, mistrust and misgivings prevail as overriding factors in the interstate relations. Some past evidences explain that even with a wider regional dub for cooperation and discourse, the thought of territorial conquest, exchanges of politically detrimental propaganda, militarization and mistrust on the real intention of every country’s policies continue to dictate in many political, security and economic agenda in the Gulf States. In the beginning of 1980s, Iraq waged war on Iran and in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In addition, since the revolution in Iran in 1979, the littoral Arab countries started to keep distance from Iran due to conflicting views on regional security paradigm. The above situation along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions have worsened the security matrix in the Gulf. The Arab Gulf leaders perceive that Iran in its current form of political dispensation cannot be perceived as the reliable partner. For GCC members,

furthering relations with the United States can be more valuable in economic gains and security umbrella than to trust Iran.”<sup>32</sup>

Besides, Iran is considered as regional power of the gulf. With a strong army, big demographic potential and huge energy reserves, littoral Arab states cannot help but to seek security protection from the United States to counter what they perceived as the biggest “threat” coming from Iran. The perception which has been triggered by the failure to determine the real intentions of Iran as a nuclear state. “The United States with its perceived interests of Energy Security is heading the international coalition by physical presence in the Gulf radiating threats to Iran, thus having potentials of destabilizing the region due to their geo-politics relating to capture of resources under the concept of energy scarcities.”<sup>33</sup>

Such a situation provides an inevitable strategic vulnerabilities to the region which is directly or indirectly connected with Gulf’s economic, political, and strategic dimensions. This makes the international relations of Gulf region more complex and unpredictable. Among those regions that directly or indirectly achieve their economic, political, and strategic strength from the Gulf are South Asia, Middle East, and Central Asia. The most important strategic alliance that would be affected under stability-instability regime theory predicts a close strategic overview for Pakistan. Pakistan is a country of strategic importance that still has relevance for regions of Muslim population regardless of their political configurations. To summarize such a critical phase of international relations particularly to identify the theoretical mechanism, stability-instability regime theory would be applied with concepts of realism to interpret security, political, economic, and strategic dimensions of Gulf security along with its relevance to the contemporary international politics of Pakistan. Although, “there is a vast theoretical support available that directly or informally explains the kind of challenges the Gulf region is facing.”<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Jones Toby, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report 237, 35 (4), (2005)

<sup>33</sup>Hussain Mohammad Samir & AbbasabadiShahriar, “U.S. and Balance of Power Strategy in Persian Gulf Region” (1 Jan 2012), available at <http://www.iranreview.org/cms/classificationList.aspx?classification=860e2142-2d05-441a-a920-0375b4f9eb4e>, accessed on 4 March 2013.

<sup>34</sup>“Pakistan and Gulf Economist”, <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/>, accessed on 24 Dec 2012.

Many prominent scholars and academic community in general have tried to use a theoretical framework to interpret the regional developments by applying one or a combination of theoretical lenses. Keeping in view the sensitivity of the regional affairs in the Gulf region and its relevance to great powers competition, a traditional power politics lens has been utilized to narrate the events and predict their future impacts on stability and instability regimes.

Stability Instability Regime Theory would become one of the reliable lens to deal with political science and international relations by emphasizing the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international system. Together they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest. Stability Instability Regime Theory stresses on domestic and international anarchy along with the interest of a state and its vulnerability to cooperate or confront with the prevailing system. Main proponents of realism like Thomas Hobbes, Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Thucydides; who altogether under 'classical and neo-realism' have discussed state reactions and international anarchy as the main pillars of international politics. But the Stability Instability Regime Theory discusses the issues of state power politics under the umbrella of its domestic political system.

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“Applying classical realist’s explanation such as Morgenthau on Gulf States behaviour towards international order, we could see that GCC states are now inherently antagonistic and obsessed with security and their territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing powers. This antagonistic build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma whereby increasing one's security may bring along even greater instability as an opposing power builds up its own arms in response (an arms race). Thus, security becomes a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made. Balance of power theory suggests that states in anarchy tend to balance rather than bandwagon. States seek to increase their power; they seek to decrease the power of their enemies.”<sup>35</sup>

Considering the Stability Instability Regime Theory explanations as the most suitable paradigm in analysing the Gulf security, economic, and political environment; the

<sup>35</sup>Waltz Kenneth N., Robert J. Art, Ibid, p. 148.

researcher can easily depict international affairs of the region as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. "Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry. Here the researcher finds a unique opportunity to bring the Cold War rivalry of Russia the then Soviet Union and USA in the Gulf region by changing the bi-polar realism to multi-polar realism where China and GCC countries also got strategic impetus contradicting the interests of traditional Cold War competitors."<sup>36</sup>

The political developments of the region had indirectly lagged behind the socio-economic progress of the region. Such intensive and realistic changes have invited dictatorships to grip the process of decision-making into their favour by incorporating feudal approach towards their people. Keeping in view the dwindling situation in the region, we can predict that the Pakistani diaspora working in many Gulf States may be compelled to migrate thus adding to complexities of problems for the country.

"The succession issues further highlight the regional demography as a challenge to its international importance such as issues like Kurd movement and its alliance within regional countries like Iran and Syria had a different face of problems. The region is in state of uncertainty and the changing scenarios on day to day bases need consideration on immediate basis. If such a situation in-terms of political instability, economic vulnerability, and strategic manoeuvrability prevails; then the role of international actors would further penetrate deep into the veins of strategic rivalries."<sup>37</sup>

The conventional regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the concept of regional imperialism under the pan Islamism and pan Arabism banners has divided the region into two different blocs on a permanent bases. Because of such rival tendencies among two leading military powers could potentially destabilise the region due to power

<sup>36</sup>Walt Stephen M., "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985).

<sup>37</sup>Hegghammer Thomas, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia". International Affairs', 84 (4), (2008). Retrieved from [http://hegghammer.com/\\_files/Hegghammer-Islamist\\_violence\\_and\\_regime\\_stability\\_in\\_Saudi\\_Arabia.pdf](http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer-Islamist_violence_and_regime_stability_in_Saudi_Arabia.pdf), (accessed 12 Jan 2013).

politics by changing their foreign policies to counter threats coming towards them. It erupts visible and invisible differences and political disputes among them. One of the important development in-terms of insecurity got fresh competition in-context to arms race. Almost every state in the region has started securing its political and strategic interest by indulging into arms race under the security umbrella of great powers. However, in doing this they disregard what Waltz opines “power is simply a means to the greater end of achieving security for the state. Indeed, power maximization might be counterproductive by persuading other states to join forces to counterbalance against the power maximizing state”.

The economic interest of the great powers in-terms of region’s vast oil resources has converted Gulf States as parasites on their military muscle making them subordinate to their policies. Gulf States’ military dependence has minimized their independent decision-making by increasing the influence of international actors towards regional security mechanisms. Among all international actors, “the United States of America is the most dominating actor in the Gulf region that has improved its energy security by physical presence in the region and security pacts with the Gulf States. Such an arrangement has made the US one of the most influential partner against the emerging blocs in the Gulf region and states like Iran is being snubbed on regular basis to satisfy its regional allies. That is why until today the country is maintaining Gulf regimes political postures for its own strategic benefits under the realm of stability-instability regime theory.”<sup>38</sup>

Keeping the pace of changing democratic versus authoritarian shift in the local affairs, the researcher focused on the key assessment of the strategic importance of the Gulf region with reference to the interests of regional and global players. Waltz argues that “anarchy creates an international environment in which each state has to protect its own interests and seek to maximize its own security”. Efforts, have been made on the current political system of the Gulf countries and potential changes along with prevailing security framework in the region to validate stability-instability regime theory.

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<sup>38</sup>Noland Marcus and Howard Pack, “Arab Economies in a Changing World”, Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, (2007).

The diagrammatic explanation of the Stability Instability Regime Theory is at annexure A.

### 1.13 Research Methodology

Research questions have been addressed under the Stability Instability Regime Theory. The identified literature review and theoretical framework has provided enough help to answer much of the written questions. Efforts have also been made to explain contemporary international dimensions of Gulf area politics, economics and strategy and its implications on Pakistan by applying available means of research to reach final conclusions and recommendations. Both Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods have been used in the conduct of research by applying Case Study and descriptive research design for analysing the data. Available data in the form of Books, literature, articles, official statements and documents and transcripts etc. has been analysed to validate Research Questions and complete the research project.

**Variables-** Power within states and the Balance of Power

### 1.14 Division of Research into Chapters


Research Questions have been addressed under Stability Instability Regime theory relating to weak political institutions and influence of international relations under the concept of realism. The project begins with introduction of the topic, Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework. Chapter 2 contains Literature Review identifying gaps in the literature on account of Stability and Instability in the Region. To set the stage of investigation, the analytical view of the pre and post 9/11 international order has been examined in Chapter 3. The global and regional power's interests in the gulf and implications for stability of the region has been evaluated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 deals with the basic political, economic, and strategic interpretation of the Gulf region; the evolving Arab Spring and its implications on stability in the Gulf. Chapter 6 deals with the Arab and Non-Arab (Ajam) friction from historical to contemporary times. The impact of this friction upon internal dynamics of the Gulf has been explained at length in this chapter. The impact of Nuclearization of Gulf region with presence of Extra Regional

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Forces (ERF) and Iranian nuclear quest have been analysed in Chapter 7. And chapter 8 deals with the implications of Stability and Instability of the Gulf on Pakistan. Lastly, with the help of analysed research questions and predictive assessments and findings, the conclusions have been drawn to validate the Hypothesis 1. Suggestions in the form of recommendations have also been proffered in last part of the research project.



**Diagrammatic Representation of Proposed Theoretical Framework; Stability –Instability Regime Theory<sup>39</sup>**



<sup>39</sup>Contours of the theory have been explained earlier. This is diagrammatic representation of the same theory.

## CHAPTER NO. 2

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Map 1: The Gulf Region<sup>40</sup>

Gulf countries unstable and rapidly changing security environment. After the September 11 incident, the 2003 war in Iraq and the recent focus on Iran's nuclear program, the challenges of security issues in the Gulf region with special emphasis on the strategic interests of the regional and global players have propped up. Threat environment may have a growing number of definitions; hegemonic behavior from the potential global country / regional power to domestic unrest and instability simmering in neighboring countries, radical transnational threats to name a few. Gulf rulers have to respond to these different vulnerabilities with traditional defensive measures, military modernization, and

<sup>40</sup>[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab\\_states\\_of\\_the\\_Persian\\_Gulf](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_states_of_the_Persian_Gulf), accessed on 23 Jul 2013.

external support and, in some cases, renewed commitments to political and economic reform.

The political dynamics of the Gulf Security are dominated by issues of traditions, monarchy, democratisation, Sunni-Shite divide and Iran-Arab competition. The political outlook of Gulf region (barring Iran and Iraq) is stereotyped as archaic exception amidst the varying flow of democracy and modernity. Greg Nonneman argues that there have been two equally 'exceptionalist' approaches to the question of democracy or the political dispensation in the Arab monarchical polities of the Gulf. The first painted these polities as anachronism stuck in traditional authoritarian absolutism or oligarchy. The second stressed their traditional nature, interpreting them as reflecting the traditional Arabian features and values of egalitarianism, personal access, and 'desert democracy', with majlises as the functional equivalent of the participatory channels. "The current state structures and increasing complexity of society, economy and governing apparatus has turned the regional countries into 'neo-traditionalist systems that are in different stages of reform."<sup>41</sup> The internal political dispensation reflects on the external political dynamics of the inter-state relations, which are patronizing towards Arab states and marked by suspicion towards Iran and Iraq.

Gulf State's responses to the territorially bounded issues of Iraq and Iran and the ideational challenge of transnational terrorism illustrate their awareness of the linkages between internal and external security. Valbjorn and Bank identify these interconnections to have been magnified by the explosion of Arab satellite television channels and internet websites, which have accelerated the spread of transnational linkages while contributing to the creation of an Arab 'imagined community'.<sup>42</sup> The gradual erosion of regime's control over the flow of information to individuals and groups within their countries and communities directly links their internal security to these external insecurities which cannot be isolated or contained within national boundaries. Accordingly, regimes have construed these issues more as threats to their political and popular legitimacy than to

<sup>41</sup>Nonneman Greg, "Political Reform in Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to Democratization? A comparative Perspective", in *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*, eds. Anoiushervan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), 4. [www.ithacapress.co.uk](http://www.ithacapress.co.uk), accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>42</sup>Valbjorn Morten and Andre Bank, "Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi'i Divide". *Middle East Report* 242. 37 (1), (2007): p. 9.

their material security, which has guided their formulation of policy to meet the challenges.

The continuing lack of internal political consensus within the GCC itself is considered a big challenge. The GCC was established in 1981 as a political and security bulwark against revolutionary Iran. Ahmed Abdul Kareem Saif, the leading expert on political issues in the Gulf argues that “lingering intra-regional disputes and fears of Saudi hegemony on the part of the smaller member states have hampered progress towards security cooperation, which has lagged behind economic integration. Qatar, for example, accuses Saudi Arabia of instigating two coup attempts against its emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, in 1996 and 2005.”<sup>43</sup> In addition, as per Kaye and Wehrey, “the six member states have been unable to agree on the nature and extent of the threats posed by Iran and Yemen, thereby making it virtually impossible to adopt a regional approach to these issues.”<sup>44</sup> Most significantly, each member state has also been integrated into the US security umbrella on a bilateral basis. This strategic reality is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and complicates any moves towards regional security cooperation. A number of hawkish Jewish historians like Shmuel Bar indicate that “enhanced Iranian ability to compel the neighbouring Gulf to accede to its political/regional ambitions can further destabilize the Gulf region and by implication U.S. will be required to continue its active presence and provide a security umbrella.”<sup>45</sup>

Apart from identity politics and politics of imagined community, the Gulf security is also viewed as politics of religion; the so-called ‘Shite Crescent’ theory impinging on Gulf Security has been at the back of strategic decisions by Gulf regional leaders. Regional policy makers believe that the security threat from Iraq has not disappeared, and the problem of integrating Iraq into the regional fold remains unresolved. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, regional and international discourse on Iraq has been dominated by analysis of its geopolitical and strategic implications on the region. The

<sup>43</sup>Saif Ahmed Abdelkareem, “Deconstructing Before Building: Perspectives on Democracy in Qatar”, in *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*, ed(s). A. Ehteshami and S. Wright, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008).p. 105. [www.ithacapress.co.uk](http://www.ithacapress.co.uk), accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>44</sup>Kaye Dassa, F. M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours”. *Survival*, 49 (2), (2007): 111

<sup>45</sup>Bar Shmuel, *Can Israel live with a Nuclear Iran?*,

[http://www.fora.tv/2013/01/16/Israel\\_Can\\_With\\_a\\_Nuclear\\_Iran?utm\\_source=Outbrain](http://www.fora.tv/2013/01/16/Israel_Can_With_a_Nuclear_Iran?utm_source=Outbrain), (accessed 31 Jan 2013)

prominent literature by Lowe, Spencer, Yamani, Carpenter, dealing with the impact of changing Iraqi situation on the regional balance of power in Gulf <sup>46</sup> emphasises the importance of stability of Iraq. The Gulf neighbourhood appears not to be at peace with the current democratic dispensation in Iraq.

In 2006, the leading American academic Vali Nasr has given a penetrating account of the Arab upheaval in the post Iraq invasion phase and a theory of Shia revival and its impact on Gulf, which has direct implications on the Gulf. He argues that “many in the West may witness the revival of Shiism, and the ensuing Sunni-Shia conflict and competition for power within Islam. “This competition will shape the future of the M.E., and West has no choice of partners.”<sup>47</sup> This theory fits neatly into the narrative of Iraqi leadership.

“Conspiracies has a profound impact on political thinking and strategic culture and life in the Middle East. Credulity in conspiracy theories cause Arabs and Iranians to believe in what is not true. Acting on these beliefs then alters the course of events. Ironically, fears of conspiracy also directly leads to proliferation of actual conspiracies. In the aggregate, “the paranoid mentality creates a suspiciousness that impedes modernisation in the Middle East and Gulf.”<sup>48</sup>

Jamal S. Alsawaidi, considers Iran as the linchpin of western strategy during much of the cold war, and it will continue to play a pivotal role in Gulf Affairs by virtue of its geography, population, size, ideology and regional leadership ambitions. Regional and central concerns over Iran’s bid to appear a paragon of socio-political development to neighbouring countries in particular the Gulf, frequently define the analytical prism through which Iranian foreign policy is interpreted. Yet the complexity of Iranian political socialisation, Tehran’s recalcitrant position towards Arab neighbours and the West, and its oscillating policies and enigmatic power structure together complicates the formulation of simple explanations. Instead, “scholarly inquiry into Iran’s decision making apparatus, its policy formulation process, the gravity of its policies, past and

<sup>46</sup>Lowe, R., and C. Spencer, “Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises”. *Chatham House Report*, (2006)

<sup>47</sup>Nasr Vali, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006

<sup>48</sup>Pipes Daniel, *The Hidden Hand, Middle East fears of Conspiracy*, Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 13

present, and what they may portend for the future, must proceed carefully and with tampered ambition. “<sup>49</sup>

Mehdi Noor Baksh examines the precepts that underpin the symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. What role Islam should assume in shaping political institutions and governance of state emerge as a central issue in the wake of 1979 revolution. Several orientations prevailed under the rubric of Islamic revivalism that capture a reformist and populist element. Noor Baskh ruminates how the forces of reformist Islam and puritanical Islam supported by populism in their struggle for power, entered the debate over religion and politics.”<sup>50</sup>

“The Gulf State’s political thinking is dominated by the ideational and military challenge’s from Iran. The potency of the ‘Shite crescent’ discourse underscores the complex nature of political, economic and historical interconnections which criss-cross the Gulf and influence the different ways in which individual GCC states view their relationship with Iran. Most of the literature on political nature of Gulf points to this fact whereas the U.S. depicts Iran as a strategic rival and military threat to its interests in the Gulf, and ME, ruling elites in the Gulf states focus more on the ideational and political threats emanating from Tehran.”<sup>51</sup>

The existing literature supports the assertion that this perception of Iranian threat is not totally unfounded and is based on legitimate concerns. “Iran has presented both material and ideational threats to its neighbours in the past. It maintained a longstanding claim on Bahrain until 1970 and periodically revives the issue, most recently in July 2007 and February 2009.” <sup>52</sup> “It has occupied three islands belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah (now part of the United Arab Emirates) since 1971.”<sup>53</sup> After 1979, Tehran also attempted to export its Islamic revolution to neighbouring states with large Shite populations as “Iranian agents were implicated in plots to destabilize internal security in

<sup>49</sup>Alsawaidi Jamal S., “Iran and the Gulf, A Search for Stability”, *Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research*, (1996)

<sup>50</sup>Ibid

<sup>51</sup>ChubinShahram, “Iran’s Power in Context”. *Survival*, 51 (1), (2009): 165

<sup>52</sup>Louis Wm. Roger, “The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967–71,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 31 (1), (2003), p. 98

<sup>53</sup>Stracke Nicole, “Where Is the UAE Islands Dispute Heading?” Gulf Research Centre, Dubai, 2008

Bahrain (1981), Saudi Arabia (1984) and Kuwait (1985, and again during the ‘tanker war’ of 1987–88).”<sup>54</sup>

The perceived ideational threat from Iran is compounded by the GCC state’s bilateral integration into the US security umbrella. This reliance on external protection is a continuation of a much older strategy of survival against regional competitors. However, it entangles the GCC states within the broader political and ideological conflicts between the U.S. and Iran. Successive US administrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution have refused to accept that Iran can play a positive role in any regional security system. Meanwhile Iran has consistently called for the exit of all foreign forces from the Gulf as the outcome of any such agreement. Such a twofold opposition of competing visions of regional security exposes the GCC to great risks should tensions between Iran and the international community over its nuclear programme escalate significantly. “The range and extent of GCC military ties with the U.S. renders their legality acutely susceptible to blowback from Iranian retaliatory strikes and enraged public opinion which would likely hold their regimes complicit in any such strike.”<sup>55</sup> This forms part of the broader ‘regimes–peoples’ division within Gulf states, “which became identifiable during Israel’s conflicts with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008–09.”<sup>56</sup>

Within the Gulf, the staunch public opposition to US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan and ties to Israel presents a range of ideational fault lines which Iran has already started to exploit in an effort to detach GCC states from the bellicose rhetoric emanating from Washington DC. The ideological threat posed by Iran to the internal security of GCC states became more acute when Tehran handed responsibility for defending the Gulf in the event of any attack to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. This decision was announced one day after a former Iranian consul-general to Dubai gave an interview to the Dubai-based Gulf News, claiming that Iran had maintained a network of sleeper cells in the GCC since 1979 which could be activated to destabilize on Tehran’s orders.

<sup>54</sup>F. Gregory Gause, *ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>55</sup>Anthony, J. D., J. F. Seznec, T. Ari and W. E. White, ‘War with Iran: Regional Reactions and Requirements’, *Middle East Policy*, 15 (3), 2008, p 4.

<sup>56</sup>Valbjorn and Bank, *ibid*, p. 3

Political evolution is by definition an incremental process, stretching over years and decades. The reforms initiated in the late 1990s and early 2000s have created some political space for new actors to emerge. Conditions-based enmeshment in layers of global governance through membership of organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the International Labour Organization is another factor in the opening up of the political economies of the GCC. “However, the partial political reforms have laid the foundations for longer-term conflicts over the locus of power and the direction of future change in Gulf polities, particularly between regimes and the Islamist opposition groups which have emerged as their primary challengers in the absence of formal political parties and ideologically based alternatives.”<sup>57</sup> This opens a potential test to regime legitimacy at a time of increasing socio-economic strains which will primarily affect youth who lack any understanding of pre-oil hardships and take for granted the current easy availability of wealth and public goods/services.


However, as per Homer-Dixon, a more intractable problem in several GCC states comes from the interaction of dwindling natural resources with unequal patterns of resource distribution. “The concentration of resources in one particular group while scarcities persist elsewhere has been a demonstrated source of civil strife in numerous instances.”<sup>58</sup> Three examples from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain illustrate how localized scarcities and uneven access to resources can lead to domestic tensions and instability between ethnic, tribal or sectarian groups within society.

As per Krause studies demonstrate the difficulties of states and societies containing numerous fault lines getting more susceptible to internal tensions and conflict. “Here the emphasis on ‘regime security’ becomes problematic as the issues of which group defines security, and for whom, become politicized and contested”.<sup>59</sup> This is evidenced by the controversy over the importing of Sunni families into Bahrain to staff the security and military services and its effect on Bahraini national security and human security issues.

<sup>57</sup>Daniel Brumberg, “Liberalization versus Autocracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform”. *Carnegie Paper 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. (2003)

<sup>58</sup>Dixon Thomas Homer, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, in M. E,” in *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*, ed(s) O. R. Cote, S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 269


<sup>59</sup>Krause Kenneth, “Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2 (3), (1996), p. 324



As described above, it is likely to lead to sense safety system, but exacerbate sectarian fault line of islands and erode the price relationship between the ruling elite and the wider community. The existing literature points at understanding the dynamic of Iran-Saudi Arabia intra –theological competition as the basis of political construct of the security of Gulf and the region at large. While the ideational challenge from Iran to Saudi Arabia is given due emphasis, the nature of that challenge in theological as well as political domain has not been delved into. The ideational challenge to Iranian clergy from the rest of the so-called Shite crescent and Hanafi and Wahabi school of thought has not been talked about much in the contemporary middle-eastern literature. Studies aim at identifying common ground between Iran and Arab Gulf States to bring stability to the region and reducing the interference of Global powers. However, there are no academic studies on how the divide can be bridged. How these political and religious fault lines are being manipulated by external actors to suit their interests? Can there ever be compromise between Sunni and Shia schools of thought and how can the impact of Extreme Wahabism and Shism be watered down? These key subjects have not been addressed by any of the analysts.

There are newer dynamics at play in the domain of political and human security, and what will be the impact of growing emancipation of women on society and politics – this sensitive issue remains unanswered. The impact of social media and Aljazeera on the political awareness of the societies at large in the youth in particular – no profound study on the future outcomes for political stability in the Gulf has been undertaken. The longevity and political relevance of monarchies in the future political dispensation – the analysts remain wary and cautious of the current trends and cannot really envision a peaceful transition to a more democratic Gulf. No empirical or analytical verdict on future of Gulf monarchies and political systems has been given. The sheikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula date back hundreds of years, but with the notable exception of Oman, they only emerged as modern states in the 20th century. There is common consensus among the academics over the historical context and strategic rationale of the political structures in place in the Gulf.

In view of Anthony H. Cordesman, heavy reliance on external guarantees and bilateral defence deals have greatly complicated the growth of any collective military framework



at the GCC level and have also resulted in each “GCC state having small standing armies and remaining reliant on Western suppliers for expensive weaponry operated largely by expatriate military personnel.”<sup>60</sup> As analysed in RAND study by Andrew Rathmell and Theodore Karasik, “Gulf security became linked to issues of political and economic legitimacy, and the emergence of new concepts of cooperative security was associated with a shift away from realist approaches predicated on zero-sum notion of national security”<sup>61</sup>. “No such comparative shift occurred in the Gulf, which since 1980 has experienced three major interstate wars based on balance of power considerations”<sup>62</sup>. The experience of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), the first Gulf war (1991) and the US-led invasion of Iraq (2003) underlined the imbalances and faults in a regional security system overly dependent on one outside powers and not inclusive of the two regional powers. “Radical extremism and transnational terrorism poses a different and profound ideational threat to regime legitimacy and internal security of the Gulf States. Security officials throughout the GCC notably were late in anticipating the rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula after 2002, but quickly realized that the organization’s publicized aim of forcing the withdrawal of Western forces and influence from the peninsula constituted an existential challenge to the legitimacy of the monarchies.”<sup>63</sup>

As per leading contemporary thinkers, “the information revolution and the creation of new forms of social space on the internet have eroded regime’s control over the flow of information and made it harder for them to isolate their societies from external influences.”<sup>64</sup> It may be noted that the simultaneous rise of satellite television, the Internet and email has enabled the “transnational organizations to spread their messages across state boundaries and appeal to a broad ‘imagined community’ of followers.”<sup>65</sup> The introduction of the Internet into Saudi Arabia early in 1999 “played a pivotal role in

<sup>60</sup>Cordesman Anthony H., “Security Cooperation in the Middle East”. *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (2007): [https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071029\\_final\\_mil\\_coop\\_in\\_me.pdf](https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071029_final_mil_coop_in_me.pdf)

<sup>61</sup>Rathmell Andrew, Karasik Andrew T., “A New Persian Gulf Security System”, *RAND Issue Paper* (2003): 2

<sup>62</sup>FurtigHenner, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy,” *Middle East Journal*, 61 (4), (2007): 627–40.

<sup>63</sup>Riedel Bruce, and B. Saab, “Al Qaeda’s Third Front: Saudi Arabia”. *Washington Quarterly*, 31 (2) (2008): p. 44

<sup>64</sup>Murphy Emma, “ICT and the Gulf Arab States: A Force for Democracy?” in A. Ehteshami and S. Wright (eds.), *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*. (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), p. 184

<sup>65</sup>Kaldor Mary, H. Anheier and M. Glasius, *Global Civil Society 2003*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 29

facilitating the spread of jihadist propaganda in the kingdom.”<sup>66</sup> Saudi security officials responded to this unprecedented ideational challenge by prioritizing “intellectual security and actively adopting cyber countermeasures in an effort to do battle with ‘deviant thoughts’ and turn the ICT weapon against their foes”.<sup>67</sup> Despite harsh and active Saudi counter-terror campaign, jihadist websites continue to survive, thrive and spread their messages and facilitate communications between different groups. “Terrorist finances have not been completely disrupted and remain a key enabler, particularly in Dubai, which is emerging as one of the new conduits for organized transnational criminal and terrorist networks.”<sup>68</sup>

Abd al-Jalil al-Marhoun, identifies seven central features of the existing security environment in the Gulf in his paper ‘Security in the Gulf Region: A Geopolitical Perspective’. First, absence of balance between regional powers; a relative strategic balance existed in the 1970s and 1980s, but disappeared with the end of the Second Gulf War, when the elimination of Iraq as a military power (which had theretofore been considered a counterbalance to Iran) was effectively achieved. Second, there are a number of historical disputes – some still looming – over water, borders, oil-rich areas and oil wells, and even fertile agricultural lands. There are also conflicts specific to sovereignty between Iran and Iraq, on the one hand, and among GCC countries, on the other. Despite the two countries having already delineated their borders, there is an ongoing border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. Some countries in the region have even built fences around their borders, a matter indicating the emergence of a new set of challenges which the region must face. Third, there exists an undeclared arms race between Iran and the GCC countries. Iraq has joined this rivalry in the past two years. Fourth, the US military presence in the region can be categorised as an advanced military presence, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The objective of such a presence is to stabilise and contain Iran’s influence. Fifth, cross-border violence is currently manifested

<sup>66</sup>Hegghammer Thomas, “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia”. *International Affairs*, 84 (4), (2008). [http://hegghammer.com/files/HegghammerIslamist\\_violence\\_and\\_regime\\_stability\\_in\\_Saudi\\_Arabia.pdf](http://hegghammer.com/files/HegghammerIslamist_violence_and_regime_stability_in_Saudi_Arabia.pdf), (accessed 12 Jan 2013)

<sup>67</sup>Ulrichsen Kristian, ‘Gulf security: changing internal and external dynamics’, *Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States*, May 2009  
<http://webfirstlive.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/Ulrichsen%20report%2012509.pdf>, accessed 28 Jan 2013

<sup>68</sup>Davidson Christopher M., *Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success*, London: Hurst & Co, 2008, p. 277

by groups dubbed as representing “political Islam”. Iraq – primarily– suffers from this phenomenon. In fact, “political Islam” in Iraq has dragged the entire country to the brink of civil war. Other countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, suffer from the same problem to varying degrees. Sixth, the absence of a collective security system; there is no collective umbrella that unites all eight countries of the Gulf region in tackling their common security problems. This indicates the lack of any mutual understanding or mechanisms that have the capacity to solve, contain, or prevent existing conflicts from escalating towards either further polarisation or armed confrontation. And lastly, there is a perpetual feeling of the imminence of war. The backdrop of this feature, is the Iranian nuclear issue and the effect it is having in intensifying tensions between Iran and both Israel and the West at large. He argues that the region has moved from a state of “no war, no peace” to a state of “looming war”. “The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 on 9 July 2010 has caused the possibility of a war in the Gulf to surge. It is possible that war will break out within a few months, rather than years. The catalyst igniting such a war could be “an exchange of fire during the inspection of an Iranian vessel, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Resolution 1929.”<sup>69</sup>

Last but perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Gulf and M.E. security is the Arab countries inability to integrate. The contemporary literature derides the notion of pan-Arab unity and identifies Arab disunity as a key feature of regional strategic interactions. Since the creation of the Arab State system, in the wake of colonisation of Arab lands, the rhetoric of pan-Arab unity has been the prevailing pretension in Arab politics. Yet, conflict and not cooperation, has been the hall mark of the highly competitive Arab State policies and interstate relations have been characterised more by divisive coalitions than by cooperative integration. As per BasamTibi “ideological and rhetorical Pan-Arabism ought to be buried once and for all, not for the sake of a further fragmentation of Arab politics, but rather, with the aim of establishing a stable Arab integration system based on

<sup>69</sup>Al-MarhounAbd al-Jalil, “Security in the Gulf Region, A Geopolitical perspective”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, [www.aljazeera.net/studies](http://www.aljazeera.net/studies), July 2010, (accessed 18 May 2013)

a democratic, non-ethnic and secular understanding of what it means to be Arab. Without this build up there can be neither a stable Gulf, nor real peace in the region.”<sup>70</sup>

Anthony H Cordesman’s authoritative and exhaustive account of the military dimension of Gulf Security indicates that for most of the modern era, “the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a “four cornered” balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf State. Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. “The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other.”<sup>71</sup>

“Two outside powers, Britain and the United States, have been the “fifth corner” in this security structure. Bahrian, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all host U.S. bases and power projection facilities and Oman has close ties with Britain. The United States, in particular, has effectively dominated the regional security structure whenever it chose to directly intervene. These interventions included aiding North Yemen against south Yemen, intervening in the Iran – Iraq War by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers in 1987-1988, leading the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-1991, and invading Iraq in 2003. In the process, “the United States has gone from being “over the horizon” to “constantly in sight.”<sup>72</sup>

“In spite of the creation of regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, Gulf “security” has been the product of largely uncoordinated national efforts. Iran and Iraq have always acted as independent powers. Each of the southern Gulf States has pursued its own path to national security, and the smaller Gulf countries have relied on the “power projection forces off the United Kingdom and the United States for security and as a counterbalance to their neighbours.”<sup>73</sup>

<sup>70</sup>TibiBassam, “From Pan- Arabism to the community of sovereign Arab States” in *Middle East Dilemma* ed. Micheal C. Hudson, (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999), 104.

<sup>71</sup>Cordesman Anthony H., and Khalid al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in the Era of Asymmetric Wars*, First Indian edition, Pentagon press, New Delhi, 2008

<sup>72</sup> ibid

<sup>73</sup> ibid

The balance began to change sharply after Iran's defeat in the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War in 1991. The Al Qaida attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, sharply weakened U.S. and Saudi security ties. At the same time, Islamist extremism and sectarian divisions began to force the Gulf States to look inward and make hard trade-offs between conventional military spending, strengthening their internal security capabilities, and funding the kind of economic and social reforms that are another way of defeating Islamist threats. "Transnational threat like Al Qaida and other neo-Salafi Islamist extremist movements have become active threat in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and they have cells and elements in other southern Gulf States."<sup>74</sup> The situation is further complicated by new pressure from outside the region. Islamic extremism surrounds the Gulf region. Extremist groups like Al Qaida and its affiliates have a power base in Afghanistan and Central Asia. They continue to fight governments in key nations like Egypt and Algeria and present a threat in all of the Arab states on the borders of the Gulf. The current debate revolves around how Iran will behave in case it becomes a nuclear power. Will it become more belligerent or will it become more cautious. Kenneth Waltz views that deterrence has worked 100% and a nuclear Iran can be deterred keeping in view the cold war paradigm. Scott Segan views the extant stability/instability paradox; a situation of stability between two countries who both have nuclear weapons that can lead one country to think that it can be more aggressive conventionally towards its neighbours in the Gulf and specially towards Israel, because it is protected from a conventional retaliation by its nuclear shield. "Similarly, the invulnerability/vulnerability paradox shows that Iran poses a very different kind of nuclear dynamic and danger than was faced in the Cold war".<sup>75</sup>

Can the Arab Gulf states live with a nuclear Iran? without the protection of U.S. and can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? has been the focus of contemporary literature and analyses on the nature of strategic balance existing and shape of strategic interaction between the states. Despite much critique by many of the validity of the concept of 'balance of power', it still captures the summary from the world and regional structures. It also determines – in reality or perception – the behaviour of different actors. As per Bahgat

<sup>74</sup> ibid

<sup>75</sup>Waltz Kenneth, Segan Scot and Betts R. K., "A nuclear Iran – Promoting stability or courting disaster", *Journal of international affairs*, Spring/summer 2007, Vol no 60

Korany, the “the U.S. administration’s approach to the Gulf region starts from the balance of power”.<sup>76</sup>

Jamal Suweidi in his paper Weapons of Mass Destruction, Threat perceptions in the Gulf, focuses on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the Gulf and their relation to a heightened threat perception among states of the region. Along with their means of delivery, such weapons are commonly referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which are an integral part of the broader security dynamic that exists in the Gulf. The motivation for proliferation is based on a variety of domestic, regional and international forces. Regarding two countries of particular concern - Iran and Iraq - issues such as internal politics, a history of rivalry, and leadership aspirations must also be considered. In this context, the possible use of WMD in a future Gulf crisis cannot be ruled out. “The high volatility of security in the Gulf is beyond question. The emergence of a WMD threat to this fragile security balance further strains the interaction among regional and external actors who strive for a stable environment.”<sup>77</sup>

What will become of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East when Iran and Israel interact as a nuclear-armed dyad? Using Philipp Bleek’s instability-stability-instability paradox theory as an analytical framework and having assumed breakout Iranian nuclear weapons capability, is to test the hypothesis that whereas a nuclear-armed Iran will result in instability at the nuclear level, a significantly reduced threat of major conventional conflict will result, leading in turn to increased sub-conventional violence. The nuclear level is demonstrated to be rife with instability, primarily caused by Iranian efforts in the politico-military and technological areas, which in turn reduces the possibility of major conventional attack from either Israel or the US. “Accordingly, nuclear instability will provide Iran enhanced freedom-of-action at the sub-conventional level, allowing it increase proxy violence against Israel”.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup>KoranyBahgat, “The Arab World and the New Balance of Power in the Middle East”, in *Middle East Dilemma* ed. Micheal C. Hudson, (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999), p. 35.

<sup>77</sup>Suweidi Jamal, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Threat Perceptions in the Gulf” 04 Jun 2009, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwhi20>, (accessed 19 May 2013)

<sup>78</sup>Bropy Desmond Lt Col, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons and the Instability-Stability - Instability Paradox: A (Prospective) Case Study of the Iran-Israel Dyad”, Canadian Forces College

Austin Long takes a contextual view of the nuclearization of Gulf and opines that a nuclear Middle East characterized by recessed arsenals is likely to be less stable than the Cold War and potentially less stable than the current balance in South Asia (itself no picture of stability). Recessed arsenals will be vulnerable but capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to the region's most developed nuclear power, Israel. This is different from the Soviet-China case, where the Chinese recessed arsenal was vulnerable to pre-emption but not able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets. Conversely, a Middle East characterized by hedged and opaque capabilities is likely to be much more stable. Yet a Middle East with survivable arsenals is also likely to be stable, particularly if some sort of arms limitation can be agreed to that would limit the size of arsenals. Unfortunately, to reach the stable equilibrium of survivable arsenals requires leaving the stable equilibrium of hedged capabilities (in other words, states will have to actually deploy weapons) and thus passing through an unstable period of vulnerable arsenals. Finally, "the three-cornered Iran-Israel-Saudi relationship will have implications for further proliferation in the region."<sup>79</sup>

From the proliferation point of view, Muhammad Al El-Baradei, underscores in his book, *The Age of Deception*, that growing instability means that we are at the twilight of the Third Nuclear Age. One way or another we are on the cusp of significant change. If we do nothing, attempting to maintain the status quo of nuclear haves and have-nots, the change will likely take the form of a veritable cascade of proliferation, or worse still, a series of nuclear exchanges. The signs are already apparent, most revealingly in the reactions of neighbouring countries as real or perceived nuclear weapon threats emerge. "The recent surge in the number of countries across the Middle East talking about or beginning to acquire nuclear technology and expertise is but one example."<sup>80</sup> The GCC States' effort to develop nuclear energy is an example of how states in a system marked by anarchy "attempt to engage in self-help"<sup>81</sup>, that is to say that they "rely on the means

<sup>79</sup>Long Austin, "Proliferation and Strategic Stability in the Middle East in Strategic Stability, Contending interpretations", ed. Edridge A Colby, Micheal S. Gerson, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.Army.mil/> (accessed 16 May 2013), pp 410-420

<sup>80</sup>Al Baradie Muhammad, "*The Age of deception, Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*", Bloomsbury Publishing, London: 2010, p 8

<sup>81</sup>In September 2007, the UAE made a deal with France to help develop a nuclear energy program while the other states are currently in negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to initiate their plans for

they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.”<sup>82</sup> This assumption is arguable in a regional system considering that “true self-help means that weak states which are struggling for survival cannot be locked in a balance of power because a stronger state or superpower could come to the aid of the weak state or, through sanctions, deny it the use of any instrument that would serve its purpose.”<sup>83</sup> However, in an essay on the regional balances of power in the M.E., Benjamin Miller proposes that to allay this assumption, it must be recognized that “regional balances of power depend on the way great powers are engaged in regional systems.”<sup>84</sup> With respect to nuclear disarmament, Shahram Chubin identifies the political requirement of success, engagement of Iran by West, regional dialogue and confidence building in the Gulf States, the inclusion of Iraq, an effective inspection regime and progress in the Middle East peace process as an idealistic vision of stable Gulf. “Gulf remains a difficult area because of the assumed linkages between various levels of WMD, and connections with other regional conflicts, the legacy of past conflicts, the persistence of authoritarian regimes and suspicious bedevil relations. However, the military nuclearization of South Asia has no bearing on the Gulf. It does, “nevertheless, focus attention on the condition of NPT regime and its future.”<sup>85</sup>

Anver Cohen on the other hand very succinctly states that “while we don’t know which nuclear weapons state will disarm first, we do know which will disarm last, that country is Israel. For last decade, Israel’s focus in nuclear matters has been Iran. Israeli concerns – the first in that nuclear weapons could exacerbate concerns about other aspects of Iran Foreign and Defence Policies by following a more risk-prone and aggressive strategies. Second, “if Iran is declared nuclear state, it could ignite a cascade proliferation effect in the Gulf and Entire Middle East. Third social and psychological impact – MAD like balance of terror might wipe off Zionist state off the map without actually dropping the

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developing nuclear energy. For more, see Peter C. Glover, "Sunni States' Fears of Iran Trigger Middle East Nuclear Race," World Politics Review, November 7, 2007, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1323>> (Dec 30, 2012).

<sup>82</sup> Waltz, *ibid* 111.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid*

<sup>84</sup> Miller Benjamin, “*The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*”, eds. T. V. Paul, Michel Fortmann and James J. Wirtz, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, P. 240

<sup>85</sup> Shahram Chubin, Nuclear disarmament, Obstacles to Building the Bomb,

bomb.”<sup>86</sup> In view of Jill Marie and Lacie Olson, the international community can eliminate the nuclear threat that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy and weapon technology poses by ridding the world of all nuclear weapons, associated technologies, nuclear material and bomb-making knowledge. In short, “if nuclear weapons are dis-invented the threat of a nuclear Iran and the greater threat of nuclear terrorism will vanish.”<sup>87</sup> Introduction of nuclear weapons to the Gulf has and will continue to have serious strategic ramifications. On various options facing Iran, the Gulf and the World, Perkovich the eminent nuclear expert opines that the GCC states, ‘like the rest of the world, would benefit from a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, or at least a continuation of the current uneasy stand-off. However, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities or an Iranian push to produce nuclear weapons would pose excruciating risks and dilemmas for the two most economically and politically significant Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Much would depend on how Iran behaved: if it were attacked, it could respond violently against GCC states and U.S. bases with missiles and other means, which could create post-war dynamics that are impossible to predict for all involved. Or Iran could hold its fire and mobilise and manipulate popular opinion in the Arab States, including Shite minorities, against the monarchical governments that appear complicit with Israel and the U.S. “If Iran develops nuclear weapons – which could also happen after Israeli or U.S. military attacks on it – a similar set of difficult but not existential political challenges would face the Gulf States.”<sup>88</sup> Stephen Walt supposes that it is impossible to persuade Iran to give up full control of the nuclear fuel cycle. He adds that “if the bottom line is for them to abandon enrichment etc, we’re certainly going to fail. The possibility of inducing Iran to agree to a ‘Japan Option.’”<sup>89</sup> Most of the leading Western academics and think tanks in their literature perceive “Iranian nuclear to be an unacceptable risk to

<sup>86</sup>Cohen Anver, “Getting to Zero, The Path to the Nuclear Disarmament”, ed(s). Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy, *Stanford Security Studies*, 2011, p 187

<sup>87</sup> Jill Marie with Lacie Olson Getting to Zero, The Path to the Nuclear Disarmament, ed by Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy, *Stanford Security Studies*, 2011p 206. Getting to Zero, The Path to the Nuclear Disarmament, ed by Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy, *Stanford Security Studies*, 2011, p 187

<sup>88</sup>Perkovich George, Brain Radzinsky and Jaclyn Tandler, *The Iranian nuclear challenge and the GCC*, May 2012, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, [www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/Iranian-nuclear-challenge-and-gcc/b67p](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/Iranian-nuclear-challenge-and-gcc/b67p) (accessed 27 Jan 2013).

<sup>89</sup> Walt Stephen, *A Realistic Approach to Iran’s Nuclear Program*, Mar 19, 2009, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/19/a\\_realistic\\_approach\\_to\\_irans\\_nuclear\\_program](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/19/a_realistic_approach_to_irans_nuclear_program), (accessed 25 Jan 2013)

the regional and Global peace, regardless of what NPT says or what Iran says about NPT.”<sup>90</sup> The Iranian academics and politicians believe that the concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation are pre-textual and any suspension of enrichment is simply intended to ultimately deprive Iran of the right to have an independent nuclear technology. “Iran’s unalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology has been the ‘subject of most extensive and intensive campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and misinformation.”<sup>91</sup>

There are extremist expressions of impending clash with Iran – where the survival of Jewish state is stated to be hanging in a balance because of nuclearization of Gulf. As per Micheal Evans, “Iran is determined to tighten the vice pursuing nuclear weapons on a fast track – and unleashing Hamas and Hezbollah to create the pressure that Israel can survive but not if the Jewish state remains steadfast in determination to defend itself at all costs and America is willing to back up its most valued ally in the Middle East. Facing the religious zealots who control the Iranian regime, a conflict of biblical proportions is building.”<sup>92</sup> Dr. Charles Doran argues that the Gulf States are one-third to one-half way through their cycles of revenue generation from oil and must look beyond current strategies for effective economic planning within the next century. Doran looks at various revenue stream optimization strategies, among them – waiting for the next international oil shortage-price hike sequence; increased Gulf foreign investment in the economies of the West; and indigenous investment within GCC economies. These three strategies, he argues however, may raise more problems than they solve. For indigenous investment, for example, the non-oil sectors of the Gulf states’ economies are, and will likely remain, too small to realize economies of scale. Doran concludes that it is ‘regional development’ that offers the best hope for long-term economic prosperity, and by extension, political security into the twenty-first century. More meaningfully, “not only is regional development the key to long-term economic prosperity for the Gulf even after oil revenues enter absolute decline, but regional economic development is also the pathway,

<sup>90</sup> “Implications of the US-India nuclear deal”, *Harvard International Review*, 6 May 2006, [www.hir.harvard.edu/implications-of-the-us-india-nuclear-deal](http://www.hir.harvard.edu/implications-of-the-us-india-nuclear-deal), accessed 20 Jan 2013.

<sup>91</sup> Communication dated 12 September 2005 from the permanent mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/657, 15 Sep 2005, [www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf), accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>92</sup> Micheal D. Evans, *Showdown with nuclear Iran*, 2006, Nelson Current, Nashville

perhaps the only pathway, to assured security for the member states. Regional economic development requires more than a plan, it requires commitment politically from the governments that will stand most to benefit on both commercial and structural grounds.”<sup>93</sup> As per leading analysts the Gulf region’s tremendous hydrocarbon resources and strong macroeconomic growth in recent years are covering an immense structural human capital and unemployment challenge that could cause longer term security problem for the Gulf countries. The use of expatriate employment over the last several decades has helped the region to quickly develop an advanced infrastructure, but it has led to an underdevelopment of the region’s local human capital and underutilisation of the demographic dividend. With the exception of Bahrain, the GCC countries have recorded large budget surpluses in recent years, and are likely to remain in surplus in 2012/13, despite lower oil prices. But this wealth is “unevenly distributed and is leading to less than optimal levels of diversity in economic outlooks.”<sup>94</sup>

Bahrain and to a lesser extent Oman lack the immense hydrocarbon wealth of their neighbours. Because the economies are heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, sectors other than construction, consumables and finance are crowded out, validating views that the region is spending beyond its means. Mahmoud El-Gamal and Amy Jaffe of Rice University in their seminal book on the M.E economies contend that the countries are “consuming the region’s non-renewable capital, instead of finding smooth paths for sustainable consumption and investment.” They argue that the “spending of hydrocarbon rents results in stark inequalities in wealth and perpetuates the cycle of speculative financial and construction bubbles based on the volatility of oil and gas markets.”<sup>95</sup> “Bahrain, Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia all suffer from double-digit unemployment.”<sup>96</sup> According to a 2010 study by Booz and Company, “48% of Saudi

<sup>93</sup>Doran Charles F., “Economics and Security in the Gulf”, in *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century*, ed(s). by David E. Long and Christian Koch, *The Emirates centre for Strategic Studies and Research*, Abu Dhabi, 1997, pp 189 -207

<sup>94</sup>Noland Marcus and Howard Pack, “Arab Economies in a Changing World”, Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, (2007)

<sup>95</sup>El-Gamal Mahmoud and Amy Jaffe, “Oil, Dollars, Debt, and Crises, *The Global Curse of Black Gold*”, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), retrieved from <http://203.128.31.71/articles/0521896142.pdf>, (accessed 25 Jan 2013)

<sup>96</sup>HaqueKhatija, ‘Research from Emirates NBD’, *GCC Outlook 2012*, <http://www.emiratesnbd.com/assets/cms/docs/quarterlyReports/2012/GCCQuarterlyQ12012.pdf>, (accessed 31 Jan 2013)

citizens aged between 20 and 24, and 31% between 25 and 29, were unemployed.”<sup>97</sup> Unemployment disproportionately affects women and those under 30 years and often lasts for extended periods of time. Public spending alone is unlikely to meet the social and economic demands of these constituencies. Multiple factors contribute to this structural unemployment problem. While small and medium enterprises constitute a majority of private firms in developed countries, they account for only a minimal share of the overall economic output of the Gulf region. The Gulf States have recognized this predicament and to varying degrees have sought to expand their economies and better prepare their human resource for the global marketplace. Across the region, a number of high-profile educational initiatives have been undertaken, including the “founding of Saudi Arabia’s first co-educational university, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology; the creation of Education City in Qatar, which hosts branch campuses of six American universities, including Georgetown, Carnegie Mellon and North-western Universities; and the establishment of a number of American branch campuses in the UAE, including New York University and Rochester Institute of Technology.”<sup>98</sup>

Dubai’s economy was originally built on the hydrocarbon sector, but oil and gas sales now account for less than 6 percent of the economy. Although it will take the city several years to fully recover from the 2008 real estate crash, the city has managed to transform itself into an international hub for commerce, finance and tourism, boasting a world-class airline and the largest manmade harbour on the planet. “While Dubai’s model is unlikely to be fully replicated elsewhere, it is an indication that the creation of free trade zones and reducing barriers to entry can stimulate the non-hydrocarbon sector.”<sup>99</sup> Similarly, while Oman is culturally more conservative than Dubai, the country has made significant social and economic progress in the last three to four decades. It has quadrupled literacy rates and increased life expectancy by approximately 27 years. Oman was rated by the UNDP as having achieved “the biggest improvement in its Human Development Index

<sup>97</sup>[http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/Meeting\\_the\\_Employment\\_Challenge\\_in\\_the\\_GCC.pdf](http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/Meeting_the_Employment_Challenge_in_the_GCC.pdf) accessed 29 Jan 2013.

<sup>98</sup>“Higher Education and the Middle East: Building Institutional Partnerships”, *The Middle East Institute* Washington, DC. December 2010. [http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/EducationVPVol.III\\_.pdf](http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/EducationVPVol.III_.pdf), accessed 27 Jan 2012.

<sup>99</sup><http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT74603/html/CPRT-112SPRT74603.htm> accessed 25 Jan 2013.

score for any country in the world between 1970 and 2010.”<sup>100</sup> At the global and regional level the major issues that will shape the economic security of the region include growing internationalization of Gulf economies. “Growing internationalization of the Gulf and its emergence as the centre of gravity in the M.E. by virtue of its economic and financial resources remains an immutable fact in the long term.”<sup>101</sup> The rapid growth of economic and political links with China, India and Russia are creating “new strategic linkages which are shifting the international relations of the region in subtle ways.”<sup>102</sup> The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, visited the Gulf in November 2008 and announced that “India viewed the Gulf as an intrinsic part of its broader neighbourhood”.<sup>103</sup> Meanwhile, China’s tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–5) referred to energy security for the first time. “China is now planned to be in charge of the recently constructed Pakistani port of Gwadar, close to the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz despite the security issues affecting the country.”<sup>104</sup> Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and possible linkage of CARs to the Gulf through Iran is also weaving the Gulf economies into the regional economic initiatives in a strategic manner that may not necessarily align with the U.S. or Russian interests. Meanwhile, Russia has begun to expand significantly its political and economic links to the Gulf in general and to its fellow gas-producer Qatar and Saudi Arabia in particular, with Putin’s visit to the region, the first by a Russian leader, in February 2007. It formed part of a broader Russian intention to increase its role in the Gulf and indicate the intent of becoming one of the key players in the Gulf regional security system.

Issues of energy dependence and security of access to regional resources give external powers a stake in regional security structures. International reactions to the outbreak of piracy in the Gulf of Aden during 2008 are a harbinger of future policy trends. The EU launched its first naval mission while both China and India reacted with a more robust deployment of naval forces to protect their own maritime security interests. “As the

<sup>100</sup>[http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2010\\_EN\\_Complete\\_reprint.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf), accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>101</sup> Salem Paul, “Kuwait: Politics in a Participatory Emirate,” *Carnegie Middle East Paper No. 3*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2007), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/07/16/kuwait-politics-in-participatory-emirate/y0c>, (accessed 23 Jan 2013).

<sup>102</sup> Yetiv Steve and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy and the Middle East,” *Middle East Journal*, 61 (2), (2007), p. 199.

<sup>103</sup> Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era*, Columbia University Press: New York, 2011, p 70.

<sup>104</sup> [www.dawn.com/2013/.../pakistan-approves-gwadar-port-transfer-to-china/](http://www.dawn.com/2013/.../pakistan-approves-gwadar-port-transfer-to-china/) accessed 2 Feb 2013.

Gulf's share of global oil and natural gas production is projected to increase from 28% in 2000 to 33% in 2020, with most of that increase going to Asia, its strategic significance will only increase, together with the number of external powers holding a stake in regional affairs."<sup>105</sup> Gulf States also confront challenges to their energy security and have positive prospects as well. The recent studies indicate that from an energy security perspective, supply security, demand security and oil prices stability in relation to U.S. dollar are important concerns. The state of world economy and supply and demand prospects, in addition to the policies of consumer nations concerning environmental protection and energy efficiency are also important interacting factors. The "interdependence between producers and consumers – particularly with high growth rates – will ensure that the energy security in the Gulf remains an issue of international importance, but one in which the role of the Gulf countries themselves should not be underestimated."<sup>106</sup>

The latest study by Emirate centre for strategic studies and research on the dynamics of relationship between the Gulf, India and China, proffers that in the world of finite hydrocarbon resources and tight oil supplies, the growing Asian giants India and China, with their burgeoning economies and massive populations has created a global demand and supply imbalance that is unlikely to ease in the future. "With the energy demand of U.S. unabated, this has initiated a triangular race among three nations to secure strategic energy resources. UAE adopts a prudent energy policy – seeking to stabilize a fluctuating market and defend interests of producers when oil prices fall to unacceptable levels – abides by OPEC decisions."<sup>107</sup> As per R.C. Vierbuchen, an eminent member of study group, "the global energy mix largely will be the same and government and industry has to focus on energy interdependence than competition."<sup>108</sup> In the same context, Adnan Shihab Eldin foresees a challenging balancing act for GCC, for the reason that the global energy situation poses a supply challenge for the GCC oil producers as they seek to weigh the needs of various countries and balance competing interests. In building GCC –

<sup>105</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, "Security Cooperation in the Middle East," *ibid*, p. 3

<sup>106</sup> Al-Sahlawi Muhammad A., "Energy Security in the Gulf and the U.S Dollar : An Overview", in *Energy Security in the Gulf and the U.S Dollar, The Emirates centre for Strategic Studies and Research*, (2010), p. 105

<sup>107</sup> *ibid*

<sup>108</sup> *ibid*

Asia strategic relationship care has to be taken to ensure that they complement and balance, rather than replace existing strategic economic, political and security relationships with other key international powers and regional partners – this is particularly the case with the U.S, which is important to the future of both GCC and Asia.

Anthony H Cordeman also points towards the same direction as he contends that the balance of energy dependence is changing on a global level. Asia is becoming a major, if not a leading gas and oil product importer. This not only is reshaping the nature of outside strategic interest in the Gulf, it is pushing world demand to the limits of supply. “One result is a massive new transfer of oil export revenues (including a war –damaged Iraq) have approached or exceeded their peak levels of \$380 billion in the 1980s. They have risen from near record lows of \$106 billion in 1995, to \$182 billion in 2000, \$143 billion in 2001, \$139 billion in 2002, \$176 billion in 2003, \$241 billion in 2004, \$303 billion in 2005, and an estimated \$351 billion in 2006. Another result is potential global competition to secure future energy exports coupled to a steadily rising dependence on the Gulf to provide increased imports at a time when there is little or no surplus production capacity. It is also clear that the reliability of near real time export supply and every aspect of Gulf security, will become steadily more important to the global economy for at least several decades to come.”<sup>109</sup> The Gulf States are ironically complacent about the issue of shale gas, as evident from Kuwaiti oil minister Hani Hussein’s comment, “Oil from the M.E. will always find a home. And we have to see more research to get a better idea about the impact of shale oil development.”<sup>110</sup> Take the impact of OPEC’s exports to the U.S. In 2011, 20% of all OPEC exports went to the U.S. accounting for half of the nation’s domestic energy needs. But America’s shale oil developments, particularly the development of the vast resource in the Green River Formation, could well, as Conoco Philips CEO Ryan Lance told OPEC in June, make North America, “self-sufficient in oil (as well as gas) by 2025”;<sup>111</sup> this will have a serious impact on the long-term commitment of the U.S. in the region.

<sup>109</sup>Cordesman, *ibid*

<sup>110</sup>ChakarvortiSovagato, ‘*Shale Oil’s Threat to OPEC, OPEC is unconcerned about unconventional competition*’, Energy and Capital, 25 June 2012, <http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/shale-oils-threat-to-opec/2271>, (accessed 25 Jan 2013)

<sup>111</sup>Johnson Robert ‘Texas Shale Oil Could Add “Another Venezuela or Kuwait”’, Worth of Oil By 2020’, May 31, 2011, [www.businessinsider.com/texas-shale-oil-fracking-eagle-ford-2011-5](http://www.businessinsider.com/texas-shale-oil-fracking-eagle-ford-2011-5)

Based on current industry production plans, energy consultants IHS CERA estimate that US unconventional oil production could rise from its current half a million barrels per day to three million barrels per day by 2020. As Daniel Yergin, chairman of IHS CERA, points out, that amounts to adding “another Venezuela or Kuwait by 2020.”<sup>112</sup> Indeed the huge shale wealth – oil and gas – of Russia and China generally, neither of which are OPEC members, needs to be factored into the changing geopolitics affecting the Gulf’s energy production and its geopolitics. Then there are the significant shale developments that may turn Israel, into a truly global energy superpower. Israel’s recent major offshore discoveries of shale gas – amounting to a huge 16 trillion cubic feet – could well be matched by the discovery of equally huge shale oil resources in the valley of Elah’s Shefla Basin. “The basin could hold what one commentator described as the mother lode of fossil fuels.”<sup>113</sup>

It is worth noting that “the traditional Saudi dominance of OPEC is under threat as an emerging grouping of oil price ‘hawks’, including Iran, (and the increasingly Tehran-influenced) Iraq and Algeria oppose Saudi policies.”<sup>114</sup> While the Saudis insist on maintaining production of around 10 million barrels per day, their peak level in decades, Tehran wants to slow production and boost up prices as sanctions over its nuclear developments hurt its economic interests. But while the differing priorities of the two factions portend new internal power struggle, the new global energy realities are already having their impact, whether OPEC members like to admit it or not. The U.S. Treasury Deputy Secretary, Roger Altman, noted, “These discoveries will reduce price and supply volatility. They will also reset and profoundly improve international relations. The days of OPEC, the oil producers’ cartel, are numbered. Unstable oil states, from Iraq to Venezuela, will be marginalized.”<sup>115</sup> There is also a viewpoint on “developing an alliance of shale-gas-producing countries, in order to rebuild the special relationship on additional


<sup>112</sup> ‘Head in the sand, OPEC sees no shale oil threat’, June 14, 2012

<http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/business/2012/06/14/head-in-the-sand-opec-sees-no-shale-oil-threat/>, (accessed 26 Jan 2013)

<sup>113</sup>Glover, *ibid*

<sup>114</sup>*ibid*

<sup>115</sup> ‘OPEC Could Collapse as Shale Gas Pops Peak Oil Myth’, [http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/OPEC\\_Could\\_Collapse\\_As\\_Shale\\_Gas\\_Pops\\_Peak\\_Oil\\_Myth\\_999.html](http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/OPEC_Could_Collapse_As_Shale_Gas_Pops_Peak_Oil_Myth_999.html), (accessed 31 Jan 2013)



economic, as opposed to solely military”<sup>116</sup>, principles, which can potentially marginalize Gulf. Willem H. Buiter in his well-researched article has reviewed the arguments for and against monetary union among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait. Both technical economic arguments and political economy considerations are discussed. He concludes that there is an economic case for GCC monetary union, but that it is not overwhelming. The lack of economic integration among the GCC members is striking. Without anything approaching the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons among the six GCC member countries, the case for monetary union is mainly based on the small size of all GCC members other than Saudi Arabia, and their high degree of openness. Indeed, even without the creation of a monetary union, there could be significant advantages to all GCC members, from both an economic and a security perspective, from greater economic integration, through the creation of a true common market for goods, services, capital and labour, and from deeper political integration. The political arguments against monetary union at this juncture appear overwhelming, however. The absence of effective supranational political institutions encompassing the six GCC members means that there could be no effective political accountability of the GCC central bank. The surrender of political sovereignty inherent in joining a monetary union would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by an increasingly politically sophisticated citizenry. It is assessed that “monetary union among the GCC members will occur only as part of a broad based movement towards far-reaching political integration. And there is little evidence of that as yet”<sup>117</sup>.

With regards to diversification of M.E economies, “the M.E. accounts for 53% of the world's oil reserves, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for 19% of the total. While some Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are heavily dependent on the export of oil, a number of countries are starting to diversify

<sup>116</sup>SkwirszinskiPrezemek, ‘Building bridges on Shale Gas’, 30 August 2012, [http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1587/building\\_bridges\\_on\\_shale\\_gas](http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1587/building_bridges_on_shale_gas), (accessed 26 Jan 2013)

<sup>117</sup> Paper presented at the Seminar “Preparing for GCC Currency Union: Institutional Framework and Policy Options”, November 20–21, 2007 in Dubai. <http://www.nber.org/~wbuiter> accessed 19 May 2013

and move to more ‘sustainable’ economic models in preparation for a post-oil era.”<sup>118</sup> The growth of banking and Islamic finance, as a result of oil-fuelled liquidity, is pushing economies in the M.E. to become more efficient and equitable, promoting risk-sharing rather than speculation in a virtuous but dynamic manner. For example, the development of sharia compliant hedge funds in the Gulf, M.E and the wider Muslim world is diversifying the banking sector. Effective financial institutions are facilitating the rise of the Muslim middle classes by popularizing Islamic insurance products which help use savings resourcefully. The UAE has a highly globalised economy that embraces new industry and generates 63% of its income from commerce and tourism, despite possessing rich oil reserves; it is set to lead the growth in 2013. The emirate “leads the commerce and tourism through a deregulated system, allowing substantial labour immigration, which accounts for 75% of the city’s population.”<sup>119</sup> It has developed excellent welfare and service oriented industries with superlative infrastructure. Dubai has accommodated immigrant population by being more culturally tolerant; for example, allowing drinking and adult entertainment. “Dubai has also actively courted the wealthy through the provision of luxury hotels and services and this may remain a strong area however, it will remain dependent on global economic conditions.”<sup>120</sup>


The potential energy shortfall of the post-oil economy is a key area of concern for Gulf States. The climate and geography of the Gulf also makes it a potential world leader in the development and production of solar energy. “Abu Dhabi leads the region in preparation for the energy shortfalls of a post-oil economy and has committed to building a \$350 million solar power plant, the first of its kind in the region.”<sup>121</sup> As part of the plant, a special economic zone is being set up dedicated to alternative energy and sustainable technology. Other nations, notably Iran, are planning for a post-oil future by developing their own nuclear power generation programme. Although quest for nuclear power has increased the chances of war. To prepare for potential resource scarcity, Gulf countries

<sup>118</sup><http://www.sigmascan.org/Live/Issue/ViewIssue/491/4/after-the-oil-the-future-of-the-middle-east/> accessed 26 Jan 2013

<sup>119</sup><http://www.emirates247.com/business/dubai-to-lead-uae-growth-in-2013-2012-04-26-1.455759>, accessed 26 Jan 2013

<sup>120</sup><http://www.economist.com/node/11088559>, (accessed 27 Jan 2013)

<sup>121</sup><http://www.sigmascan.org/Live/Issue/ViewIssue/491/4/after-the-oil-the-future-of-the-middle-east/> accessed 26 Jan 2013



may seek to cooperate with and invest in developing countries that have similar cultural, religious, and political backgrounds in agro-foods and livestock sector - such as Pakistan - to secure food supplies. These arrangements may become increasingly common in the future if resource scarcity increases.

Bahrain owing to large oil deposits and a small population, “has a per capita GDP of \$27,300.<sup>122</sup> Despite the nation's ability to provide for its population by relying on its oil reserves, Bahrain has made efforts to expand its economic base. It has built refining capacity that outstrips its own oil production. Consequently, Bahrain actually imports crude oil from Saudi Arabia, refines it, and re-exports it. The state has expanded its industrial capacity to include aluminium and signed a FTA in an effort to expand its export base. Because of heavy industrialization and the necessary construction that accompanies it and Bahrain's small population it relies heavily on imported labour. Consequently “44% of the population in Bahrain between the ages of 15 and 64 are foreign nationals. Bahrain has also positioned itself as a strong player in Islamic Banking in an effort to expand beyond resource exports and into a greater role in the international service industry.”<sup>123</sup> Iran has one of the largest economies in the Gulf. Iran's major industries are largely state owned. “Iran ranks 69th out of 139 in Global Competitiveness Report.”<sup>124</sup> Iran has been able to subsidize inefficient industry through large oil revenue and maintain respectable growth rates. Iran has begun a privatization effort in order to stimulate trade in accordance with its ongoing five-year plan as well as an ambitious economic reform plan despite tough economic sanctions which is hurting the Iranian economy badly. The most important advantage that Iran's capital market has in comparison with other regional markets is that there are “40 industries directly involved in it. Industries such as the automotive, telecommunications, agriculture, petrochemical,

<sup>122</sup><https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html#Econ>, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>123</sup>Noland Marcus and Howard Pack, “*Arab Economies in a Changing World*”, Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, (2007)

<sup>124</sup><http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/09/13/iran-ranks-69th-out-of-139-in-global-competitiveness-world-economic-forum/>

mining, steel, iron, copper, banking and insurance, financial mediation and others trade shares at the stock market, which makes it unique in the Gulf.”<sup>125</sup>

Iraq has suffered nearly 30 years of fighting, against Iran in the 1980s and the U.S. since 1991, which has had a serious detrimental impact on Iraqi economic growth. Oil production remains Iraq's chief economic activity. “The lack of development in other sectors has resulted in 18%–30% unemployed and a depressed per capita GDP of \$4,000. Reconstruction aid has helped to bolster the nation's infrastructure, however, an ongoing insurgency/terrorism has impeded economic recovery.”<sup>126</sup> Kuwait's small population and substantial oil resources led it to become a Rentier state. The per capita GDP is \$40,700. As part of a diversification plan the Kuwaiti government has invested its oil revenues and maintains a sizable sovereign wealth fund. These investments currently account for nearly half of Kuwait's GDP. Because Kuwait's wealth has provided a comfortable standard of living for its citizens, it imports most of its labour. “Roughly 80% of Kuwait's work force is foreigners.”<sup>127</sup> Among the nations of the M.E., Oman is the most reliant on oil for its finances. Currently oil production and export accounts for 69% of the nation's revenue. The oil industry is relatively young in Oman and consequently growth has come rapidly to the country. The government is also developing a plan to sustain its economy and divest its reliance on oil. By 2020 it hopes to reduce oil revenue to just 9% of its income. Along with that plan the country hopes to move away from rentier economics and employ its citizens in the labour market and reduce reliance on expatriate labour. “To take its first steps in economic independence it has signed a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. and is seeking to do the same with the European Union, China, and Japan. It is currently manoeuvring itself into the re-export and heavy manufacturing markets.”<sup>128</sup>

Qatar currently enjoys the regions highest per capita GDP. It has derived its wealth from “exploiting its oil and natural gas reserves.”<sup>129</sup> With the revenues from its hydrocarbon

<sup>125</sup> Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy\\_of\\_the\\_Middle\\_East#cite\\_note-WEF-11](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Middle_East#cite_note-WEF-11), (accessed 31 Jan 2013)

<sup>126</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html#Econ>, accessed 31 Jan 2013

<sup>127</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html#Econ>, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

<sup>128</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html#Econ>, accessed 31 Jan 2013

<sup>129</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html#Econ>, accessed 1 Feb 2013.

industries Qatar has established a rentier economy. Qatar has also established the largest per capita sovereign wealth funding the world. With a population under one-million people the government has not found it necessary to diversify its economy. Saudi Arabia has 20% of the known oil reserves in the world. With its oil they have a national GDP of \$546 billion and a per capita GDP of \$21,300. With this revenue stream the country has become the largest rentier economy in the world. As the oil wealth grew so too did the civil service. It grew from 37,000 in 1962 to 232,000 in 1981. Further, as Saudi Arabia's civil service grew so too did its reliance on foreign labour which currently stands at 5.5 million or about one-third of its working age population. Currently about 40% of Saudi Arabia's population is under the age of 15. This has led the government to accelerate investment in education and infrastructure in an effort to ensure jobs for the growing population and alleviate a chronically high unemployment rate. "The state has announced plans to build six 'economic cities' in order to diversify its economy."<sup>130</sup>

The United Arab Emirates have used their oil revenues to develop a modern state. They have made considerable investment in infrastructure and are negotiating a free trade agreement with the U.S. in an effort to diversify their economy. Additionally, the nation has made a notable efforts to develop a tourist industry by building popular global attractions in an open social system. The UAE is also making an effort to attract foreign direct investment by offering 100% foreign ownership and no taxes. Because of the "massive growth and construction involved in their projects the UAE is heavily dependent on foreign labour."<sup>131</sup> Yemen has plagued by chronic economic mismanagement. With 35% unemployment, the nation relies heavily on expatriate remittances. The reliance on foreign labour markets proved disastrous following the 1991 Gulf War when Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expelled Yemeni workers and curtailed aid to the country in response to its support of Iraq. Most of Yemen's GDP comes from its limited oil production. "The bulk of its labour is involved in agriculture where its primary cash crop is khat."<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup><https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html#Econ>, accessed 1 Feb 2013.

<sup>131</sup><https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html#Econ>, accessed 1 Feb 2013.


<sup>132</sup><https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html#Econ>, accessed 1 Feb 2013.

### Gaps in the Existing Literature

After comprehensive literature review, following gaps have been identified:

The impact of changing international world order from bipolar to unipolar world and subsequently futuristic rise of China and her ability to impact upon the prevailing world order has not been dilated upon in detail. The dynamics of competing Great power rivalry in the future with China's inevitable rise and its increasing influence in the Gulf region needs to be analysed. What will be the response of Arab Gulf states to the rise of China vis-a-vis its enhanced security interests in the Gulf and wider regions of Middle East. The effectiveness of the GCC, Peninsula Shield Force and its impact on the stability of the region needs to be studied in detail. The impact of this collaboration amongst the GCC States upon regional balance of power is an other void in the existing literature.

The Arab Spring is one of the most talked about topics now-a-days. However, the human security dimensions of the Gulf, coupled with the issue of political security need further deliberation. Moreover, the measures undertaken by the governments of the Gulf to check its further spread need to be studied as models. Nuclearization of the Gulf in the backdrop of varying interests of the regional and international powers, especially after change of the US and the international community's stance towards Iran's nuclear programme is another vacuum identified in the existing literature. Impact of these changing priorities and probabilities of conflict in future scenarios need further deliberation. The question of mutual coexistence of nuclear Iran and nuclear Israel with the GCC, addressing the security concerns of the stakeholders also needs to be studied in detail. The Arab-Ajam divide in the Muslim Ummah in the historical perspective and the contemporary Arab sense of superiority in the pursuit of balance of power in the Gulf is another area requiring detail research. The impact of security environment in the Gulf on Pakistan and its long term implications needs to comprehensively debated. Besides studying the effects of stability and instability regimes in the Gulf on Pakistan, various avenues of opportunities available for Pakistan also need deliberation.



## CHAPTER NO. 3

### PRE AND POST 9/11 INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE GULF REGION

As society is always evolving, security doctrines have much lower social status viewing society itself and its relationship with the world, as well as changes in social roles. With the Russia, the United States must re-adjust its fundamental role in the world, thereby reducing a helper positioned imperialism. Hegemonic posture tends not only to influence the global direction, but also will bring within enemy range. Thus, esoteric threats such as chaos, 'terror' instability will become a dominant theme - the then President George W. Bush even described the US strategy in the Gulf War, "as the world's most powerful democratic countries, we are inevitably leader in democratic countries the Global Alliance nexus thereof. For ensuring stability, stable balance of power remains a key part of our responsibility. Since the hegemonic countries often have more than one such vague enemy, it will also try to keep their choice by entering the convenience of the Union, which is easily retractable. National Hegemons sharing ideas and concepts of orientation, which focused on the values of the culture of a country, who is opposed to such a perception from the ideal enemy threat to these values. Such states will tend to try to dominate or influence world to bear weight for carrying out their agendas of ideational protection. The United States is a classic example, because it explicitly supported during the Cold War, in order to serve the balance of power steering dictatorship. Paul Kennedy reminds us, once again with the United States in mind: "Since it is not humanly possible to all, unpredictable and volatile world of the early 21st century may occur, the task is to build military and economic, social preparation in a good position to meet contingencies."<sup>133</sup>

#### 3.1 International World Order – A Theoretical Analysis

The structure of international system is defined by five assumptions about how the world is organized that has some basis in-fact:

1. "States are the important players in world politics and they operate in a disorganized system.

<sup>133</sup> Kennedy Paul, "Preparing for 21<sup>st</sup> Century", Vintage Books, NY, 1994, Pg 23

2. Great powers always have some hostile military capability over other nations.
3. States cannot be confident whether other states became enemy with them.
4. Great powers place a high premium on survival, and
5. States would sensibly be normal performing artists who would be outlining methodologies that expand their survival.”<sup>134</sup>.

These features of the international system appear to be intact as we begin the twenty-first century. The world still comprises states that operate in an anarchic setting. Neither the United Nations nor any other state has coercive leverage over the great powers. Furthermore, virtually every state has at least some offensive military capability, and there is little evidence that world disarmament is in sight. According to Theory of Realism, if we consider about International relations, realist offset of force alludes all of the inclination for contending states should change their discerned energy posture in place to guarantee the survival of the state. The force of state relative with rivals that pose a risk on national survival. The harmony will not be achieved, war may be the probable aftereffect in light. If you quit offering on that, one side might feel undermined towards the discerned absence of relative energy. Same time there would be various scholars that try to illustrate this paradigm. Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer would generally acknowledged its importance to neo-realism.”<sup>135</sup> In the context of Realism – Balance of Power Theory, neo-realists political researchers acknowledge certain presumptions with regards to their investigation from claiming state’s self-destructive considerations and conduct in the universal framework. The presumptions are as follows:.

1. States are prime players in the international system;
2. The international system is characterized by anarchy;

<sup>134</sup>Mearsheimer John J. Ibid, p.363.

<sup>135</sup>Whereas *realism* is the belief that states are motivated primarily by the quest for economic or military power, *neo-realism* or *structural realism* is the belief that the international system is a constraint on state behavior and thus the amount of power a state can project is restrictive and will certainly generate a response from a competitor. Neo-realism is further broken down into offensive and defensive realism. Kenneth Waltz has written several tomes on the subject of neo-realism; most prominent among them is *Theory of International Politics*. Mearsheimer’s contribution is *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* in which he introduces offensive realism. Stephen Walt is credited with expanding the discussion of balance of power theory in his book *The Origins of Alliances*. See John J. Mearsheimer, *the Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); and Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

3. The acknowledged conduct from claiming states on an anarchic framework may be “self-help” on which states “must depend on the methods they might produce and the courses of action they might make for themselves;”.
4. Action of states in the international system is affected mainly by external factors;
5. States are rational actors;
6. The international system comprises autonomous political units (states) that bring no vital power over them.
7. Apart from these common presumptions, the philosopher present opposing views on competing state’s behaviour in a realist system. Mearsheimer proposes a theory of offensive realism which differ to Waltz’ defensive realism, whereas Waltz focused on state’s tendency to engage in balancing behaviour.

According to Kenneth Waltz – Defensive Realism, “This may be the reason Waltz need underpinned those moderate spread from claiming atomic weapons as an impediment for war.”<sup>136</sup> Waltz contends that clinched alongside a customary war, “states setting off should war camwood without a moment's delay trust that they might win. Furthermore, “ought they lose, those value from claiming rout will make tolerable.”<sup>137</sup>

### 3.2 The International Order – Beginning of a Bipolar World

The emergence of a bipolar world order was visible as far back as the final phases of the Second World War. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, the only nation that attacked US soil, and the USSR’s defeat of the German Army in operation Barbarossa and its subsequent march towards Berlin left little doubt over the future status of the two nations. Churchill had already begun to sound his fears of the Iron Curtain compartmenting Europe. And the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings had convinced the Soviets of the necessity to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the primacy of the two nations was established during the Suez Crisis in 1956 when France, UK and Israel

<sup>136</sup>Indeed, Waltz has written several articles and books which provide amplifying support of his theory. He posits that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent to aggression and states that seek them are more inclined to be subject to international rules due to the high cost of entry into the nuclear community. See, Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi papers, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

<sup>137</sup>Waltz Kenneth N., Robert J. Art, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman& Littlefield, 2004, p116.

seized Suez Canal without consulting US and ultimately had to withdraw under US pressure to avoid an intervention by the USSR, an ally at the time of President Nasser of Egypt. The decision by President Eisenhower to pressurize UK, France and the Israel to withdraw in the face of the Soviet threat established once and for all the bipolar nature of the post war period. While China was acknowledged as a player in the wake of the Korean War and the subsequent division of the peninsula, China limited its interests to the region where its main adversary Japan was no longer a threat.

Thus came the bipolar world order and divided the globe into three main spheres - the US, the Soviet and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The United States led NATO, a seven member collective defence pact signed in 1949. In 1955, the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European states formed their own military alliance called the Warsaw Pact.

“The Warsaw Pact was as much a tool for the Soviet Union to keep its satellites firmly under its control as it was a defensive agreement.”<sup>138</sup> The unrelenting quest for force characterized the bipolar globe to fifty years a considerable length of time, what has more helped the destruction of the Soviet Union in any case just following populating the globe for weapons that might obliterate those world a few times through. The weapons contest between the United States and Soviet Union was the fantastic sample of a security situation assumed out in those universal framework between extraordinary force states. Mearsheimer contends that the extraordinary forces are continually “searching to chances to increase control in their rivals, for dominion as their last objective.”<sup>139</sup> Similarly as such, “it is outright control that great forces try to accomplish.”<sup>140</sup>

### 3.3 The Era of 1970s – Middle East and a Bipolar World

The complexities of politics, diplomacy and armed conflicts in the years immediately after 1945 cannot be readily understood through the prism of Soviet-American ideological or geo-strategic conflict. Both the Soviet Union and US helped the creation of a Jewish state. The pan-Arabism of the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, embraced a form of socialism, but was far removed from Marxism-Leninism. The state of Israel was created by force and owed its survival to a continuing capacity to defend itself

<sup>138</sup><http://teacherweb.ftl.pinecrest.edu/snyderd/MWH/readings/11/15Bipolar%20World.pdf> (accessed 26 Jan 2013)

<sup>139</sup>Mearsheimer John J. Ibid,p 29.

<sup>140</sup>States concerned with the former are only concerned with the continued achievement of additional power while states that desire the latter believe in achieving a balance of power seen in defensive realism.

against adversaries who did not recognize its legitimacy. Israel developed secret relations with British and French culminating in their secret agreement to attack Egypt in 1956. Overtime a more crucial relationship developed with US, with whom a de facto strategic alliance emerged. Yet “British, France and the US also developed complex of relationships with Arab states”<sup>141</sup>. Despite the Gulf region’s importance, it was never much of a theatre in the U.S.-USSR Cold War. This was partly due to the fact that the Gulf was far more of an American than of a Soviet sphere of influence. While Moscow had a close relationship with Iraq, it never really penetrated the region. There was “virtually no direct tension between the war time allies.”<sup>142</sup> “In comparison, the “United States had an alliance with Iran and Saudi Arabia, while U.S. or British influence was preeminent in all the smaller Arab states of the region.”<sup>143</sup> Waltz argues that “the international system induces states to engage in balancing behaviour.”<sup>144</sup> His claim is that “a state’s first concern is “not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”<sup>145</sup>

In 1973, the Yom Kippur war between Israel and its neighbours polarized the entire Middle East and led to the oil crisis where major oil producers cut off oil supplies to those who supported Israel, including the US. This incident alone convinced all future US policy makers that control of the energy resources in the Middle East remained critical for the vital national interests of the US. This mind-set would lead to almost four decades of US policy in favour of stability and dictatorships in the region at the cost of democratic growth which would ultimately result in these regimes crumbling and the Arab spring spreading across the region. Although they instituted a short-lived oil embargo in 1973, the Gulf Arab monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) never let themselves influenced very much by U.S. support for Israel or other regional policies. The key factors for them was that they wanted some level of American protection against local threats from radicals, internal upheavals, or perhaps


<sup>141</sup>Baylis John, Smith Steve, Owens Patricia, “The Globalization of World Politics”, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition”, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 57.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

<sup>143</sup>Spykman NJ, 1942. American's Strategy In World Politics. New York: Harcourt Brace

<sup>144</sup> In contrast to balancing, bandwagon occurs when weaker states seek to maximize power by aligning with stronger states. Waltz and Mearsheimer address the differences in *Theory of International Politics*, 126 and *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 267-333, respectively.

<sup>145</sup> Waltz, Ibid, p126



any Soviet actions. As Walt argues that “balancing is more common than bandwagon because states prefer to “join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers.”<sup>146</sup> Waltz also claims that “states prefer balancing because states place their survival at risk “if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong” and because “joining the more vulnerable side increases the new member’s influence [within an alliance] because the weaker side has greater need for assistance.”<sup>147</sup> At the same time, though, they did not want to provoke their own highly traditional people or militant neighbours by showing too high a profile in their relationship with America. This balance of seeking a protector and appeasing potential threats basically worked for many years. There was no need for a Soviet role since its clients (Iraq, Syria, Egypt under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and South Yemen) were the very forces threatening the local regimes. The monarchies cooperated to some extent by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) but they could never defend themselves from external attack or intimidation without outside help. While it may appear to be an argument of semantics, Waltz argues that “states form alliances not to balance a perceived increase in power but as a response to the threat that power increase implies.”<sup>148</sup>

**Iran.** The 1970s brought profound changes to Iran as well. While Reza Shah's international stature grew his power at home diminished in almost equal proportions. His decision to deal with unrest through force instead of political accommodation alienated both the merchant and the religious classes culminating in the revolution in 1979 that toppled him from power and forced him into exile. At the time of the revolution self-proclaimed student groups stormed and took over the US embassy and held 52 diplomats hostage for over a year. This single event has had a deep impact on US-Iran relations for over 40 years. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil, Iraq also initiated hostilities with Iran by attacking disputed territories in the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq war would turn out to be a prolonged conflict resulting in the loss of millions. Iraq’s motives were both from dread of Iranian subversion and starting with those feeling of a chance to rout Iran, What's more undoubtedly to rule the Gulf, Baghdad had, of course, underestimated Iran’s soundness.

<sup>146</sup>Walt Stephen M., "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985), p. 5

<sup>147</sup>Ibid.,p. 6.

<sup>148</sup>Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*, p263.

Instead, the war went on to a considerable length of time. Furthermore brought about a million casualties, and also huge costs for both combatants.

**Afghanistan.** During the same period, Afghanistan was going through its own internal turmoil starting with a coup against King Zahir Shah by his own cousin Daoud and then subsequent bloody coups through Soviet sponsorships. In addition, Afghanistan consistently suffered from strained relationship of Kabul with its peripheries that hardly recognized its writ. According to US ambassador Robert Neumann, in Afghanistan, “survival is the first objective of the leadership that seek to balance off external and internal forces perceived as threatening the regime’s power”<sup>149</sup>. In 1979, the USSR decided to change course from propping up puppet regimes and directly intervened by sending in Soviet troops and occupying the country. The Soviet invasion made Afghanistan the front line state in the war against communism. While Pakistan's leadership started preparing for the danger at its border early on, it was not until the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 that the U.S. fully committed its support to defeat the Soviets. As John Mearsheimer mentions that “offensive realism is basically a ‘zero sum’ game where the “great power” states have tendency to “seek power at each other’s expense.”<sup>150</sup>

## ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS

### 3.4 The Era of 1980s

The global order in the decade of 1980s saw some significant shifts that were to have long term implications for the future as well as for the balance of power in the world. Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980 and embarked on a policy of bankrupting the Soviet Union through an arms race. In this context, he also increased support for the Afghan’s resistance battling the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan consequently became the staging ground for the Mujahideens and a pipeline to funnel arms to various groups.

**USSR.** The USSR itself was beginning to realize that its internal decay could no longer remain hidden. Change came with Mikhail Gorbachev taking over as the Secretary-

<sup>149</sup>Ahmed Rashid, “*Pakistan on the Brink*”, Penguin Books, London, 2012, p. 95.

<sup>150</sup>Mearsheimer does not discount the smaller states but claims the great power states “have the largest impact on what happens in the international system.” Additionally, Mearsheimer identifies ‘great powers’ as those states with significant military capabilities that could “put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful states in the world.” For more, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p5.

General of the Communist Party and head of the Government. He introduced his doctrines of Glasnost and Perestroika unleashed nationalist and other forces that to Gorbachev's dismay "were to destroy the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."<sup>151</sup> While his critics cite this as the mistake that initiated the start of the unravelling of the Soviet Empire, he is widely respected for recognizing that the Soviet system in its current state was no longer sustainable economically, politically or socially. In Afghanistan, the fight against the Soviets gained momentum with international support for their cause increasing manifold. The Soviet system was beginning to crumble primarily due to internal decay. Gorbachev had realized it and had begun to send out signals that the Afghan war was no longer a viable or affordable endeavour. However, the USSR needed a face saving exit without which it had vowed to continue the war.

**Iran-Iraq War.** The decade was not easy for the Gulf as well. As mentioned above, the escalations between Iran and Iraq reached their zenith during 1980s with both sides resorting to the use of chemical weapons and long range missiles. Neither side spared civilians or city targets and inflicted massive human toll on each other. "The West and the Arab world supported Iraq and made the war more sustainable for Saddam Hussein."<sup>152</sup> In the end, Khomeini had to accept a cessation of hostility agreement without much in it for Iran as his country could no longer sustain the war. "He likened the acceptance to 'drinking a bowl of poison'."<sup>153</sup> Things were not good in Iraq either which had accrued huge debts from other countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to fight the war. A massive and battle-hardened army had given additional confidence to the already swaggering Saddam Hussein who now considered himself a regional leader.

**The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).** Although most of the Gulf States historically relied on outside security guarantors through bilateral relationships, they have in recent decades also sought closer regional coordination. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981, galvanized by regional events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the Iran-Iraq 'Tanker War'. But the Gulf States were careful not to offend their more powerful neighbours, Iran and Iraq. In fact, the

<sup>151</sup>John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, Ibid, p. 61.

<sup>152</sup>Bromley S, 2006. Blood for oil? New Political Economy

<sup>153</sup><http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/21/us/khomeini-accepts-poison-of-ending-the-war-with-iraq-un-sending-mission.html> (accessed 26 Jan 2013)

GCC Charter, still in effect today, “focused entirely on non-security issues.”<sup>154</sup> In 1984, the Peninsula Shield Force was created, but it was a virtual coalition with no real integration. Before the 1991 Gulf War, there had been a tendency for successive administrations to seek a relative power balance between Iran and Iraq. However, in 1993 the Clinton Administration concluded that “both Iran and Iraq were hostile to American interests in the Gulf and announced a policy of dual containment.”<sup>155</sup> As a senior White House official described it at the time, “as long as we are able to maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and as long as we can rely on our regional allies Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and Turkey to preserve a balance of power in our favour in the wider Middle East region, we will have the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes.”<sup>156</sup> On 7 June 1981, Israel took advantage of the Iran-Iraq war and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad. This was Israel's first overt act of signalling its intent to protect its regional superiority in the field of nuclear weapons. It was and remains paranoid about a Muslim country acquiring a nuclear weapon fearing proliferation to one of its neighbours.

### 3.5 The Era of 1990s – Emergence of a Unipolar World

#### Disintegration of USSR.

For decades it was thought that the west should try to keep the Warsaw Pact alive because the “bipolar division of Europe was responsible for peace that reigned on the continent since 1945.”<sup>157</sup> The 1990s were the decade where the domino effect of the two preceding decades began to surface. Those might have been quick, same time quite a while coming, at breakdown of the Soviet Union. At the middle

<sup>154</sup>The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Islamic beliefs. Presidency of the council rotates annually.

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249154/Gulf-Cooperation-Council-GCC>

<sup>155</sup>On May 18, 1993, Martin Indyk, the special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, outlined the dual containment policy in a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said that the United States would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. The strength of the United States and its friends in the region, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the GCC, would allow Washington to “counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other.” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49686/f-gregory-gause-iii/the-illogic-of-dual-containment>

<sup>156</sup> Martin Indyk, Ibid

<sup>157</sup>Gaddis John, “One Germany – In both Alliances”, *New York Times*, March 21, 1990, p. 227

of 1989, “Soviet domain totally unravelled, and the frosty war finished.”<sup>158</sup> Start done at Estonia. In November 1988 the law making bodies of the Soviet republics started passing laws undermining control of the national administration and endorsing more stupendous freedom inside the Soviet Union. Lithuania might have been the initial Soviet Republic to announce freedom and started withdraw from USSR. The Unions of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) might have been formally broken down around 26 December 1991 towards revelation № 142-H. This revelation recognized the Freedom of fifteen republics from Soviet Union accompanying the formation of free States. The Soviet Union’s disintegration altered a bipolar international system to a unipolar one thus making the United States the only remaining global power. The Berlin Wall came down reuniting Germany and all around Europe, the Iron Curtain bowed out. US President Bush announced “the emergence of a new world order.”<sup>159</sup>

**New Theories.** On emergence of Unipolar World, two theories gained popularity. The first idea came from a young Washington think tank dweller named Francis Fukuyama. He called his thesis "The End of History," and although that sounded apocalyptic, he was attempting to deliver good news. Fukuyama argued that “the historical process that had seen the rise of feudalism, monarchism, communism, fascism and various other isms had come to its conclusion. Democracy and free markets — the core values of Western civilization — had proved victorious over all competing systems. There was no better way to organize human affairs.”<sup>160</sup> But there was this other idea. It was darker. Indeed it sounded like a medieval nightmare. The theorist was a Harvard professor named Samuel Huntington, Fukuyama's former teacher. Huntington summed up his theory in a dramatic phrase: "The Clash of Civilizations. “The Huntington thesis mocked the feel-good notions of the Fukuyama camp. Huntington saw a world of tribes. Tribalism was increasing. “Ancient hatreds were rising to the surface.”<sup>161</sup> The reason is culture. *Culture*, said Huntington, “is the preeminent force of conflict in the modern world. Politics, economics, ideology and national interests remain important, but culture

<sup>158</sup>Bentley Jerry H., “Tradition and Encounter” Available at [http://glencoe.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/2222555555/student\\_view0/chapter38/](http://glencoe.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/2222555555/student_view0/chapter38/)

<sup>159</sup>President George Bush’s address to Congress on 11 September 1991

<sup>160</sup>Fukuyama Francis, “*The End of History and the last man*”, Free Press, New York, 1992, 2006.

<sup>161</sup>Huntington Samuel P., “The Clash of the civilization”, p45.

trumps everything. Culture is bone deep, essential to a person's identity, and transcends national boundaries. Cultural conflict, Huntington said, was erupting along civilization fault lines.”<sup>162</sup>

**Middle East in a Unipolar World.** A unipolar world order presented a different challenge the world would need to deal with for years to come. During the Cold War, bitter and long standing inter and intra state disputes were placated under duress from the two super powers to avoid a direct confrontation between the US and the USSR which could only lead to a nuclear war carrying a doom's day scenario. A unipolar system was too new to devise an alternative and the US too inward looking and enjoying the dot com boom to provide adequate leadership. As a result, the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the civil war in Somalia were some of the salient symptoms of the aforementioned phenomena. Out of those mentioned, the occupation of Kuwait due to its obvious economic value received a disproportionate US and international response where President Bush uttered the famous warning “this will not stand”<sup>163</sup>. An impressive international coalition dislodged Iraqi forces from Kuwait but allowed Saddam to retain power and the capacity to gas and kill thousands of Shites who rose against him in the aftermath of defeat. This was done primarily not to allow an Iran friendly Shite majority and due to the obsession the US policy makers carry against Iran since the storming of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. This obsession against Iran would cost the US heavily during the second gulf war and its occupation of Iraq. Iran continued to struggle with the effects of its revolution as it tried to recover from the aftermath of its decade long war with Iraq. However, it continued to pursue nuclear technology raising alarms in the region as well as among the broader international community. Saddam Hussein in Iraq on the other hand was licking his wounds after its defeat during the first Gulf War and a forced withdrawal from Kuwait. However, when a Shite revolt in the South of the country tried to topple him, the western forces in the region allowed Saddam to fly gunship helicopters armed with chemical weapons to be used against Shiite population centres and civilians for fear of Iraq being taken over by an

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup><http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110704> (accessed 31 Jan 2013)

Iran friendly regime. Afghanistan witnessed a bloody civil war and with the help of Pakistani security establishment, saw “the rise and ultimately the dominance of the Taliban movement in the country.”<sup>164</sup> The rise and coming to power of the Taliban was a watershed event that received little notice from the United States which was basking in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its new found status as both the military and economic super power that was unrivalled by any other nation in the world. It was during the 1990s that Osama Bin Laden moved his setup from Sudan to Afghanistan and established himself in the country as the guest of the Supreme Leader Mullah Omar. Another prominent leader from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Aiman Al Zawahiri, also moved to Afghanistan and joined Bin Laden and his organization, Al-Qaida. In August 1996, through a fatwa, Bin Laden declared war on the United States and demanded the exodus of all western forces from Islamic lands. “This was followed by attacks on US Embassies in Kenya in August 1998.”<sup>165</sup> However, little did the world know that planning for a more spectacular operation had commenced which would completely change the world.

### 3.6 The Water Shed Event – 9/11

The start of the new millennium was relatively calmer than the decades preceding it. The United States elected George W Bush as its President after one of the closest elections in the country’s history. The country was beginning to suffer from an economic downturn. Russia was no longer a threat and was struggling with its own internal challenges vis-à-vis wealth distribution and new challenges to President Putin’s power by the oligarchs. Europe was moving towards further integration. However, the most significant events were taking place in Afghanistan. Al Qaida had recruited 20 odd young men to carry out a suicide operation on mainland United States. “9-11 will be remembered as one of the most significant event of the century. It changed the world forever, instigated the so called ‘war on terror’ but most importantly gave the world used to a system of nation states, the rude awakening of the power of non-state actors with multiple if not unknown postal addresses and most modern and innovative means to spread their message”<sup>166</sup>.

<sup>164</sup>Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism”, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1999

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.

<sup>166</sup>John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, *ibid*, p. 75.

**Middle East - Post 9/11.** The events of 9/11 changed the original formula whereby US ignored autocratic regimes in the region for cheap oil and stability. Hence, the conditions were created for waging war against Iraq in 2003. However, it is perplexing that Iraqi regime was itself secular and shared the same goal as of US; to contain Iran. For all these reasons, different analysts have identified different factors to explain war, “ranging from ideological influence of ‘neo cons’ to US-Israel relationship and US desire to control Iraqi oil. However, this so called ‘war of choice’ proved to be a tragic blunder”<sup>167</sup>. Then after the 2003 Iraq War, the United States adequately destroyed Iraqi military. By 2006, those shrunken organization started Gulf security dialogue to coordinate basic resistance activities between United States and the GCC. Today, Iraq remains politically volatile, same time Iran turned politically disengaged. At the same time, the GCC states are emerging from their historic security dependency. In particular, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are playing larger roles on the regional and even global stage, taking leadership roles in regional crises such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. “Their relationships with the United States are maturing even as they expand their economic ties with Asia.”<sup>168</sup> This evolution takes place against the backdrop of a region in the midst of historic change. Bahrain faced a large-scale popular uprising in 2011 that continues, and protest movements have occurred in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The UAE and Qatar are the only Arab countries that have not faced significant displays of public unrest since 2011. It does not seem a stretch to posit, however, that the Arab awakening will have profound and lasting implications for the entire Arab world, including to varying degrees on all six Gulf monarchies. “The GCC remains a fundamentally asymmetric organization, with Saudi Arabia accounting for roughly half of the gross domestic product of the Arabian Peninsula, two-thirds its population, and four-fifths its landmass.”<sup>169</sup> Despite recent discussions among GCC members about the possibility of transitioning to a Gulf union, this asymmetry creates a structural constraint on the willingness of some of the smaller states to engage in further regional integration. Perhaps not accidentally, it is the smaller Gulf States—Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid, p. 76.

<sup>168</sup>“The Gulf security architecture: partnership with the GCC”, a majority staff report, prepared for the use of the committee on foreign relations U.S. senate June 19, 2012

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

Bahrain—that have a relatively larger U.S. military presence, particularly after the post-9/11 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia.

### 3.7 Present World Order and Middle East

#### The Gulf Security Architecture




Figure 3.1: Funding for Foreign Military Education and Training by Region FY 2010

Source: 2010–2011 Report on Foreign Military Training and U.S. Department of Defence Engagement Activities of Interest

**Status Quo.** “Despite the Saudi royal family’s struggling record with regards to political rights and civil liberties, the U.S. has recognized the need to maintain its relationship with the Saudis. In the mutually beneficial relationship, Saudi Arabia has used its influence among the oil producing countries to maintain the flow of oil at reasonable prices while the U.S. has guaranteed the security of Saudi oil exports across the globe.”<sup>170</sup> However, the argument to maintain the status quo is not based exclusively on oil. “The U.S.-Saudi alliance has been a shared commitment to defeat a common enemy.”<sup>171</sup> During the Cold War, the U.S. used its alliance with Saudi Arabia to prevent Soviet influence in the Middle East and the potential disruption of the flow of resources. Middle East scholar Maurice Lavian, a regular contributor to *Scholars for Peace* in the Middle East suggests that “The U.S -Saudi relationship has always been based on shared

<sup>170</sup>This dynamic has changed considerably since 2001 as reflected by the sky-rocketing price of oil from less than \$30 per barrel in 2001 to over \$120 in May 2008. Among the factors credited with the rapid escalation in price is regional instability as well as the growing global demand due to the burgeoning middle class populations in China and India. Since January 2008, President Bush has twice met with the Saudi king to ask for an increase in oil production. The slight increase in oil production has done little to curb the rising price as oil neared \$130 in June.

<sup>171</sup> Rachel Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

strategic interests rather than a mutual ‘friendship’, but the recent events, particularly in Iran, have strengthened the relationship”.<sup>172</sup>

**“Self-Help” and External Influences.** The GCC state’s efforts to develop nuclear energy is an example of how states in a system marked by anarchy attempt to engage in self-help.”<sup>173</sup> That is to say that they “rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.”<sup>174</sup> This assumption is arguable in a regional system considering that true self-help means that “weak states which are struggling for survival cannot be locked in a balance of power because a stronger state or superpower could come to the aid of the weak state or through sanctions, deny it the use of any instrument that would serve its purpose.”<sup>175</sup> However, in an essay on the regional balances of power in the Middle East, Benjamin Miller proposes that to allay this assumption it must be recognized that “regional balances of power depend on the way great powers are engaged in regional systems.”<sup>176</sup> To be sure, throughout the twentieth century the United States was the patron to client-states Iran and Saudi Arabia and formed its ‘Twin Pillars’ policy around the two states in order to foster stability in the region. However, Saudi Arabia is now the weak state that receives support from the superpower, the United States, to deter external threats. In 1990, Riyadh was concerned by the threat posed by Iraq and contracted out its external defence to the United States, a diplomatic manoeuvre Mearsheimer calls “external balancing.”<sup>177</sup> The United States continues to exert its influence in the region primarily through its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which, according to the self-help assumption, contradicts the application of balance of power theory to the situation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is Benjamin Miller’s contention that “only when the great powers disengage from a particular region

<sup>172</sup>Lavian Maurice, *Shcolars for Peace in the Middle East*

<sup>173</sup>The six members of the GCC of Arab States are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and UAE, all predominantly Sunni states. In September 2007, the UAE made a deal with France to help develop a nuclear energy program while the other states are currently in negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to initiate their plans for developing nuclear energy. For more, see Peter C. Glover, "Sunni States' Fears of Iran Trigger Middle East Nuclear Race," *World Politics Review*, November 7, 2007 <<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1323>> (Dec 30, 2012).

<sup>174</sup>Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 111.

<sup>175</sup>Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 118.

<sup>176</sup>Benjamin Miller, *Ibid*, p. 240.

<sup>177</sup>Mearsheimer, *Ibid*, p. 156

is an autonomous regional system able to arise.”<sup>178</sup> Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from its Western ties even as it signs a multi-billion dollar arms deal. In a speech given at the Arab League summit meeting in March 2007, King Abdullah stated that “the American occupation of Iraq is illegal.”<sup>179</sup> He also warned that constant instability in the region renders them subject to foreign, particularly U.S. intervention. The Saudi regime recognizes that its links to the West inherently tie it to Israel, a point that is heretical for the regime which stakes its legitimacy on strict Islamic teachings and an aversion of Judaism. Conversely, Iran has been without the support of a patron state since the 1979 Islamic Revolution the cataclysmic event that severed the ties between Tehran and Washington. The fall of the Soviet Union a decade later assured that Iran remained without a sponsor. It is in that regard that Iran fits the category of a state endeavoured to self-help. However, Iran’s presumed support of international terrorism has rendered it a target of economic sanctions and thus it is adversely affected by the great powers of the international system. The international community, in particular the United States, is committed to the denial of those tools which would serve Iran’s purpose. Tehran’s reaction to these external influences is to engage in “internal balancing.”<sup>180</sup> Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran has increased its militant posture through the conventional operations mentioned above and through its persistent push for nuclear power. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz asserts that “nuclear power is the ultimate balancing weapon and its development is the purest example of a state inclined to self-help.”<sup>181</sup> After all, as the leading protagonist of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer, states, “in the nuclear age, great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable forces.”<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup>Fattah Hassan M., "Saudi King Condemns U.S. Occupation of Iraq," *New York Times*, sec. International, Mar 28, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/28/world/middleeast/29saudiend.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss> (Jan 7, 2013).

<sup>180</sup>Balancing will be discussed later in the chapter. However, for an explanation of internal balancing, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 157.

<sup>181</sup> Waltz’ argument is that, because the stakes are so high, states that possess a nuclear weapon are less likely to engage in conventional war and thus nuclear proliferation is actually a stabilizing force. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. For more, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 160. and Art and Waltz, *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 483.

<sup>182</sup>Mearsheimer, *ibid*, 5.

As stated by Mearsheimer, also exhibited toward Saudi Arabia and Iran in the cases above, states might never be certain about other state's intentions. Therefore "their conduct is impacted by their outside surroundings."<sup>183</sup> Thus, the Middle East is settled in the security situation of States that need aid "unsure from claiming another's [states] intentions, arm to those purpose from claiming security."<sup>184</sup> Saudi Arabia and Iran previously locked in weapons contest as they try to offset against the force of the opposite by purchasing a greater amount arms alternately.

### 3.8 Future World Order

The old order in the Middle East is declining. The change is still in its early stages, and what will follow (and when) is undecided. However political Islam beyond any doubt will assume a large part. Exactly outskirts would be inclined to be redrawn, also a portion new states might considerably develop. "Intra and interstate clashes are liable to be conventional."<sup>185</sup> The United States could and ought further bolstering attempt an impact on the course of events, anyhow it is farfetched to substantially control. Mearsheimer accepts that, similarly as energy maximizers, states are not fulfilled by a offset of force. Best impediment for war is an adjusted bi-polar framework clinched alongside which the two hegemons push their impact against states to forestall the probability of war. Furthermore, Mearsheimer contends that "if discouragement fails, buck-passing, as opposed balancing, will be the favoured decision of states that don't wish battle with a forcefulness."<sup>186</sup> In present world order in Middle East when United States is attempting to disengage from the region, Israel is driving towards regional hegemony. That makes the strategic logic of relying on Israel to guarantee U.S. interest more clear than it has been before. The pentagon, at the very least, appears to be embracing the idea of Israel fighting America's battle in the Middle East in exchange of high-end weapon systems, the same way it did during the Cold War. The strikes in Syria came two weeks after the

<sup>183</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>184</sup> The term "security dilemma" was first coined by John Herz in 1950 John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950), 157. The quote is from Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; the quote continues to say that states, "Having armed for the sake of security...feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming."

<sup>185</sup>Richard N. Haass, Ibid, p 64.

<sup>186</sup>Mearsheimer spends a significant amount of time on balancing and buck-passing in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, ibid, p267-333.

major arms sale between the United States and Israel in which the Jewish state received anti-radiation missiles designed to target enemy aerial defences, upgraded radar system, Osprey helicopters, and air refuelling tankers – a sale that U.S. secretary of defence Chuck Hagel described “as a ‘clear signal’ to Iran.”<sup>187</sup> Change in the long-term strategy in the Middle East continuing support for American policies in the Middle East, even in the face of the obvious risks and dubious benefits, stems from the erroneous belief that American military involvement in the Middle East protects U.S. access to “cheap” oil. The notion that U.S. policy in the Middle East helps give Americans access to affordable oil makes little sense if one takes account of the military and other costs—including two Gulf Wars—that should be added to the price that U.S. consumers pay for driving. Many Americans assume that the oil resources in the Gulf would be shut off if American troops were removed from the region. But the U.S. military need not be present in the Gulf to ensure that the region’s oil makes it to market. The oil-producing states have few resources other than oil, and if they don’t sell it to somebody, they will have little wealth to maintain their power and curb domestic challenges.

They need to sell oil more than the United States needs to buy it, and once this oil reaches the market, there is no practical way to somehow punish American consumers. In short, the so-called oil weapon is a dud. Further, if political and military influence were truly required to keep oil flowing, consumers in western Europe and Asia—who are far more likely than Americans to consume oil that originates in the Gulf—should be the ones to bear the cost. Accordingly, very few economists believe that “keeping U.S. troops in the region is a cost effective strategy.”<sup>188</sup> During the cold war, the U.S. policy of actively safeguarding a strategic resource may have made sense with regard to maintaining the unity of the non-communist alliance under American leadership. At present, however, this policy is badly outdated. A responsible policy in the Middle East, consistent with American security interests in the region, should be based on de-emphasizing U.S. alliances, especially those with Saudi Arabia and Israel. It should also include a change in popular attitudes toward U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the necessity for U.S. leadership in the negotiations to end Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Reshaping U.S.

<sup>187</sup>Jordan Chandler Hirsch and Sam Kleiner, “Why U.S. Israel alliance may be returning to its Cold war roots”, May 13, 2013, Information clearing house,p34.

<sup>188</sup>Richard N. Haass, Ibid, p 62-63.

policy in the Middle East would enhance American security and help alter the perception that U.S. policies are guided by double standards. Maintaining a frail balance among all of Washington's commitments in the region is becoming ever more costly, dangerous, and unnecessary. "Americans are paying a heavy price to sustain a U.S. military and political presence there. A change is long overdue."<sup>189</sup>

The United States retains important and in some cases vital interests in the Middle East, including a deep commitment to Israel's security, opposition to terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons, and a commitment to safeguarding access to the region's energy resources. But today, the region is not an arena of decisive great-power competition, as it was at times during the Cold War, nor is it home to any major power. In addition, it is a part of the world where local realities can and often do limit the utility of military force, economic sanctions, and diplomacy. The fact that the United States is moving towards energy self-sufficiency gives it some added cushion (although not independence) from the consequences of the region's turbulence.



## ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS

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<sup>189</sup>CATO handbook for policy makers, 7<sup>th</sup> edition, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-52.pdf>, accessed on 17<sup>th</sup> May, 2013.

## CHAPTER NO. 4

### BALANCE OF POWER- GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POWER'S INTERESTS IN THE GULF AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY OF THE REGION

Located at the junction of three great continents, historic heartland of the world's oldest Mesopotamian civilization and the focal point of oceanic/land trade routes that link the entire world, the "Gulf has always pulled, like a magnet, various powerful nations towards itself for centuries."<sup>190</sup> In the contemporary history, first the sea routes around the Arabian Peninsula and later the short cut between Europe and the Asian subcontinent represented by the Suez Canal ensured that various major powers always kept an eye on developments in the region, at times remaining mere observers, but more frequently intervening to ensure a favourable outcome. Over the course of the twentieth century, the discovery of the huge reserves of fossil fuels in the region brought it on the security agenda of the world. "With known oil stores approaching 750,000 million barrels (accounting for more than 60% of the universe total), 40% of the world's gas reserves, the Gulf nations are the world's primary hotspot of vitality. More or less 40% of the world's seaborne oil shipments, 25% of the world's daily oil utilization pass through the Gulf and the strait of hormuz."<sup>191</sup> Since the discovery of oil, the littoral states of the Gulf have been subject to the influence of major powers, most often represented by powerful national or international oil companies, desirous of exploiting the substantial oil reserves of the region.

More recently, at the end of the last century, the need to secure a stable oil supply at low prices to the global energy market, and particularly to the United States, saw the "hitherto fore commercial involvement becoming linked to a political and then a military strategy to secure the assured supplies of cheap oil<sup>192</sup>". The Gulf region saw regimes deemed friendly to Western interest supported by these major powers, while others

<sup>190</sup>Sometimes also known as Persian Gulf, especially from an Iranian perspective.

<sup>191</sup>Haizam Amirah-Fernández, "International Relations of the Gulf: Interests, Alliances, Dilemmas and Paradoxes," [http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_eng/Content?](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari48-2011)

WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari48-2011, 15 Mar 2011, (accessed 30 Jan 13)

<sup>192</sup> Al-Suwaidi, Jamal, *International Interests in the Gulf Region*, (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004), xiii.

considered hostile were either removed by force or subjected to international sanctions to contain them. Iraq and Iran are two clear examples of such policies.

The first Gulf war (1990) and then the later overthrow of Saddam Husain in second Gulf war (2003) has provided a vivid illustration of the national interests of major powers at play in the Gulf region. The United States, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, all have manifested differing levels of engagement in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular. However, the nature of their involvement with the Gulf and equally important, with each other is primarily dictated by what each perceives to be in its national interest. Beyond energy security, the Palestine dispute, nuclearization of Iran and threat to Israel, traditional intra-Arab power dynamics and Arab-Iran rivalry are the major issues of interest for major powers making Gulf States as “pivotal actors in the global rebalancing between west and east<sup>193</sup>”. A recent addition to the list is the growing threat of piracy in vicinity of region which threatens the arteries of global commerce.

The Gulf remains the “axis and the centre of centre<sup>194</sup>” of the world. “Stability of the Gulf has been a victim of “flawed and short-sighted perceptions of different regional actors and extra-regional powers<sup>195</sup>” as to what should be the most ideal situation/ system in the Gulf. All major powers have pursued blind policies of own self-interest or that of their allies. While a majority of other Arab states have been of the short-sighted view that presence of an outside major power (such as US) can counter balance the potential regional threats (i.e. from Iran, Israel, and Iraq etc.). Accordingly major powers have always sought to pursue their strategic interests and exercise their influence in the Gulf. The region has seen rulers supported or deposed, rival powers engaged in battle or forced to retreat, alliances made and broken.

Apart from competing interests of major powers, any discussion of the Gulf stability-instability milieu would be incomplete without discussion on the role of regional powers. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel are the major regional players affecting security calculus of the Gulf region. Other significant regional countries are UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait

<sup>193</sup>*Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era*, ibid, 9

<sup>194</sup>ValdaniAsgarJafari, “Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf Security”, *International Journal of West Asian Studies* Vol. 3 No. 1, 2011 at [www.journalarticle.ukm.my/2036/1/index.pdf](http://www.journalarticle.ukm.my/2036/1/index.pdf), (accessed on 28 Jan 13)

<sup>195</sup> Ibid

and Oman etc. India, a regional power in vicinity and Pakistan, an Islamic nuclear power located right at the mouth of Gulf, also exercised influence in Gulf affairs due to competing interests and a large diaspora living in the Gulf region.

“Apart from hydrocarbons, the Gulf’s importance has also increased due to the appearance of large international business and finance centres, as well as to its capacity for investment and the growing presence of emerging powers (China and India). To this should be added the rise in Iran’s regional power (following the toppling of Saddam Hussein) and the tensions caused by its regional ambitions, especially with the US and Israel. It may be noted that Iran currently remains “the most-important country in the region<sup>196</sup>” with reference to future of Gulf stability. Though the interests of major powers and regional powers in the Gulf are intertwined, for ease of analysis, an attempt has been made in the succeeding paragraphs to examine these two dimensions separately.

### Interests of Global Powers

Due to great power struggle and the confluence of geo-politics and geo-economics in the region, the Gulf has always been a highly conflict-prone region in contemporary times. “Foreign powers in the Gulf uniformly considered the pursuit of security a military and geostrategic problem”.<sup>197</sup> Accordingly major powers have maintained presence in and around the Gulf region, apparently to further trade, but actually to maintain influence and stability, and to establish military presence that would protect their respective national interests. As highlighted by President Ronald Regan in the National Security Strategy of the United States 1987, “Our principal interests in the Middle East include maintaining regional stability, containing and reducing Soviet influence, preserving the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, and curbing state-sponsored terrorism... Our strategy in the region aims to ... help our friends in the Gulf protect themselves and international shipping lanes.”<sup>198</sup> In contemporary history, two distinct periods can be identified i.e. role of British in the stability of the Gulf before 1971 which remains distinct from that of US

<sup>196</sup>Hunter Robert E, “Building Security in the Persian Gulf” Washington: RAND, 2010, xiii

<sup>197</sup>Russell James A., “Critical Issues Facing the Middle East Security, Politics and Economics”, New York: Palgrave, 2006, 3

<sup>198</sup>US National Security Strategy Archives, at <http://nssarchive.us/>, (accessed on 30 May 2013)

later with reference to different approaches to Gulf stability. The British were instrumental in dominating the regional dynamics especially around the two World Wars, carving out borders on geo-political expediency and naked national interest. “The British sponsored Balfour declaration”<sup>199</sup> which led to the creation of the State of Israel right inside the Arabian heartland unleashed the forces of instability which continue to send tremors far and wide. “It would be prudent to recall here that the fundamental underlying cause for Osama Bin Laden to take up arms against the west was the unresolved, “most intractable and tragic”<sup>200</sup> Palestine dispute. Hence the 9/11 which shook the world had its roots firmly planted in the security dynamics of the Gulf. Furthermore, the region since 1980s has witnessed three large-scale international wars: the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-88 egged on behind the scene by USA, the First Gulf War in 1990/91 under UN flag to evict Iraq from Kuwait and the unilaterally US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the pretext of WMDs which led to regime change in Iraq. A consequence and cause of this state of perpetual conflict is that the main countries in the Gulf have for decades spent huge amounts of resources on all kinds of conventional weapons and on maintaining oversized armed forces, both in terms of troop numbers and the percentage of the GDP allocated to them. However, rather than enhancing their individual security, this has merely generated a constant climate of mistrust and has strengthened the rivalry between the neighbouring countries in the Gulf, while increasing the likelihood that a minor dispute can blow up into an unintended military confrontation. This Causus Belli has been one of the main reasons which has been played up by major powers to sell arms in the region and support friendly puppet regimes to maintain foothold in the region.

“The threats to stability of Gulf countries go beyond the conventional risks associated with the use of military force and include ideological and “asymmetric threats”<sup>201</sup>, related to the transnational identities in the region, religious threats (different interpretations of Islam, some opposed to the official version of each country) and, lastly, ethno-sectarian threats (divisions between Sunnis and Shias, and between Arabs, Kurds etc). “These identities have proved to be useful for leaders and ideologues as cross-border social

<sup>199</sup> “The Balfour Declaration of 1917,” [http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/balfour\\_declaration\\_of\\_1917.htm](http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/balfour_declaration_of_1917.htm) , accessed 28 Jan 13

<sup>200</sup> Fraser T G, “*The Arab-Israeli Conflict*” England: Palgrave, 2004, 1

<sup>201</sup> Robert E Hunter, *Ibid*, xiv

mobilization drivers, thus generating mistrust between neighbours and manoeuvres to anticipate or counterattack in ideological battles.”<sup>202</sup> It is because of internal reasons, such as the authoritarian nature of their political systems and the rentier nature of their economies, as well as regional rivalries and tension, that the international, and domestic, policies of the Gulf regimes have traditionally been focused on considerations conditioned to a large extent by security. This factor has increased their reliance on foreign major powers for provision of diplomatic support and military security.

“On the other hand, when seen from the outside perspective, the heavy dependence of the international system on the Gulf states’ energy resources has conditioned their international relations, making them highly complex and subject to the establishment of alliances with Gulf countries to defend or challenge the status quo and to address security dilemmas”<sup>203</sup> which often lead to paradoxes and contradictions. Accordingly, the Arab countries in the Gulf have chosen to outsource their security by resorting to seeking the protection of foreign powers, mainly the US, thus opening the door to foreign military presence in the region. One of the paradoxes is that this dependence on foreign powers undermines the internal legitimacy of the petro-monarchies and encourages local opposition movements against the major powers (such as Al-Qaeda) which complicate interest-matrix of major powers.

To comprehend the interests of major powers in the region, it would be helpful to answer the question as to why did a majority of the people living in the USA think it in their interest to send half a million soldiers 6,000 miles away to the Gulf (Gulf War I and II)? The simplest answer could be one word, oil. “This can be gleaned from one of the placards displayed during a peace march; "If Kuwait exported broccoli, we wouldn't be there now”<sup>204</sup>. However, like most of the anti-war slogans, this too oversimplifies the truth in an emotional framework. Gulf oil accounts for less than five percent of America's energy consumption. Japan, which is highly dependent on Gulf oil, did not send troops, while Britain, which exports oil, did send troops. In this way oil is not the

<sup>202</sup> Amirah-FernándezHaizam, Ibid

<sup>203</sup> Sokolsky Richard D., “*United States and the Persian Gulf; Re-Shaping Security Strategy for the Post Containment Era*”, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.2003

<sup>204</sup> Nye Jr Joseph S., “Why the Gulf War saved National Interest,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1991, <http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/91jul/nye.htm>, (accessed 6 Feb 13)

entirety answer. Different viewpoints of the response incorporate ‘a new world order’, aggregate security, interdependence, avoidance of territorial hegemony... This part of the paper will attempt to discern the competing as well as at times converging interests of various major powers in the Gulf.

#### 4.1 Evolution of Gulf Security Architecture in British Era

Since the West’s hunger for oil converted “Gulf hub of worldwide governmental issues in the early twentieth century, outer forces need overwhelmed territorial framework.”<sup>205</sup>. The British vicinity in the Gulf stretched out past the UK’s withdrawal starting with India 1947. Till 1970, the United Kingdom developed its security umbrella in the area. Furthermore, Britain created proxy regimes, seconded officers from troops in well-chosen bases, seaward maritime forces supported propped up cordial legislatures. Regardless of incidental sensational transforms in the region, Britain avoided significant clashes notably Iraqi transformations done in 1958, progressive coups, destabilizing weights concerning Iraqi dangers to Kuwait were deterred, insurgents for Oman were defeated, and Bedouin nationalism in Saudi Arabia were minimized. Nonetheless, the rise of Bedouin patriotism and a declining economy compelled Britain and provided enough reasons for complete withdrawal from the lands starting from 1961. That might have been times when the tiny states such as Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar picked up their freedom after decades under British insurance (Kuwait has attained to be autonomous a decade earlier followed by Oman). This made all the more incentives for those bigger territorial forces (Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq) to go after the more impact in this tri-polar territorial framework.

#### 4.2 US Interests

An analysis of the earlier State of the Union Addresses and US National Security Strategies from 1974 till 2010 indicates that Gulf region has dominated US security calculus since an early time. This can be gleaned from following excerpts:-

1. **State of the Union Address by US President Richard Nixon January 30, 1974.** “In all of the 186 State of the Union messages delivered from this place, in

<sup>205</sup> “A New Persian Gulf Security System”, Ibid.

our history this is the first in which the one priority, the first priority, is energy...I can announce tonight that I have been assured, through my personal contacts with friendly leaders in the Middle Eastern area, that an urgent meeting will be called in the immediate future to discuss the lifting of the oil embargo...Just as 1970 was the year in which we began a full-scale effort to protect the environment, 1974 must be the year in which we organize a full-scale effort to provide for our energy needs, not only in this decade but through the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Let us press vigorously on toward the goal I announced last November for Project Independence. Let this be our national goal: At the end of this decade, in the year 1980, the United States will not be dependent on any other country for the energy we need to provide our jobs, to heat our homes, and to keep our transportation moving... we will be working with the other nations of the world toward agreement on means by which oil supplies can be assured at reasonable prices on a stable basis.”<sup>206</sup>

2. **National Security Strategy of the United States 1987 by President Ronald Reagan.** “Our principal interests in the Middle East include maintaining regional stability, containing and reducing Soviet influence, preserving the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, and curbing state-sponsored terrorism... Our strategy in the region aims to ... help our friends in the Gulf protect themselves and international shipping lanes”.<sup>207</sup>

3. **National Security Strategy of the United States 1990 by President George H W Bush:**

- i) “The free world's reliance on energy supplies from this pivotal region (Gulf) and our strong ties with many of the region's countries continue to constitute important interests of the United States... Therefore, we will maintain a naval presence in the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.
- ii) Secure supplies of energy are essential to our prosperity and security. The concentration of 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves in the Gulf

<sup>206</sup> American Presidents Blog, at <http://www.american-presidents.org/2005/01/richard-nixon-state-of-union-addresses.html>, accessed on 12 May 2013.

<sup>207</sup>US National Security Strategy Archives, at <http://nssarchive.us/>, (accessed on 30 May 2013)

means we must continue to ensure reliable access to competitively priced oil and a prompt, adequate response to any major oil supply disruption.”<sup>208</sup>

**4. National Security Strategy of the United States 1994 by President Bill Clinton.**

- i) “The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially pursuing a comprehensive breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices.
- ii) A key objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states. Therefore, we will continue to encourage members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to work closely on collective defence and security arrangements, help individual GCC states meet their appropriate defence requirements and maintain our bilateral defence agreements.”<sup>209</sup>

**5. National Security Strategy of the United States 2002 by President George Bush.** “This NSS followed the 9/11, hence it was heavily premised against need for war on terror. Accordingly, Middle East, Gulf or energy security did not find a specific mention. However, the emphasis on internal reforms in Muslim world can be clearly seen, “The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel.”<sup>210</sup>

**6. National Security Strategy of the United States 2010 by President Barack Obama:**

- i) “The United States has important interests in the greater Middle East. They include broad cooperation on a wide range of issues .... The transformation of Iranian policy away from its pursuit of nuclear weapons, ....access to energy...

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid

<sup>209</sup> Ibid

<sup>210</sup> Ibid

- ii) As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources .... Our energy dependence will continue to undermine our security and prosperity”.
- iii) The U.S. also will continue to develop our key security relationships in the region with such Arab states as with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—partnerships that enable our militaries and defence systems to work together more effectively....we seek to advance shared security interests, such as through NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the GCC.”<sup>211</sup>

7. **State of the Union Address by US President Barak Obama 2013.** “In the Middle East, we will stand with citizens as they demand their universal rights, and support stable transitions to democracy. The process will be messy, and we cannot presume to dictate the course of change in countries like Egypt; but we can – and will – insist on respect for the fundamental rights of all people. We will keep the pressure on a Syrian regime that has murdered its own people, and support opposition leaders that respect the rights of every Syrian. And we will stand steadfast with Israel in pursuit of security and a lasting peace. These are the messages I will deliver when I travel to the Middle East next month.”<sup>212</sup>

### **Analysis of the Evolving US Interests in Gulf**

With Britain’s withdrawal, the United States developed interest in those parts of the Gulf. From the outset, “the United States considered to stay away from an exorbitant and unwelcome forward vicinity in the region, instead adopted a policy relying on once territorial partners and pro-American regimes to monitor a security framework there. US presence in that region also provided capacity to intervene militarily when required.”<sup>213</sup>

Major strands of the US policy were as follows:

<sup>211</sup> Ibid

<sup>212</sup> <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/transcript-president-barack-obamas-2013-state-union-address/story?id=18480069&page=10> , accessed 29 May 2014

<sup>213</sup> Anthony Cordesman, “US Strategy in the Gulf: Shaping and Communicating US Plans for the Future in a Time of Region-Wide Change and Instability” Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 14Apr 2011, available at [www.csis.org/burke/reports](http://www.csis.org/burke/reports), accessed on 20 Apr 2013

“As far back as in 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had said that ‘the defence of Saudi Arabia is essential for the defence of the US’. The same support for its allies in the Gulf was also expressed by other US Presidents such as Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon.

Since World War II, American ships have been patrolling the Gulf to keep the sea-lanes open and the West’s vital supply of oil flowing. However, it was not until the events of 1979 that Washington announced the so-called ‘Carter Doctrine’, by which the US declared its willingness to use military force, if required, to defend its national interests in the Gulf.”<sup>214</sup>

In the 1970s, the United States used the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure stability and to contain threats to the status quo. Iran was effective in the 1970s in helping to crush Dhofari rebels in Oman and in marginalizing Soviet-backed Baathist Iraq. But the dependence of the United States on Iran and Saudi Arabia tied its fortunes to regimes of dubious legitimacy (and uncertain tenure). The United States supported Iranian and Saudi autocrats out of strategic expedience and fear of radical alternatives. Political reform was not on the American agenda; American diplomats and intelligence operatives had virtually no contact with reformist and other opposition elements. This policy ended badly for the United States in Iran. The initial US-managed system collapsed when a popular uprising spearheaded by radical clerics swept away the Shah. A strategy based on structures of power without regard to internal governance proved to be only as stable as its least stable pillar. This led US policy makers to discern that stability demanded legitimacy which was crucial for building a new Gulf order. Similarly, in demise of Shah of Iran, US policy makers came to the conclusion that sole dependence on local powers, without own major presence, can be self-deluding especially if the local powers are prone to fail or change. Fearing Iranian revolutionary expansionism, during the 1980s the United States turned, with misgivings, to Iraq to balance the Islamic Republic, as well as to the newly enriched GCC states to bankroll the Iraqi military. At the same time, given the military weakness of the GCC states and lacking the strong pillar previously provided by Iran, the United States began to be drawn more directly into the region, against its better judgment. “After the Shah’s fall, the Rapid Deployment Force, organized by the

<sup>214</sup>Yoshihara Toshi and Richard Sokolsky, “The United States and China in the Persian Gulf: Challenges and Opportunities”, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol 6, Winter/Spring 2002

U.S. Department of Defense, and growing U.S. investment in regional military bases, such as Masira and Bahrain, highlighted this trend. Dependence on Iraq to contain Iran backfired when the former attacked the latter in 1980.”<sup>215</sup> And plans to build up the GCC military proved futile, as the Gulf Arabs showed little aptitude for, or interest in, modern warfare. In August 1990, the U.S. strategy of relying on Iraq and the Gulf states came to a spectacular end when the former attacked Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. “The principal U.S. enemy at the time, revolutionary Iran, acted prudently in the Gulf during and after that war.”<sup>216</sup> Under the rubric of dual containment and lacking confidence in the ability of the GCC states to contribute to their own defence, the United States shifted from reliance on regional friends to an even more muscular forward presence. This involved a large-scale build-up of U.S. forces in the region, as well as basing, prepositioning, and exercises to support reinforcement in crises. “This forward presence was accompanied by even larger arms sales to the GCC states (notwithstanding their inability to use what they had previously bought) in the attempt to provide some pro-U.S. indigenous military capability to complement U.S. forces.”<sup>217</sup>

“After Desert Storm, the Department of Defence began to treat a conventional military threat to the Gulf from either Iran or Iraq as one of its canonical major war scenarios. With Soviet threats to Europe and East Asia gone by 1991, the Gulf became the central theatre in U.S. strategic thinking and force planning.”<sup>218</sup> From then on, the requirement to conduct large-scale expeditionary warfare in the Gulf, spurred on by both Iran and Iraq’s use of asymmetric military strategies, has accounted for a large share of total U.S. military operating, force-structure, and investment costs.

During the 1990s, important intra-regional developments occurred beneath the U.S. security blanket. “Within the GCC, the emergence of Qatar as an independent player

<sup>215</sup> “A New Persian Gulf Security System”, Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Kuffel Glenn P., Jr. “The Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsular Shield Force” *US Naval War College*, Feb 2000, at [www.nwc.edu](http://www.nwc.edu), (accessed on 21 May 2013).

<sup>217</sup> BarzegarKayhan, “The Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian View” *Belfer Centre* available at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20359/balance\\_of\\_power\\_in\\_the\\_persian\\_gulf.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20359/balance_of_power_in_the_persian_gulf.html) (accessed on 13 June 2013)

<sup>218</sup> US National Security Strategy 1990 Archives, Ibid.

shook up relationships within the six-member grouping.”<sup>219</sup> More important, Iran gradually, and in zigzag fashion, moved towards accepting some tenets of a more moderate security approach, albeit with the proviso that what Tehran saw as Iran’s natural leadership in the Gulf be recognized. This was accompanied by the appearance of a pro-reform movement and the holding of (fairly) democratic elections in Iran. Of course, Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah and its quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction prolonged American antipathy towards Tehran, even as Iran’s revolutionary fervour began to fracture and abate. Iranian moderation in the immediate region even led to hopes that, between the GCC and Iran at least, tentative steps towards cooperative measures, such as Confidence Building Measures (CBM), could be taken. By the late 1990s, the evolution of Iran and its external conduct held out the promise that the daunting challenge of dual containment of the Gulf’s two strongest states would not be required in perpetuity. In one of history’s crueller ironies, it was the U.S. failure to contain Iraq that destabilized the whole region, and in the wake of 9/11, led to regime change in Iraq and further embroiling of US in the region’s security calculus.

Before 2003, any change in the regional *status quo* was considered by the US as a threat that put its dominance in danger. However, the neo-cons in the George W. Bush Administration decided to alter the traditional focus with that of ‘remaking’ the region through the transformation of their political systems. By using preventive war and regime change, Bush tried to secure US interests at the risk of altering regional stability and the balance of power. Time is proving that the neo-cons approach has succeeded in achieving the opposite of what it intended. The US went from using countries in the region during the 1970s and 1980s in protecting its interests to intervening directly and repeatedly in the 1990s. In this way, it moved from being the guarantor of regional stability at a distance to becoming the military hegemon, though in doing so it has been caught up in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq, for which it cannot find satisfactory solutions, although President Obama is trying to return to the traditional focus of placing stability before all other considerations.

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<sup>219</sup>Wright Steven, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Autonomy and Security” quoted in “International Relations of the Gulf”, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009, at <http://qatar.sfs.georgetown.edu>. (Accessed on 25 May 2013)

Despite the withdrawal of battle troops from Iraq in 2011, the United States administers critical national security diversions in the Gulf region. The investment requirements have necessitated to ensure protection and have propelled to proactive political, military and other measures, including commitment to ensure safety of sea routes and trafficability all around the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, “presence of US in Middle East provides latitude to approach vital interests in the area.” <sup>220</sup>:-

1. Preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital to the US, global and regional economies.
2. Discouraging interstate conflicts that can threaten allies (including Israel) and jeopardize other interests.
3. Ensuring transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations.
4. Countering spread of extremism and terrorism.
5. Stemming the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons.
6. Promoting economic growth, democracy, and human rights.

The US posturing towards the Gulf countries in pursuit of her national interest is the demonstration of realists’ explanation of power beyond the state. US is using her military muscle to ensure that the balance of power remains in her favour to be the prime beneficiary of resource rich Gulf countries.

## ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS

### 4.3 Russian Interests

The Cold war between Russia and the West and its impact has persuaded Vladimir Putin, who in retrospect laments the break-up of the Soviet Union, about Russia’s misfortune for superpower status. Particularly, as much as latent agreeability with George W. Bush’s intrusion of Iraq that would provide Moscow to concentrate on her budgetary and geostrategic standpoints beyond a reasonable doubt. The war hit Russia’s financial burden of the tune for \$8 billion alongside unfulfilled bargains also brought about the mushrooming about US military bases for Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia..

For as much determination should muscle again under those region, Putin need couple of doubts regarding fashioning unholy alliances for anti-Western nations on the support ‘the

<sup>220</sup>Darrell J. Bennett, Jr. “From the Carter to the Bush Doctrine: An In-Depth Analysis of US Middle Eastern Policy” Center for the Study of the Presidency, 27 Apr 2007, Morehouse College

adversary for my adversary may be my friend’ and also common diversions and imparted ambitions.”<sup>221</sup> Unlike the majority of the world, Moscow needs minimal dread of a nuclear-armed Iran. Indeed, it will be a standout amongst Tehran’s significant weapons suppliers For quite some time, it gave “Iran organization and equipment for atomic and rocket engineering. Today, it actively helps Iran’s atomic system and profits from exchange arrangements of atomic reactor parts should be more than \$4 billion yearly.”<sup>222</sup>

Moscow has set itself up as a buffer against any attempt by the international community to use UN sanctions or military intervention to halt the carnage in Syria and actively props-up Iran’s closest ally President Bashar Al-Assad. “Iraqi leader Nouri Al-Maliki’s visit with Russian partner Dmitry Medvedev might have been fixed with rebuilding for reciprocal collaboration in various fields, including diplomatic, military, aeronautics and more trade.”<sup>223</sup> In October 2012, “Russia reported marking of a \$4. 2 billion arms agreement will incorporate MI-28 assault helicopters and Pantsir-21 surface-to-air rocket frameworks.”<sup>224</sup>

#### 4.4 Chinese Interests

Unlike the association for Iran and Iraq, China’s relations with the GCC began late as the GCC states were created in the late 1960s to 1970s. Moreover, the GCC was formally created just for 1981. In the 1980s, China secured discretionary binds for other more diminutive states in the Gulf, including the UAE in 1984, Qatar to 1988 and Bahrain by 1989. Yet, it might have been not until 1990 that China made discretionary relationship for the territorial power, Saudi Arabia. This final formalization of bilateral relations resulted from the following initiatives – supporting the Chinese Muslims to the Hajj, In 2010, over 13,000 Chinese Muslims were organized to make pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia, sending Muslim scholars abroad to attend various Islamic conferences at different levels, dispatching business delegations to Riyadh and selling missiles. When President Hu Jintao visited Riyadh for the first time in 2006, the two countries reached consensus

<sup>221</sup>Grummon Stephen, “Russian Ambitions in the Persian Gulf” *Middle East Quarterly*/ March 1995, available at <http://www.meforum.org/247/russian-ambitions-in-the-persian-gulf> (accessed on 10 Nov 12)

<sup>222</sup>Al HabtoorKhalaf Ahmad, ‘Gulf pawn in new ‘Great Game’, Arab Times, at <http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smld/414/ArticleID/189064/reftab/69/Default.aspx>, (accessed on Mar 2013)

<sup>223</sup>“Gulf States, Russia Differ on Solution to Syrian Crisis” Arab News 7 Feb 2013

<sup>224</sup>Khalaf Ahmad Al Habtoor, Ibid.

in establishing “strategic friendly relations”. When China was struck by a severe earthquake in May 2008, “Saudi Arabia donated US\$ 60 million to the stricken areas, becoming the largest donor to the Chinese government.”<sup>225</sup>

China’s rise is shaping up to be the most salient development of international politics and economics in the early 21st century, and Beijing is increasingly searching for stable sources of energy to power its ballooning economy. This has meant that China’s relations with resource-rich Gulf States have become more intensive even as Beijing has become more pragmatic in its approach to the region. Whereas once China viewed events in the Gulf region through the lens of its own ideology, its relations with Gulf nations are now driven more by energy concerns. “Chinese state-owned oil companies are now aggressively bidding for contracts in the Gulf, and there is a clear Chinese presence in regional commerce.”<sup>226</sup> However, energy commerce is not the only aspect of invigorated relations between China and Gulf nations, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq. China’s rise as an export power has also presented Middle Eastern merchants with the opportunity to travel to China in search of cheap goods, while the Gulf is an increasingly important source of capital for Chinese financial institutions. With the United States acting as a security guarantor in the region, Beijing’s reluctance to take a stance on political issues means that Washington is increasingly irritated by what it sees as China’s free ride on American security. Worse, it is not altogether clear that Beijing views the U.S. presence as a stabilizing force in the Gulf, a perception gap that may be a source of friction between the two great powers in years to come. “China increasingly sees Iran as an important partner in the region. Though China openly opposes any military action against Iran, it has adopted a very cautious approach, given Tehran’s nuclear provocations. China’s (and in tandem, Russia’s) support to Iran is now of obvious concern to the United States.”<sup>227</sup>

The rapidly expanding economic relationships for China in the region mean that, from an American perspective at least, China benefits from U.S. security guarantees. There is something inherently unstable about a region that relies on the West for security and the

<sup>225</sup><http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/gjlb/2878/> (accessed 27 Jan 2013)

<sup>226</sup>Ibid, 62.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, 3.

East for prosperity. Since 2000, there have been growing interactions between China and the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), especially in the economic field. This relationship is cemented on China's growing oil demands and boosted by China's going-out strategy. "The attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 and the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion in 2003 have transformed the geo-political and geo-economic balance in the Gulf."<sup>228</sup> On the Gulf side, frequent visits of high-level Gulf officials to China suggest that there are growing signals of seeking for a new strategic partner to offset the US influence, by 'looking east'. China has become an important alternative. One notable visit was that of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2006 when he made China his first overseas destination after his coronation. "On the Chinese side, the government is aware the significance of the Gulf from the energy supply perspective, as well as its geo-implications."<sup>229</sup> China's growing presence in the Middle East has alarmed the West.

At the institutional level, China and the GCC signed the Framework Agreement on Economic, Trade, Investment and Technological Cooperation. To both China and the GCC, the political implications of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were reflected in two major areas. One was to diversify oil-import sources/export destinations. The balance of US dominancy of the region was an other factor. The GCC leadership felt a vital need to trim down US existence in the region after 9/11. Hence, GCC tended for alternatives in the East. Consequently, 'China-GCC FTA first round of negotiation was launched in January 2005.'<sup>230</sup> The trade between China and GCC states expanded at an "exponential rate (\$350 billion and \$500 billion by 2020). So for the trade structure including oil, natural gas and chemical products are concerned the major products from the GCC are exported to China. However from China garments, fabrics, electronic and telecommunication exported to the GCC. Ever since the 1990s, the UAE became the

<sup>228</sup>Jamal Al-Suwaidi, "International Interests in the Gulf Region", (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004)

<sup>229</sup>Palonkorpi Mikko, "Energy Security and the Regional Security Complex Theory", *Aleksanteri Institute / University of Helsinki* available at [mikko.palonkorpi@helsinki.fi](mailto:mikko.palonkorpi@helsinki.fi) (accessed on 12 Jan 2013)

<sup>230</sup> Bryce Wakefield and Susan L. Levenstein, *Ibid.*

most important location for China's manufactured products to be re-exported to the neighbouring countries.”<sup>231</sup>




Figure 4.1 China's Imports from GCC<sup>232</sup>




Figure 4.2 China's Exports to GCC<sup>233</sup>

<sup>231</sup>Afshin Molavi, "The New Silkroad, "Chindia," and the Geo-Economic ties that Bind Middle East and Asia" quoted in "China and the Persian Gulf: Implications for United States", 48

<sup>232</sup>Yoshihara Toshi and Richard Sokolsky, "The United States and China in the Persian Gulf: Challenges and Opportunities", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol 6, Winter/Spring 2002

<sup>233</sup> Ibid

China's diversions in the Gulf might grow past economics and energy, though China's primary interests in the short and medium term is focus on economic and energy cooperation.

#### 4.5 European Union (EU) Interests

It is worth mentioning that the "GCC is EU's fifth largest export market (€75 Bn's worth of exports in 2011), and EU is the group's biggest trading partner, with trade flows totalling €130 billion, or 13.5% of the GCC's global trade."<sup>234</sup> Most of Europe's fuel needs come from the Gulf. That is why oil has become a matter of national security for the EU, the world's second largest consumer of the precious fuel after the US. In spite of the vitality of trade relations between the EU and GCC, European nations made a back-situate in the Gulf's international relations. The EU's endeavours to apply an 'inter-regional' logic to its relationship with the petro-monarchies as a way of encouraging stability through political reforms and economic liberalization have met with little success. "The chief European nations have close relationships with the Gulf monarchies, which could explain their preference for strengthening bilateral policies as opposed to multilateral ones. One example was the opening by Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2009 of the first permanent French military base in the area, in Abu Dhabi."<sup>235</sup> Major changes are taking place on the European continent, albeit very slowly with reference to having a parallel but independent role from NATO to manifest European identity. One of the manifestations of this policy is the deployed European Naval Task force off the Gulf for anti-piracy operations. This appears as a symbolic move only at present as European countries simultaneously contribute warships to the Task forces operating under US leadership as well. However as a separate European identity in security and defence domain takes shape in future, the scope of EU's interaction with Gulf can drastically change.

#### 4.6 Japan's Interests

Since Japan is essentially completely dependent on foreign oil, over 90 per cent imports passing through the Straits of Hormuz, things that endanger the supply understandably

<sup>234</sup> "EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)" available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf\\_cooperation/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_cooperation/index_en.htm) accessed on 26 June 2013.

<sup>235</sup> Haizam Amirah-Fernández, *Ibid*.

make them very nervous, like a war in and around Gulf between America, possibly Israel, and Iran. On the other hand, as to correct perceptions of Japanese interests, having Russia and China increase their power in the Middle East at American expense isn't a good thing for how most people would see Japanese interests either. Israel's interests in the Gulf are of course derived from Iran's nuclear program and more generally from Iran's definition of Israel as an enemy to be attacked from points of convenience, e.g. Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas. Thus, some can argue that “Japanese and Israeli interests in the Gulf collide.”<sup>236</sup>

#### 4.7 Australia’s Interests

Australia may be far off from Gulf, but by virtue of a part of West’s coalition efforts, it has an enduring interest in the Gulf region. A policy brief on the subject identifies that there are “substantial, diverse and growing Australian economic interests in the Gulf, our interests in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.”<sup>237</sup> The brief recommended that “Australian policy-makers should view the Gulf as an area of priority strategic interest distinct from the wider Middle East. Given our ongoing interest in the region and limited resources to influence outcomes, the government should identify a key regional partner with whom to develop a strategic partnership.”<sup>238</sup> Hence, Australia by virtue of its military capacity may not matter much, however being a modernized country it adds weight to any international effort. “Australia is also pursuing a Free Trade Agreement with GCC countries since 2007. Its interest to remain engaged with Gulf is indicative of the sensitivity of the issue and importance of region for Australia.”<sup>239</sup>

#### Interests of Regional Powers / Countries

Having analysed interests of major powers in the Gulf, it is now pertinent to have a detailed look at the interests of regional powers. Before discussing individual countries, it will be prudent to have a working knowledge of the GCC which, despite its limitations, is

<sup>236</sup>Rich Don, “Are Israel & Japan's Interest in Persian Gulf Colliding?” 12 August 2012 available at [http://open.salon.com/blog/don\\_rich/2012/08/12/are\\_israel\\_japans\\_interest\\_in\\_perisan\\_gulf\\_colliding](http://open.salon.com/blog/don_rich/2012/08/12/are_israel_japans_interest_in_perisan_gulf_colliding), (accessed on 26 June 2013)

<sup>237</sup>Rodger Shanahan, “Why the Gulf Matters: Crafting an Australian Security Policy for the Arabian Gulf, at [www.mercury.ethz.ch/.../Shanahan,+Why+the+Gulf+matters\\_web.pdf](http://www.mercury.ethz.ch/.../Shanahan,+Why+the+Gulf+matters_web.pdf), (accessed on 3 Feb 13)

<sup>238</sup>Ibid

<sup>239</sup>“Australia-Gulf Cooperation Council Free Trade Agreement”, Australian Govt Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/agccfta/> accessed on 26 June 2013.

the main collective grouping in the area. It is a great irony that the regional countries have played as pawns in the hands of super powers of the time to lead in the security effort in the Gulf Region. Over and over again, the interested powers chose one against another and kept the pot boiling. This arrangement has worked up to this day, at least to the benefit of the outside powers in particular and world in general, if not the Gulf itself. We shall now see each regional player's role in the Gulf.

#### 4.8 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It was “established in May 1981 as a response of the Arab petro-monarchies in the Gulf to the regional ambitions of the revolutionary Iran of Khomeini, as well as to the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran some months earlier.”<sup>240</sup> The US endorsed its creation under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, the largest of the six members and the one with the most resources. In this way, “Riyadh was guaranteed the support of its smaller neighbours and increased its influence within the tri-polar regional system against Iraq and Iran.”<sup>241</sup> Nonetheless, the sadistic events that have occurred in the region since then have tinted the limitations of the GCC as an organization of regional cooperation, “making it transparent that its members have a preference their bilateral relationships with the US to any regional agreement.”<sup>242</sup> Consequently escalating interests of major powers in GCC have decided on not to develop a regional framework of cooperation in the field of security, rather preferring to uphold a level from claiming coordination as views of danger and their response to them. “Since GCC created, the security and stability of its members has depended on three factors:-

1. Protection provided by the US.
2. Diplomacy they exercise to avoid and neutralize conflicts.
3. Creation of internal alliances.”<sup>243</sup>

<sup>240</sup> “The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf” available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/> (accessed on 26 June 2013)

<sup>241</sup> “The Persian Gulf as a Regional Security Complex” available at <http://policytensor.com/2011/11/17/the-persian-gulf-as-a-regional-security-complex/> accessed on 26 June 2013.

<sup>242</sup> Haizam Amirah-Fernández, Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

However, these three levels reflect the organization's limitations. Despite the obvious need to create a strategic alliance, several structural problems have made it impossible to achieve this goal. The nature of the regional regimes, the fear of the GCC's smaller members of the enormous power of Saudi Arabia, as well as the general lack of confidence in their own defence capacity, have meant that there are still no common policies within the Council. Its function is to accommodate common interests while preserving the individual safety of each ruling family. Many complexities faced would-be architects of a lasting stability order in the Gulf. First, there are three potential poles (Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, Iran, and Iraq). While, in the past, Saudi Arabia has preferred the strategic and political power status quo, Iran and Iraq have not. Neither one is content with the existing balance of power or with the American sword of Damocles that preserves it. At times, it is not clear that even the largest equity holder in the status quo, Saudi Arabia, welcomes U.S. intervention to preserve regional security. "Iran feels that its rightful position as leading power in the Gulf has been denied; Iraq of the Saddam era had both ambitions to be a major player in the Arab world and deep insecurities resulting from the fact that actual and potential enemies sit astride its oil export routes. How the present day Iraq will respond to the Gulf dynamics is yet to be seen; however an independent decision making by Iraq is yet a decade down the road."<sup>244</sup>

Second, there is no symmetry among the three poles. "Iran's geography and population give it a naturally dominant position and strategic depth."<sup>245</sup> Iraq was able to race with Iranian power in the 1970s and 1980s, but only by an unsustainable and oppressive militarization of its society and economy. The GCC states have tremendous fossil and financial power, but they have been unable to translate this into the strategic weight needed to balance Iran. This dynamic means that the region has been run according to the principles of realpolitik but without the preconditions of success, namely the ability to find balance and general acceptance of the status quo. Consequently, this region has remained dangerous to its peoples and to the rest of the world even as other regions have become more secure. On a global level, the new security thinking championed, ironically,

<sup>244</sup> Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, "A New Persian Gulf Security System", Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Suzanne Maloney, "Bridging The Gulf? Iran And A Changing GCC" June 25, 2013, Brookings, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2013/06/25-bahrain-qatar-iran-gcc-gulf> accessed on 26 June 2013.

by Gorbachev and Reagan in the 1980s coincided with a broader definition of security in Western thinking to include economic and political legitimacy. The decline of a traditional realist perception of international relations and an end to zero-sum notions of national security allowed more room for cooperative security. Concepts of cooperative security gained ground in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America during the 1990s. In these regions, recast security systems were reinforced by political transformation, which provides the underlying stability—the kind that both fosters and depends on meaningful reform—that is missing in the Gulf. However, despite talk of a Gulf cooperative security regime in the mid-1990s, such concepts had little traction. The balance of power has remained unstable even in the traditional sense. “Even the GCC is a defensive alignment against the other Gulf powers, rather than a real cooperative security system.”<sup>246</sup>

### **GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force**<sup>247</sup>

During Iran-Iraq war, members of the GCC formed a standing coalition force, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). It is a land force comprising infantry, armour, artillery, and combat support elements from all GCC countries. It is mandated for “defending GCC state.”<sup>248</sup> It has shown moderate performance during several Gulf crisis, most conspicuously during 1991 Gulf War. The greatest obstruction to the Force's development has been political limitations. Resultantly, Peninsula Shield Force experiences problems in operational readiness, weapon systems, interoperability and manning. Nevertheless, it has achieved some milestones such as establishment of a permanent Headquarters, annual military exercises, and two deployments to Kuwait as a show of force during Iran-Iraq war and in 1994 in response to an Iraqi troop build-up on the Iraq-Kuwait border. More recently, Peninsula Shield action in Bahrain seems to have complicated prospects for political compromise in Bahrain. The Force needs to fully develop its military capabilities in order to enable it to effectively defend GCC state's borders. Till then, GCC states will have to rely on outside intervention, mainly by US, for their stability.

<sup>246</sup>Hajjar Dr. Sami G., “U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf: Challenges and Prospects”, *Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army WarCollege* available at

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=185> (accessed on 26 June 2013)

<sup>247</sup> Glenn P. Kuffel, Jr. Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Military Cooperation brief on GC website, available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/> accessed on 20 June 2013.

*Maintaining Peninsula Shield Force by the GCC States is what can be called as pursuing the “Power Beyond the State” prong of the proposed Stability Instability Regime Theory.* The GCC States seem to have realized over a period of time that dependence on foreign guarantors for security cannot be relied upon wholly. They appear to be pursuing self-reliance strategy to influence beyond the state.

### **Syria Conflict and Interest of Gulf States**<sup>249</sup>

The ongoing civil war in Syria offers the Gulf States an opportunity to weaken or even dislodge Assad regime which is aligned with Iran, but their ability to project power or shape events in Syria is very limited. Dislike of the Assad regime doesn't necessarily align Gulf interests for working out a long-term vision of Syria. Moreover, cooperation on diplomacy and strategy is lacking. Sectarianism, most evidenced in media commentary and clerical statements, is already a major feature of Gulf discourse on Syria. “Parts of the Syrian opposition have approached and have been courted by Gulf governments. Still, a degree of unease and mistrust continues to define their relations.”<sup>250</sup>

“The Gulf States were taken by surprise when the Syrian uprising started.”<sup>251</sup> Sensing the opportunity yet wary of danger, they at first remained silent. And while they seemed headed towards a political and regional status quo, the stability of which looked increasingly uncertain, staying out of the fray seemed the best course of action. They were unwilling and unable to assume the political and strategic costs of either investing in the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or encouraging a negotiated settlement. Since then, however, unabated regime violence, enduring popular mobilization against it, prospects of a protracted sectarian war and Syrian accusations against several Gulf states have influenced the outlook and calculations of Gulf rulers. There was already little love for the Assad regime in Gulf capitals prior to the uprising. The list of Gulf state grievances stems from a host of issues, from its Ba’athist, Alawite, pseudo-secular, pseudo-republican character and socialist economy, to a history of alignment with the Soviet Union, an alliance with Iran, support for terrorist groups and

<sup>249</sup>Hukayem Emi Li, “The Gulf States and Syria”, *USIP*, Sep 30, 2011

<sup>250</sup>Jonathan Masters, "Syria's Crisis and the Global Response" *Council on Foreign Relations*, Oct 2012 available at [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org) (accessed on 5 Feb 2013)

<sup>251</sup> Georg Oftedal, *Ibid.*

Palestinian factions, and meddling in Lebanon. Still, the longevity of the regime, its canny ability to play a regional role despite weak attributes of power and its surprising resilience to outside pressure modified Gulf attitudes toward Damascus. In addition, as “with most regional challenges there exists, no uniformity of views and few shared interests regarding Syria among the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).”<sup>252</sup> As a result, and especially in recent years, the Gulf States stood divided. Concerned by Syria’s perceived enabling of Iranian penetration into the Arab world and suspected responsibility in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a Saudi citizen and protégé, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates, adopted a tough approach. However, this gave way to acquiescence and even cooperation since 2009. “To their thinly-disguised anger, and as part of its bid for regional leadership, Qatar cultivated good relations with Damascus. It extended political, economic and media support to the Assad regime, and served as a facilitator of Syria’s regional reintegration after years of isolation. But the uprising in Syria has brought a measure of unity to the main Gulf States.”<sup>253</sup> It led them to adopt increasingly tough and coordinated political and rhetorical positions. And, it reportedly led them to provide funding to Sunni insurgents fighting against the regime. However, it hasn’t yet compelled them to define, separately or together, a clear goal and then back it with a coherent and effective strategy.

The emergence of Daesh in Iraq with the announcement of creation of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and later in Libya) by its self proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi is another development which merits attention. During the initial stages of creation of ISIS and Daesh, many analysts tried to align the organisation with the Arab Countries especially GCC. The rumours about moral and material support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE were discussed a lot in the international circles. It was not until the desecration of holy sites and shrines by Daesh that the world at large was of the same view point regarding linkages between Daesh and the Arab Countries. The announcement of spread of Islamic Caliphate from Syria to Northern India encompassing the Gulf States took

<sup>252</sup> Hassan Hassan, “Syria: the view from the Gulf states” European Council on Foreign Relations, available at <http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/syria> accessed on 26 June 2013.

<sup>253</sup> Pradhan Prasanta Kumar, “Why Gulf States Want Regime Change in Syria” Palestine Chronicle available at [http://www.palestinechronicle.com/old/view\\_article\\_details.php?id=19380](http://www.palestinechronicle.com/old/view_article_details.php?id=19380) (accessed on 26 June 2013)

everyone by surprise. The concerns of Saudi Government over withdrawal of Iraqi Army from Iraq – Saudi Arabia border after taking over of major Iraqi towns by Daesh was the first time that showed despise of the Gulf States against Daesh. Presently even the US has conducted air strikes against Daesh hideouts in Iraq due to their violent and terrorist ideology. Saudi Arabia is also watching all moves of Daesh very cautiously so as to take appropriate steps to prevent its spill over effect into Saudi Arabia. Diverse and rarely in sync, no Gulf state is adjacent to Syria, and save for significant tribal links with Saudi Arabia, societal interaction between Gulf and Syrian societies pales in comparison with other Levantine ones. Syria's cultural decline, the scarcity of exportable Syrian professional talent, and the Gulf State's own visa policies have limited dealings with Syria to elite circles.

From the perspective of the Gulf States, the regional balance of power has been fundamentally upset by the political transformation of Iraq, the subsequent rise of Iran in the Gulf and its growing influence in the Levant via Syria and Hezbollah. How to roll back Iranian power while maintaining and even relying on the decaying Arab order places Syria at the heart of Gulf strategic preoccupations. In recent years, these options ranged from isolating and combating Syria to engaging and attempting to lure it away from Iran. The notion that the loss of Iraq can be compensated by a power shift in Syria is now gaining traction in the Gulf. "For Oman, the Gulf States are Sunni conservative monarchies whose religious character and legitimacy are at odds with Syria."<sup>254</sup> The willingness and ability of the Gulf States to leverage and manipulate sectarian passions in Syria is widely assumed but not yet proven. In particular, Saudi Arabia has at times styled itself as the protector and reference of the Sunni majority but has achieved limited success because of the strong—albeit eroding—allegiance of senior Sunni clerics to the Syrian regime and Saudi Arabia's own distrust of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood."<sup>255</sup> To date, no Gulf state has publicly endorsed regime change in Syria, even though Gulf elites

<sup>254</sup> "Gulf states will consider punishing Hezbollah for role in Syria" Al-Arabia 2 June 2013 available at <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/06/02/Gulf-FMs-reject-Iranian-interference-in-GCC-countries-.html> accessed on 26 June 2013.

<sup>255</sup> Peel Michael and AbeerAllam, "Syria war fuels sectarianism in Gulf" *Financial Times* 14 June 2013 available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1dcbfe76-d4d9-11e2-9302-00144feab7de.html#axzz2XMP0Xte7> (accessed on 26 June 2013)

in private admit that the point of no-return for the Assad regime has been crossed.”<sup>256</sup> Still unsure about whether this outcome would serve their interests and concerned that a civil war could actually strengthen Iran’s hand, Gulf States have avoided sensational statements. They prefer instead at present “to rely on and hide behind Arab League diplomacy, however ineffective. It is also notable that the UAE and Oman still maintain diplomatic relations with Damascus.”<sup>257</sup> At April 12 vote at the UN Human Rights Council on Syria that adopted a mildly tough resolution on Syria, Saudi Arabia abstained while Qatar and Bahrain chose not to show up. Tellingly, in late August, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia approved a tougher resolution by the same UN body. No Gulf state sits on the UN Security Council at present, but they have lobbied in favour of a harsh presidential declaration in early August. The numerous interests and relationships among GCC agreed have multiple entry points into the Syrian opposition. Even though they were successful into taming allies and proxies, it would tranquil be unable to impose their agenda. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE profoundly mistrust the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia prefers to utilize its tribal and Salafi connections in the regime. Apart from it , Qatar has invested in the Muslim Brotherhood (along with Turkey) and hosts small meetings of the Syrian opposition. Simultaneously, GCC have presented no unconditional safe haven and cover for the Syrian opposition to operate freely. Certainly, in addition to one outsized meeting in Doha, a little number of dialogue meetings, Syrian opposition leaders have favoured to hold their regional meetings in Turkey, a more amiable country.

#### 4.9 Iran’s interests

Iran, under Reza Shah Pahlavi, remained trusted US ally. It, together with monarchies of Saudi Arabia, counter balanced the strength of Iraq for its master super power. “The alliance broke down due to revolution of 1979 in Iran in which Reza Shah was dethroned. Immediately, it hit the enemy’s list in US.”<sup>258</sup> Transforming itself to the role of enemy,

<sup>256</sup>Beach Alastair, “Gulf countries pull support for Arab League's Syria mission” *The Independent* 25 Jan 2012 available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gulf-countries-pull-support-for-arab-leagues-syria-mission-6294048.html> (accessed on 26 June 2013)

<sup>257</sup>Wood Paul, “Syria crisis: Gulf Arab states expel Syrian ambassadors” *BBC*, 7 Feb 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16932556> (accessed on 26 June 2013)

<sup>258</sup>GhasemiShapour, “Pahlavi Dynasty” Available at <http://www.iranchamber.com/history/pahlavi/pahlavi.php> (accessed on 2 Feb 2013)

Iran found itself on the wrong side of the world, when in 1980, it was attacked by Iraq, apparently on behest of US. The war ravaged the country for next eight years. It cost in men, materials and economy and ended only in 1988. The end of war did not see Iran promoting to neutrality or friendship with US, while the US got busy with Iraq 1990 onwards. 2001 saw the attack on twin towers and invasion of Afghanistan. It is said that “had Iran not maintained a strong stance against Israel, the US may have reconciled with Iran.”<sup>259</sup> However the Israeli factor “complicates relations between Iran and USA and the entire stability dynamics of the Gulf.”<sup>260</sup> For Iran, attacking Israel means a direct attack on US interests. A threatened Israel, fans the Iran-US stand-off and thus the vicious cycle continues. Accordingly all these years, Iran, due to her anti-Israel policies in the region and support of Hezbollah, has remained on US hate/hit list. Freeing itself of Iraq and prospective withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014, have given US the time to re-think Iran question. There is lot of pressure on Iran to seize work on nuclear reactors. While on the other side, Iran sees the presence of ERF in the Gulf as a threat to its security. Iranian ex-president Ahmed Nijad while addressing the military parade on 13 Apr 2013 said, “Presence of foreign forces is causing insecurity and fuelling instability in the region.” Tensions are high in the region. The third pillar in the region, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as threat and is equally worried about Iran’s quest to attain nuclear weapons. Iran fears US / Israel strikes on her sites.

### **Recent Developments in the U.S. Iran Relations**

“Even as the United States and Iran pursue negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program, they find themselves on the same side of a range of regional issues surrounding an insurgency raging across the Middle East.”<sup>261</sup> While the two governments quietly continue to pursue their often conflicting interests, they are being drawn together by their mutual opposition to an international movement of young Sunni fighters, who with their pickup trucks and Kalashnikovs are raising the black flag of Al Qaeda along sectarian fault lines in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. The United States, reluctant

<sup>259</sup>Ottaway Marina, “Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: The Elusive Regional Policy” *Carnegie Papers*, Nov 2009 available at [Carnegieendowment.org/files/iran\\_us\\_gulf1.pdf](http://Carnegieendowment.org/files/iran_us_gulf1.pdf) (accessed on 1 Jan 2013)

<sup>260</sup>KayhanBarzegar, *Ibid*.

<sup>261</sup>ErdbrinkThomas, “U.S. and Iran Find Common Enemies Amidst Mideast Strife”, *The New York Times*, 6 January 2014

to intervene in bloody, inconclusive conflicts, is seeing its regional influence decline, while Iraq, which cost the Americans \$1 trillion and more than 4,000 lives, is growing increasingly unstable. At the same time, Shite-dominated Iran, the magnetic pole for the Shite minority in the region, has its own reasons to be nervous, with the ragtag army of Sunni militants threatening Syria and Iraq, both important allies, and the United States drawing down its troops in Afghanistan. Several Iranian moves echo the witty practicality of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, aimed at developing their country into a regional power. On the other hand, while it would show willingness for reconciliation with West but at the same time wants to pursue acquisition of nuclear technology and also continue its own Jihadists in area for vested interests. Iran still figures out prominently in the US foreign policy. The US is planning to play her cards intelligently to curtail Iran's nuclear programme. The success achieved by the US with regards to Iranian Nuclear programme were highlighted in the State of the Union Address held on 28 Jan 2014. Additionally, it may be American diplomacy, supported by pressure, that has ended the progress on advancement of Iran's atomic system – and rolled parts of that system– for the first few years of the decade. Iran has started to dispose off its stockpile from higher levels of enriched Uranium. It may be not introducing technical equipment and centrifuges. Inspections also indicate that Iran may be not fabricating a shell. Additionally, with our partners and friends, we're locked in conversations to ascertain whether we can peacefully attain an objective we mutually share: keeping Iran away from acquiring atomic weapon. These conversations will have to be challenging. They might not succeed. We would have clear-look at something like Iran's backing for terrorist associations with Hezbollah, which debilitate our allies; and the question between our countries can't make longed out. In any case, these transactions don't depend for trust; at whatever long haul we bargain it must be dependent upon certain movement that convinces us and the global group that Iran is not fabricating an atomic shell. “Whether John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan might arrange with Soviet Union, then without a doubt a solid America might arrange for capable adversaries today.”<sup>262</sup>

<sup>262</sup> President Barak Obama's State of the Union Address 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address>, accessed on 27 May 2014

#### 4.10 Saudi Arabia's Interests

Foreign policy of Saudi Arabia clearly states that “security and stability of the region is the responsibility of the states of the region.”<sup>263</sup> Saudi Arabia, the biggest shareholder in the oil trade out of Gulf States, does not enjoy good relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia-Iran relations have been mixed throughout its history. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have aspiration for Islamic leadership and both countries possess different vision of regional order based upon sectarian overtones. Iran, which after the Islamic Revolution strictly followed an anti-US policy, always deemed Saudi Arabia as an agent of the US in the Gulf region that speaks for the US interests. Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran on the other side are mainly associated to its plans of expanding Shia influence to other parts of the Gulf region, notably in post-Saddam Iraq, and the quest to build its own nuclear arsenal. “The mistrust and hostility breeds danger for Gulf stability. Main differences are in the areas as discussed in succeeding paragraphs.”<sup>264</sup> The difference of political ideologies and governance also divided both countries. For Iran, it is said that there is no place for monarchical regimes in Islam as is seen in Saudi Arabia and also in some other Arab countries, which legitimizes the authority of Iranian clerical elites. Energy is a third source of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Whereas Saudi Arabia, in contrast to Iran with its smaller oil reserves and larger population, can afford and is in a position to take a long-term view of the global oil market and has incentive to moderate prices, on the other hand Iran is compelled to focus on high prices in the short term.

#### Recent Shift in U.S. Policy in Middle East and Implications for Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has been under British and later American protection since its creation after World War I. Under the leadership of the Saudis, it became a critical player in the global system for a single reason: It was a massive producer of oil. “It was also the protector of Mecca and Medina, two Muslim holy cities, giving the Saudis an added influence in the Islamic world on top of their extraordinary wealth.”<sup>265</sup> It was in British and American interests to protect Saudi Arabia from its enemies, most of which were part of the Muslim


<sup>263</sup>The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, available at [www.mofa.gov.sa](http://www.mofa.gov.sa) accessed on 12 June 2013.

<sup>264</sup>Cordesman Anthony, “Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region”, *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*

<sup>265</sup>Friedman George, “Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement”, *StratforGlobal Intelligence*, 26Nov 2013

world. The United States protected the Saudis from radical Arab socialists who threatened to overthrow the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It later protected Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. But it also protected Saudi Arabia from Iran. Without United States in the Gulf, Iran might have been capable of territorial military control of a large portion. In addition, Saudis have moved considerable shite minority in the country's oil-rich east. The Iranians, afforded a possibility for natural inclination for Shia, and thereby the control by Saudi Arabia needed with distress. Until this understanding with Iran, United States needed a unhedged duty to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranians. Later on deals provided for more possibility and this dedication gets to be progressively supported. The truth might have been that getting atomic weapon might have been not an essential Iranian interest, and handicapping Iran's economy might have been not an essential interest of the United States. Though United States and Iran could consent around this quid ace quo, the fundamental issues would have settled. Also there may be something drawing them together. The Iranians need venture over their oil division and other parts from claiming their economy. American oil organizations might put resources into Iran similarly. Additionally, the lion's share don't stay in their starting work areas once their organizations communicate. Concerning illustration, the centre issue dividing those two nations dissolves, practically more investment relations open up - a step that eventually Tom's perusing definition will structure and only as last assertion - shared hobbies will show up. There are noteworthy political issues that can't be publicly tended to. The United States needs Iran to temper its help for Hezbollah's militancy, and additionally ensure it will not help terrorism. Iranians desire that Iraq won't create an anti-Iranian government, and also that United States will make worth effort to keep this. (Iran's memories of its war with Iraq run profound). The Iranians will also need American certifications that Washington won't be backing anti-Iranian strengths built in Iraq.

Starting with the Saudi view for purpose of claiming, Iranian requests with regards to Iraq will be of best concern. Alternately if there is no agreement, it doesn't have any desire for a pro-Iranian Shite state for its northern outskirts. Riyadh has been subsidizing Sunni contenders all around the area against Shite contenders in a proxy war for Iran. "Any assertion toward Americans appreciation on Iranian investment alongside Iraq



might speak of a risk to Saudi Arabia.”<sup>266</sup> Moreover, a shift away from American age long strategic partnership with the Gulf and particularly Saudi Arabia is currently being witnessed. President Obama is now more focused on relying upon developing indigenous means for energy rather than depending upon foreign resources. This aspect was amply highlighted in the State of the Union Address held on 28 Jan 2014; “A standout reason amongst other reasons is fuel gas – if extracted safely, it’s the fuel that might energise our economy without carbon contamination which is reason environmental change. Organizations will arrange to contribute \$100 billion to new industrial facilities that utilize fuel gas. I’ll curtail formality that will help states get the individual industrial facilities built, and this Congress might help individuals for building fuelling stations that will gradually shift us to American gas rather than foreign fuel. We will continue protecting our fields for future people and my organizations will help sustain progress and employment.”<sup>267</sup> Saudi Arabia being wary of rapprochement between the US and Iran to settlement of Syrian issue have considered re-aligning her approach towards engagement about Iran. For improvement of relations, Saudi Arabia welcomed Iranian official to Riyadh for talks between heavy weights since the Arab awakenings for which both nations have continued a proxy war for so long. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, contacted Iranian foreign Minister as a sequel to months of lower level talks between both nations, “expecting to achieve some agreement on issues of common interest particularly Syria.”<sup>268</sup>

#### 4.11 Oman's Interests

Oman, due to its geo-strategic location, enjoys considerable influence in the security affairs of the Gulf. A vision of Oman is formed from the interaction of several elements, both with each other, or with its regional and international peripheries. The geographic location of Oman is crucial not only for its impact on her internal conditions, national unity and the personality traits of Oman as well, but also for its impact on its policies and its regional and international relations. The strait is the only passage for the exports and imports for most of the GCC countries, Iraq and Iran, where they depend on the passage

<sup>266</sup> Ibid

<sup>267</sup> President Barak Obama’s State of the Union Address 2014, Ibid

<sup>268</sup> Martin Chulov, “Saudi Arabia moves to settle differences with Iran”, The Guardian, 13 May 2014

of trade and import of goods from around the world, the shipping lines of the Strait are located in the territorial waters of Oman. "This is a crucial factor which imparts considerable leverage to Oman in the Gulf stability. Oman has also done a defence cooperation agreement with India."<sup>269</sup> The most prominent features of Oman's vision of stability in the Gulf region are:-

1. To ensure peace, stability and security in the Gulf, the Sultanate has proposed the establishment of a joint Gulf-strong army of about hundred thousand soldiers.
2. "Oman has abandoned selling out any axes or rigid alliances of the Gulf"<sup>270</sup>, either regionally or internationally. Her relations are marked by flexibility and ability to work with all parties.
3. The Sultanate doesn't want to take strong positions on any controversial issue.

Oman has a very strong and effective role in the security issues in the Gulf region now and it becomes stronger day by day. Controlling of Strait of Hormuz where the "navigation lines of it are located inside Oman's territorial waters" which increases the effectiveness of Oman in the region. Oman is considered as the "Gulf region's safety valve"<sup>271</sup> due to its location. Stable relations with Iran is a big factor which gives Oman a due role in the region, especially when Iranian relations with other Gulf countries are generally fragile.

#### 4.12 Qatar's Interests

Qatar is a small country, however by virtue of its economic significance, and political ingenuity of its ruler, it enjoys considerable name and weight on the international scene. This is evidenced by the popularity of Al-Jazeera TV channel and mediatory role played by Qatar in letting Taliban establish an office in Doha for dialogue with the West. Qatar's concerns and interests can be gleaned from an address by Foreign Minister of Qatar, to the Washington Institute's Policy Forum on regional stability in the Gulf. He stated, "When Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990, Qatar realized that a large void existed in its security and the stability of the region as a whole, due not to a lack of

<sup>269</sup>Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Internal and External Security - Arab Gulf States" available at [www.mpec.org/journal](http://www.mpec.org/journal) accessed on 20 June 2013.

<sup>270</sup>[www.mofa.gov.om/mofanew/index](http://www.mofa.gov.om/mofanew/index)

<sup>271</sup>[www.arayalmostenir.com/component/content/article](http://www.arayalmostenir.com/component/content/article)

equipment, but a lack of cooperation among the Gulf States.”<sup>272</sup> This statement reveals dilemma of the extremely rich but smaller countries of the Gulf where they seek to draw a sense of stability from collective security system.

#### 4.13 Bahrain’s Interests

Bahrain’s security dilemma is not too different from that faced by Qatar. “Rather it recently saw practical manifestation of a security crisis due to massive public uprisings which were controlled after massive crack down and military / LEA support from GCC countries.”<sup>273</sup> Infact Bahrain crisis has given a fillip to GCC stability efforts as during a recent GCC Summit in Bahrain, “the member countries endorsed an amended version of a Gulf security pact which was first announced in December 1994.”<sup>274</sup> During the meeting, Bahrain’s interior minister said that Bahrain was able to ward off threats to the security of the GCC as a whole thanks to support from its member countries. This approach of terming own security problem as region’s stability problem is typical of collective security approach. However this was not an external threat rather an internal threat which besieged Bahrain. Cooperation on such issues by GCC countries manifested a forward progress.

#### 4.14 UAE’s Interests

UAE being more international in outlook relies on international guarantees of security rather than a collective security approach of GCC. This is indicated by UAE’s initiative to give a military base to France on its terrain. Recently, while replying to a media question about UAE’s security perspective, UAE’s foreign minister replied, “I want to define the UAE's stance: it is clear the stability of the Gulf is part of international security and it is impossible to separate the two.”<sup>275</sup> UAE is also in the lead role in intellectual efforts as a number of Think Tanks on security are doing active research on various aspects of the security. Being a State full of immigrants, and one which thrives on

<sup>272</sup>Al-Thani, “*Gulf Security – The Qatari View*” at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-security-the-qatari-view>, 1994, (accessed on 3 Feb 13)

<sup>273</sup>Stares Paul B., “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East”available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/by\\_type/transcript.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/transcript.html) (accessed on 10 Jun 2103)

<sup>274</sup>Toumi Habib, “Bahrain hails GCC security pact as bulwark”, at <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-hails-gcc-security-pact-as-bulwark-1.1136238>, (accessed on 3 Feb 2013)

<sup>275</sup>Haneen “Dajani, Gulf security remains world's responsibility”, at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/gulf-security-remains-worlds-responsibility-says-abdullah>, (accessed on 3 Feb 13)

tourism, international finance, UAE's security awareness is far enhanced and its interests are in region's stability and eradication of terrorism. It has disputes on islands with Iran and is greatly concerned with reference to external security. However at present the crisis is being kept at low key.

#### 4.15 Israel's Interest

Israel's bitter antagonism towards Palestinians and her refusal to give any concessions to them sits at the heart of "Arab People's antagonism towards West in general and US in particular."<sup>276</sup> The same feelings are easily exploitable by any government, be it monarchy or democracy. Furthermore, her arch rivalry with Iran impinges negatively on the stability in the Gulf. "Peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have not comprehensively succeeded so far. The reason, oft quoted by Israelis is "not disagreement over specific issues, such as settlements or Jerusalem, but something much more fundamental: the Palestinians' refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish State."<sup>277</sup> One fact however remains undisputed i.e. both main parties (Israel and Palestinians) have recognized the right of each other to exist peacefully side by side as two-State solution. The recent award of observer status to PLO as a non-State entity is also viewed as a positive development in the process. Israel's rivalry and security dilemma with Iran casts even a greater shadow on the stability of Gulf. "Israel's concerns can be gleaned from extracts of the Israeli PM's speech before UN General Assembly as follows:

1. One sees all the things similar for universal peace for an atomic outfitted Iran and nuclear-armed Al-Qaeda.... Who "out of you might feel safe in the Middle East? Who might be safe in Europe? Who might have a chance to be protected in America? Who might have a chance to be protected anywhere?.
2. There are those who believe that a nuclear armed Iran can be deterred like the Soviet Union...That's a very dangerous assumption.

<sup>276</sup>GhassanKhatib and Michael Bröning, *Why the Jewish State Must Recognize Palestine*, December 11, 2011.

<sup>277</sup>Kuperwasser Yosef and Shalom Lipner, "The Problem Is Palestinian Rejectionism" *Foreign Affairs*, available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136588/yosef-kuperwasser-and-shalom-lipner/the-problem-is-palestinian-rejectionism> (accessed on 23 Mar 2013)

3. Appallingly some people have begun to peddle the absurd notion that a nuclear armed Iran would actually stabilize Middle East...That's like saying a nuclear-armed Al-Qaeda would usher in an era of universal peace."<sup>278</sup>

Any Iran-Israeli confrontation would destabilize not only Gulf, but the entire world because of Iran's anticipated backlash in closing the Gulf.

### **Recent Shift in U.S. Policy in Middle East and Implications for Israel**

From the Israeli point of view, there are two threats from Iran. One is the nuclear program. The other is Iranian support not only for Hezbollah but also for Hamas and other groups in the region. Iran is far from Israel and poses no conventional military threat. The Israelis would be delighted if Iran gave up its nuclear program in some verifiable way, simply because they themselves have no reliable means to destroy that program militarily. What the Israelis don't want to see is the United States and Iran making deals on their side issues, especially the political ones that really matter to Israel. The Israelis have more room to manoeuvre than the Saudis do. Israel can live with a pro-Iranian Iraq. The Saudis can't; from their point of view, it is only a matter of time before Iranian power starts to encroach on their sphere of influence. The Saudis can't live with an Iranian-supported Hezbollah. The Israelis can and have, but don't want to; the issue is less fundamental to the Israelis than Iraq is to the Saudis. But in the end, this is not the problem that the Saudis and Israelis have. Their problem is that both depend on the United States for their national security. Neither country can permanently exist in a region filled with dangers without the United States as a guarantor. Israel needs access to American military equipment that it can't build itself, like fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia needs to have American troops available as the ultimate guarantor of their security, as they were in 1990. Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the two countries with the greatest influence in Washington. As this agreement shows, that is no longer the case. Both together weren't strong enough to block this agreement. What frightens them the most about this agreement is that fact? If the foundation of their national security is the American commitment to them, then the inability to influence Washington is a threat to their national security. There are no other guarantors accessible. Israeli leader Benjamin

<sup>278</sup> Transcript of Israeli PM Netanyahu's speech before UN General Assembly dated 27 Sep 2013.

Netanyahu went to Moscow, plainly attempting on to get Russians' concurrence to block agreement but did not succeed. "However, if he would have got what he wanted then he would have certainly got away from United States United States. He would have only been successful in getting patronage incapable enough to provided necessary and adequate equipment for Israel. As a matter of fact, neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel have a better ally other than United States."<sup>279</sup>

#### 4.16 India's Interests

India has done tremendous investment both in Iran and the GCC as far as "securing vital supply, ensuring employment of the Indian diaspora, upgrading exchange and investment, battling against piracy and as of late attempting to build capacity of some organizations in the region."<sup>280</sup> The rising Chinese interest in the area may be another challenge for India. To India its association with GCC speaks of its diversified investment in the economic, and political fields. The Gulf area has been the fundamental supplier for India's oil and gas necessities and around two-thirds of India's known aggregate of vital prerequisites is supplied by Gulf. The Gulf area has been a lucrative market for Indian made products including textiles, spices, nourishment products, electrical products and machineries. India's five million solid worth of effort drive in the GCC nations may be a of critical importance. India takes a strong position with relevance to energy security of GCC nations and as accomplice for handling terrorism.

#### Challenges for India

US vital participation in the Gulf and the US-Iran clash pose a genuine challenge to India. India can't completely back US arrangements in the region, or India cannot totally contradict them. "India might oblige the help of the USA in the area to further its ambitions. China's developing economy, hunger for further development is vital and engagement with Gulf is main challenge for India due to fear of encirclement."<sup>281</sup> First ever deployment of Chinese navy warships in Indian Ocean for anti-piracy is seen as

<sup>279</sup>Friedman George, "Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement", *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 26 Nov 2013

<sup>280</sup>Gupta Ranjit and Abu Backer Bagader, "The India-Gulf Strategic Partnership in a Pan-Asian Cooperative Paradigm", Workshop No 19, *Gulf Research Centre Cambridge*

<sup>281</sup>"India's Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States", *Gulf Research Centre*, available at [www.grc.ae](http://www.grc.ae), (accessed on 13June 2013)

ringing alarm bells for India. China has been using the conflict between the GCC and Iran in the best possible manner. Despite voting against Iran at the IAEA over the nuclear issue, China has managed to stabilize its relations with Iran. China is viewed by Iran as a counterweight for the USA in the region. On the other hand, China is viewed by Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries as an important trade partner and a big power in Asia. GCC-Iran rivalry is deepening in Iraq. India should build its ties with Iraq but this is taking a lot of time because of the unstable political situation and the social situation. “India is highly dependent on the Gulf region for its energy security as it imports about two thirds of its energy requirement from the region.”<sup>282</sup> As the issue of energy is directly related to the regional political conditions and the warmth of the bilateral relations between the countries, it becomes important to take the relationship up to level of stability. “India has huge interests in GCC and Iran and this makes it important for India to calibrate its policies so as to ensure supply of oil from both GCC countries and Iran.”<sup>283</sup>

### Competing Interests and its Impact on Gulf Stability

The first two parts of this paper analysed the interests of major powers and regional countries on the Gulf stability. This part shall now attempt to crystallize pertinent conclusions.

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### 4.17 Gulf as a Regional Security Complex

According to Buzan’s theory, “the Gulf can be conceived as a Regional Security Complex i.e. “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”<sup>284</sup> Another fact is abundantly certain with regards to the Gulf region; for a foreseeable future, it will remain a centre of power struggle among the major powers irrespective of the primacy of hydro-carbon resources. As far as inter-Arab and intra-regional cooperation is concerned, distrust and suspicion will prevail as

<sup>282</sup>Al-TamimiNaser, “China and India in the Gulf: Cooperation or Conflict” *Al Arabia News*, available at <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2013/01/15/260508.html> (accessed on 4 March 2013)

<sup>283</sup>Pradhan Prasanta Kumar, “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* Vol. 6, No. 1, January–March 2011

<sup>284</sup>Stone Marianne, “Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis”, at [http://geest.msh-paris.fr/IMG/pdf/Security\\_for\\_Buzan.mp3.pdf](http://geest.msh-paris.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf), (accessed on 23 Jan 13)

dominant factors despite a wider regional call for cooperation and dialogue. “The militarization and suspicion on the real intention of each other’s country’s policies and priorities will continue to dominate the political, security and economic agenda of the Gulf littoral States.”<sup>285</sup> Apart from huge oil and gas reserves, proximity of vital choke points of sea routes facilitating international commerce would require well-coordinated policies on the part of all State actors. In order to maintain easy and affordable access to hydro-carbons, and to ensure that free movement of oil and other tradable commodities continues to take place between East and the West, it is necessary that the security of the Gulf remains stable.

#### 4.18 How the competing interests of major powers will play out?

The last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the US and its allies engaged in a war in Gulf to push back an invading force, Iraq, from Kuwait. The first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century witnessed the US and coalition partners involved in another war in Iraq. The similarity resides in the fact that both wars had the ultimate aim of securing supplies of Gulf oil to the world energy market. “The difference lies in the fact that the 1990-91 Gulf war was fought with the support and cooperation of the international community and the approval of United Nations, while the 2003 Iraq war was fought in spite of the disapproval of the international community as represented in the same world organization.”<sup>286</sup> There is little doubt that the strategic importance of the Gulf lies in its vast capacity to supply the global energy requirements with oil at prices lower than any other oil producing region. This is both a blessing and a bane for consumers and producers alike. On the positive side, for producers, oil revenues have provided the resources for economic development and a significant voice on the international stage. For consumers, it has provided fuel at affordable prices for rapid economic growth. “On the negative side, for producers, it has meant decades of interference in their region and in some cases in the internal affairs of the various states, as well as intra-regional tension.”<sup>287</sup> For consumers, it has meant increased vulnerability thorough energy dependence and the need to ensure the stability

<sup>285</sup>SevillaHenelito, “Re-constructing the Political Mindset of the Persian Gulf Security”, *International Journal of West Asian Studies* Vol. 3 No. 1, 2011

<sup>286</sup> David Aaron, *Ibid.*

<sup>287</sup>Hussain Mohammad Samir & AbbasabadiShahriar, “U.S. and Balance of Power Strategy in Persian Gulf Region” 1 Jan 2012, available at <http://www.iranreview.org/cms/classificationList.aspx?classification=860e2142-2d05-441a-a920-0375b4f9eb4e> (accessed on 4 March 2013)

of producing countries and the region as a whole, at ties at high political, financial and human cost.”<sup>288</sup> While all countries have stakes in the supplies of oil and in price stability, by virtue of their power and influence in world affairs and in international forums, the interests in the Gulf region of the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany are especially notable. It is often said that when it comes to foreign policy, states have no friends, only interests. “The present day dynamics of the Gulf region clearly demonstrates this dictum. Moreover, international interests have increased in the region substantially since the cataclysmic event of 9/11 as terrorist groups had their origin in the Middle East.”<sup>289</sup>

#### 4.19 Balance of Power Dynamics in Gulf Region

From neo-realism perspective, balance of power is a natural course of action in anarchy where due to insecurity and drive for survival, weaker states form an alliance with other states to ensure their security against the major power. “Patterns of alignment can take two forms: balancing or band-wagoning. Balancing prescribes an alliance against the most powerful state in a system, in order to counter any dangerous concentrations of power that might in time endanger survival of the other states in the system. Band-wagoning assumes opposite behaviour, states do not balance against threats, but rather choose to join it. States balance when aligning with the weaker power, and they bandwagon when aligning with the stronger power.”<sup>290</sup> Traditionally, the Gulf was divided into three zones: Iraq in the north, Iran in the east, and the six GCC countries in the west. Ever since, a conversation on creating a regional structure in the Gulf has been ongoing. Local interactions within the Gulf region have not, however, been successful in shaping themselves into a cooperative format. Rather, a competitive mode has always been dominant. A relative strategic balance existed in the 1970s and 1980s, but disappeared with the end of the Second Gulf War, when the elimination of Iraq as a

<sup>288</sup>Engel Richard and Robert Windrem, “How the US oil, gas boom could shake up global order” *NBC News* available at <http://investigations.nbcnews.com/news/2013/04/01/17519026-how-the-us-oil-gas-boom-could-shake-up-global-order> (accessed on 15 May 2013)

<sup>289</sup>HooshangAmirahmad, “Persian Gulf Stability Hinges on U.S.-Iran Dialogue” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Apr 1996

<sup>290</sup>“Explaining patterns of alignment in the Persian Gulf: balancing, bandwagoning or omnibalancing?” at <http://globalpoliticsblog.com/2013/01/23/explaining-patterns-of-alignment-in-the-persian-gulf-balancing-bandwagoning-or-omnibalancing/>, (accessed on 15 Apr 2013)

military power (which had theretofore been considered a counterbalance to Iran) was effectively achieved. Currently, the regional stability system of the Gulf is witnessing what can cautiously be called a balance of power that is dependent on a "foreign balancer". Within this model, it is the US military presence in the Gulf that functions as a stabilising power against the power of Iran. The same aspect is also covered under the Stability Instability Regime Theory's "Power Beyond State". One component of the proposed theory is power maximization to be able to influence outside the state which is dealt under the International Relations. Dependence upon foreign forces as guarantor of security in the Middle East is thus very much covered under the proposed theory. According to numerous rumours that are currently circulating, the US has begun the process of deploying a new radar surveillance system in one of the GCC countries. This "system is capable of tracking missiles within a 2,000 kilometre range, an upgrade which would give US defence systems an additional 60-70 seconds to intercept any missile offensive."<sup>291</sup> Such militarization will invite action from Iran and other powers such as china which may destabilize the region. This implies that there may be a requirement to evolve an expanded but indigenous security system to preserve regions stability. However given political differences among GCC, expecting GCC to enlarge and emerge as a lead vehicle for conflict resolution in the region may remain a pipe dream.

The future stability of the Gulf region is of vital concern to entire world due to obvious sensitivities. It is a lesson from history that common threats, common interests and common aims/ objectives are the primary ingredients for any meaningful political cooperation. In todays' environment, common threat to everyone is from terrorism/extremism, common interests are economic development and common aims/objectives are the human development. Whereas this formula may be applicable worldwide, nowhere else in Gulf its applicability is more desired due to sensitivities and the range of issues involved. The main issue in the Gulf is of security ranging from State security on one end to the Human security. It is a paradox in gulf that whereas countries are besieged by the crisis of State security, they are being stretched on the seams from pressures emanating from Human security such as being witnessed during the Arab

<sup>291</sup>Abd al-Jalil al-Marhoun, "A new paradigm for Gulf security", <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/07/201072013104813376.html>, accessed on 17 Jun 2013

Spring. To deal with this twin crisis, a revival of the Gulf Security system is proposed that allows the regional countries a more amenable platform to hammer out their mutual security concerns. With the departure of US from Iraq and ongoing draw-down from Afghanistan, it is an opportunity of the century which must be capitalized. The means being used by the international powers predominantly US, to pursue their interest in the Gulf are akin to what realists believe. Realists are the power theorists in IR. When realists talk of power, what they really mean is military power, the ability of the state to achieve its objectives and ensure its survival because it has the military capability to do so. Clearly, power is not evenly distributed and states will be involved in an ongoing competition for greater power. States are 'powerful to the extent that they affect others more than other affect them'. Realists expect states to behave in certain ways based on their interpretation of human nature, which Hans Morgenthau, describes as 'the desire to live, to propagate, and to dominate'. Powerful states in such thinking are obliged to act in such a way that maximizes their power and prevents challenges emerging. The presence of ERF and NATO staging bases is the manifestation of the realist design being followed by major international players. The use of military power to influence the Arab countries more than these countries can influence them is what we have seen in the developing interest of major powers in the Gulf.



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## CHAPTER NO. 5

### THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF GULF COUNTRIES AND THE ARAB SPRING

The Arabian Peninsula comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, and the Republic of Yemen. Together, these countries (excluding the Republic of Yemen) constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Founded on 26 May 1981, “the aim of this group is to promote coordination between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity.”<sup>292</sup> To understand the impact of the Arab Spring upon the Gulf countries, it is important to first comprehend the internal dynamics of these countries. The details include governance system, demography, economy and societal aspects. All the statistical data has been taken from the primary resources which include official government websites. Capitulaton of this data will help the reader to comprehend a wholesome picture, before interpreting the impact of the Arab Spring. Moreover, this chapter will also enable the readers to understand one prong of the proposed Stability Instability Regime Theory, which deals with the “power within the state”.

A brief resume of internal dynamic of the Gulf countries is explained in the succeeding paras.

#### 5.1 Saudi Arabia

##### Governance System

Kingdom for Saudi Arabia is a Bedouin Muslim state with a complete authority. Its religion will be Islam, its constitution will be inferred starting with the blessed Qur'an and the Prophet's (peace be upon him) Sunnah (traditions), it has Arabic as the authorized dialect and its capital as Riyadh. The framework for administering over Saudi Arabia has been an imperial framework which places the sons and grandsons of the Kingdom's founder ruler Abdulaziz Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud bring been to hold reins for force of the Kingdom. As far as qualification for administration is concerned, loyalty to the the blessed Qur'an and Prophet's (peace make upon him) Sunnah is vital. The force of administering in the kingdom has been inferred from the sacred Qur'an and prophet's (peace a chance to be upon him) Sunnah that would that would provide the rulers

<sup>292</sup><http://www.sheikhmohammed.com/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=b10a4c8631cb4110VgnVCM100000b0140a0aRCRD> Accessed on 14 Jul 2014

administering framework and associated frameworks for authority be based upon justice, Shura and fairness in the ambit of Islamic Sharia. The King is the President of the Council of Ministers who steers the general policies of the State to achieve appropriate coordination and collaboration among all Government Agencies and to ensure harmony and constant unity of all works of the Cabinet. He has the full power to supervise over the Cabinet, Ministries and all Government Agencies. Supervising over all rules, acts and bylaws to be appropriately executed, all Ministries and other Government Agencies should provide the President of the Council of Ministries with detailed reports within the start of every financial year to indicate achievements made in comparison with what was included within the General Development Plan of the financial lapsed year. “This report should also include the challenges faced by each Government Agency and supposed solutions to improve its work.”<sup>293</sup>

### Statistics

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's total population is 27,136,977 people, 18,707,576 of them Saudis, according to 2010 statistics, and the growth rate of the total population between 2004 and 2010 is 3.2%, while the population density is 14 people / square kilometre. The 2010 GDP reached with constant prices to 3.76%, the private sector contributed at a rate of 47.8%, while the GDP per capita at the current prices reached 60.066 SAR. Moreover, the gross enrolment rate in primary education in 2009 reached 99%, and the infant mortality rate for the same year reached 17.3 per thousand live births, while the unemployment rate among Saudis in the same year reached 10.5%. Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 17% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 80% of budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings. Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Diversification efforts are focusing on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. Over 5 million remote labourers assume a paramount part in the Saudi economy,

<sup>293</sup> Saudi Government Portal. <http://www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal/yesserRoot/home> (accessed 26 Jan 2013)

especially in the oil and administration sectors, same time Riyadh is battling to decrease unemployment amongst its own nationals. Saudi authorities are especially focusing to consider utilizing its vast young population, which for the most part fails to have basic skills and education for private sector demands. Riyadh has considerably helped in utilizing training and education, significantly with the opening of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology - Saudi Arabia's principal co-educational university. Likewise, to meet supply and demand requirement, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with WTO and over 2,800 doctor's assignments were considered from April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010. The legislature has started considering establishment of six "economic urban areas" in distinctive locales of the State to promote arrangements for investment of about \$373 billion between 2010 and 2014 for social improvement. This would further provide base for additional investment by Saudi Arabia in future and enhance social improvement. Following are some data;

1. GDP (PPP), \$740.5 billion (2012 est.) Country comparison to the world 23.
2. Labour Force. 8.012 million

The Kingdom's General Budget for the Fiscal year 1433/1434 Hijra includes "SR 702 billion revenues, SR 690 billion expenditure and SR 12 billion surplus. Concentration on development projects continued, specially education, health, security, social, municipal, water and sewage services, roads, e-services and support of research. The budget includes news programs and projects, additional phases of existing projects that have been previously approved are approximately SR 265 billion in total."<sup>294</sup>

### **Social Efforts in the Kingdom**

Development in Kingdom has generally been regarded as a discerning process dedicated to formulating a well-cultured and comprehensive social structure where community has stressed its identity and creativity. In this respect, development has mainly been founded on affirmative collective partnership starting from planning and decision making, in addition executing and holding responsibilities reaching to utilization of fruits of development projects and programs. All such related programs have focused on Saudi people as focus of development and its objective as well. The Saudi Government has

<sup>294</sup> Saudi embassy USA, <http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/>

consequently attached much interest to Cooperative Societies where charity works have been supported and urged by the Government. Coordinated efforts between both legislature and Private sector have aided much legislation and the projects have been identified for improving management. Additionally, the management is also overseeing and monitoring previously stalled projects in the country. Additional efforts are required and being taken to address issue of illiteracy by opening and operating number of schools in urban areas for ladies also. The kingdom also need to revamp its system and look into the matter of lawlessness at places where it interrupts social improvement of masses and has consumed considerable length of time.

## 5.2 Iran

### Ruling System

The former monarchy and the Constitution of 1906 were abolished by the revolution of February 1979. “The 1979 Constitution dates 24 Oct 1979 and is in force since 3 Dec 1979. Significant amendments were adopted on 28 July 1989.”<sup>295</sup> Those 270-member Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly) formulates laws and is subject to number of amount of limitations (Art. 72). The Majlis can impeach the President for misconduct in office, may produce amendments for the bills. Majlis has 270 members which are elected by direct vote of the people. The Preamble of constitution will be precise, holding historical background of the revolution, a portrayal of the new state, and also cites Quranic verses. The Preamble states that economy will be Means, Not an End. It additionally asserts that the ladies are essential part of society and have a position in Islam and their exceptional status and liberties are safeguarded. Iran has an authoritative religion and accepts religious minorities and recognizes their rights. It grants adequate social, political and economic rights to citizens and opportunities for benefits of the business. The Constitution requires that the taking of foreign aid be approved by the Parliament. Concessions for foreign businesses are forbidden. The Constitution acknowledges committee legislation and features a religious leader as well as a Head of Judiciary. Public officials are subject to an asset control. Expediency Council is an advisory body for the Leader which has the responsibility of resolving the difference

<sup>295</sup> [http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir\\_\\_indx.html](http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir__indx.html)

between the judiciary and the parliament. All the members are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council (Shoraye Negahban), the twelve appointed members screen all potential candidates for Assembly of Experts, President and Parliament. The conservative council has the authority to veto legislation they judge to be inconsistent with the Constitution or Islamic law.”<sup>296</sup>

### **Economy**

Iran's economy is marked by statist policies and an inefficient state sector, which create major distortions throughout the system, and reliance on oil, which provides a large share of government revenues. Price controls, subsidies, and other rigidities weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth. Private sector activity is typically limited to small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread. Tehran since the early 1990s has recognized the need to reduce these inefficiencies, and in December 2010 the Majles passed President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD's Targeted Subsidies Law (TSL) to reduce state subsidies on food and energy. This was the most extensive economic reform since the government implemented gasoline rationing in 2007. Over a five-year period the legislation sought to phase out subsidies that previously cost Tehran \$60-\$100 billion annually and mostly benefited Iran's upper and middle classes. Cash pay-outs of \$45 per person to more than 90% of Iranian households mitigated initial widespread resistance to the TSL program. However, inflation in 2012 reached its highest level in four years, eroding the value of these cash pay-outs and motivating the Majles to halt planned price increases for the second half of 2012 through at least March 2013. New fiscal and monetary constraints on Tehran, following international sanctions in January against Iran's Central Bank and oil exports, significantly reduced Iran's oil revenue, forced government spending cuts, and fuelled a 20% currency depreciation. Monetary development transformed negative to the principal for over two decades. Iran likewise proceeds with endure from double-digit unemployment to underemployment. Underemployment "around Iran's taught adolescent

<sup>296</sup>Presidency Official Site, <http://www.president.ir/en/>

need persuaded a significant number to search occupations overseas, bringing about a critical "brain channel.." <sup>297</sup>

1. GDP (PPP). \$997.4 billion (2012 est.). Country comparison to the world: 18
2. Labour Force. 27.05 million, country comparison to the world: 24
3. Unemployment Rate. 15.5% (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 149 <sup>298</sup>

### 5.3 UAE

#### Governance System

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federal state that was established on the 2nd of December, 1971. It consists of seven emirates, which are Abu Dhabi , Dubai , Sharjah, Ajman, Um Al Quwein, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. Since its foundation on the second of December, 1971, the UAE has set a transitory constitution, which quickly became permanent in nature. The states constituted the federation of UAE and dedicated to adopt direct policy, new steps have been taken to reform the political system to cope with the need of progressive adopted for uplift of human beings. The Federal Supreme Council is the highest constitutional authority in the United Arab Emirates. It is the most elevated authoritative and legislative official power. It is the body which approves all laws and executive actions. The national body comprises of rulers of all seven states which then nominate their leaders as president and vice-presidents from among the members. "Each emirate need one absolute vote in the committee resolutions and deliberations" <sup>299</sup>

#### Economy

The UAE has an open and diversified economy for per capita wage and a sizable yearly exchange surplus. Fruitful deliberations in investment expansion have diminished the crisis of GDP in light of oil and gas yield. Since the disclosure of oil in the UAE more than 30 years ago, the nation over a period of time has undergone a profound conversion from a devastated area for little desert principalities to an advanced state with a diversified lifestyle for everyday life. The legislature has to create expanded base for

<sup>297</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>

<sup>298</sup> Iran's Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance,

<http://www.mefa.ir/portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=8fa13e36-87b5-42d0-9e55-5bb2064983d4>

<sup>299</sup> UAE Official cabinet Web Site, <http://www.uaecabinet.ae/English/UAEGovernment/Pages/default.aspx>

creation of job opportunities and opening up broader utility services utilizing excessive private sector contribution. For April 2004 onwards, economic efforts boosted. The UAE marked a trade and investment agreement with Washington in November 2004 and concurred on attempt for conversations on free trade with US; however, the individual discussions did not move ahead. The country's organized commerce Zones – proposed 100% foreign proprietorship and zero tolls – has helped in developing interest of foreign investors. The worldwide monetary crisis, tight global credit and emptied proprietorship costs tightened the economy till 2009. UAE authorities attempted to overcome these issues and expanded investment in the saving money segment. The crisis was felt hardest in Dubai, as it might have been vigorously laid open on discouraged land costs. Dubai lacked additional money to help serve it obligated debts, provoking worldwide worry regarding its becoming default. The UAE National Bank Abu Dhabi-based bailed out and purchased the biggest stakes. In December 2009 Dubai gained a extra \$10 billion advance from emirate of Abu Dhabi. Developing manufacturing and construction expansion and services sector are helping economy. Overall private sector remains low while UAE focuses on requirement for ensuing couple of year's time. Focus on education of nationals will enhance chances for better employment opportunities in private segment of society:

1. “GDP (PPP). \$271.2 billion (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 50
2. Labour Force. 4.337 million, country comparison to the world: 88
3. Unemployment Rate. 2.4% (2001), country comparison to the world: 17”<sup>300</sup>

## 5.4 Bahrain

### Governance System

Bahrain's little area in Gulf region also obliges it to assume a fragile role necessitating its adjustment to outside undertakings "around its bigger neighbours". Confronting declining oil reserves, Bahrain has turned into a vibrant economy and is a financial hub for regional economic activity. The new Amir, introduced broader financial and economic changes in 1999 and improved relations for the Shi'a group. In February 2001, Bahraini voters endorsed a submission on the national activity contract - the centrepiece of the Amir's

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

political liberalization system. Previously, in February 2002, Isa al Khalifa announced himself as King. In October 2002, “Bahrainis chose members of house from Bahrain's reconstituted bicameral legislature, the National Council.”<sup>301</sup>

### Statistics.

1. “Nationality: Bahraini(s).
2. Population: 1,23 million, including 666,000 non-nationals (2010 Census)
3. GNI per capita PPP: \$ 19 748 (year)
4. Ethnic groups: Bahraini 63%, Asian 19%, other Arab 10%, Iranian 8%.
5. Religions: 98% Muslim (Shi'a 70%, Sunni 30%), small Christian, Jewish and Hindu communities.
6. Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, and Urdu are also widely spoken.  
Literacy: 90%”<sup>302</sup>

### Economy

Bahrain has taken incredible strides to diversifying its economy and its exceedingly created communication and transport systems have made Bahrain home to various multinational organizations with business in the Gulf. Likewise, in its expansion plans, Bahrain actualized an organized commerce concurred upon (FTA) with the US during 2006 which has made it one of the fastest growing economies in the Gulf. Bahrain's economy, however, progress mostly depended on changing conditions of oil market. Petroleum handling and refining represent more than 60% for Bahrain's fare receipts, 70% for administration revenues, more than 11% for GDP. Different significant investment exercises are processing from aluminium - Bahrain's second greatest export after oil – and brings more development. Bahrain competes with Malaysia in terms of saving money in Islamic countries and has developed new look on fuel gas supplies. Likewise feedstock is likely to help its growing petrochemical and aluminium enterprises. During 2011 and 2012, Bahrain encountered financial setbacks due to an aftereffect of internal unrest, however, a few variables demonstrate that the economy will start to

<sup>301</sup>Bahrain Official Site,

[http://www.bahrain.bh/wps/portal!/ut/p/c5/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gLAxNHQ093A3d\\_J29DA08\\_cw9TT1dvI8cgU\\_1wkA6zeGd3Rw8Tcx8DAwsXNwsDIydTM89AAxcDA09TiLwBDuBooO\\_nkZ-bql-QnZ3m6KioCADby8Qc/dl3/d3/L0IDUmITUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBL11CUmZ3QSEhL2Fy/](http://www.bahrain.bh/wps/portal!/ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gLAxNHQ093A3d_J29DA08_cw9TT1dvI8cgU_1wkA6zeGd3Rw8Tcx8DAwsXNwsDIydTM89AAxcDA09TiLwBDuBooO_nkZ-bql-QnZ3m6KioCADby8Qc/dl3/d3/L0IDUmITUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBL11CUmZ3QSEhL2Fy/)

<sup>302</sup> <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/bahrain.htm>

recover, for example, such that the profit on tourism industry is growing. Budgetary arrangements have also pointed in restoring certainty in Bahrain's economy, for example, Gulf air is also recovering . Youth unemployment and the growth for administration debt and decreasing resources are greater challenges for Bahrain.

1. “GDP (PPP). \$32.44 billion (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 111
2. Labour Force. 705,900, country comparison to the world: 152
3. Unemployment Rate. 15% (2005 est.), country comparison to the world: 144”<sup>303</sup>

## 5.5 Kuwait

### Governance System

Nominally a region of the Ottoman Empire, managed from Constantinople starting with the sixteenth century until the last nineteenth century. In that situation, Sheik Mubarak al Sabah or "Mubarak the Great" (r. 1896-1915) entered an agreement with Britain, which created Kuwait as an self-sufficient British protectorate with a semi-autonomous position. Mid-1930s, Kuwait started the improvement from its petroleum industry, the groundwork of the country's advanced progress. With respect to June 19, 1961 Kuwait picked up full autonomy starting with Britain in 1963 it turned into a part of the united countries. Kuwait's influences were critically undermined when Iraq attacked it. This momentarily decreased oil production and economy was impacted. Huge numbers of Kuwaitis were compelled to escape to Saudi Arabia and other different nations. After a few weeks of air bombardment, a worldwide coalition of 30 states, headed by United States started a ground ambush on 23 February 1991 which totally freed Kuwait in four days. “Kuwait has spent more than \$5 billion to repair oil infrastructure damaged during 1990-91.”<sup>304</sup>

### Statistics

1. “Nationality: Kuwaiti(s)
2. Population: 3.3 million, including non-Kuwaiti citizens (2008).
3. GNI per capita PPP: \$ 16,297 (year)
4. Ethnic groups: Kuwaitis 1 million (30% of total), Arab, South Asian, Iranian, Southeast Asian.

<sup>303</sup> Bahrain Official Site, Op. Cit.

<sup>304</sup><http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/hhamir/hhamir.php>

5. Religion: Islam 85% (most Kuwaiti citizens are Muslim).
6. Languages: Arabic (official); English widely spoken.
7. Literacy: male 82%, female 75%.”<sup>305</sup>

### **Economy**

Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - about 7% of world reserves. Petroleum accounts for nearly half of GDP, 95% of export revenues, and 95% of government income. Kuwaiti officials have committed to increasing oil production to 4 million barrels per day by 2020. The rise in global oil prices throughout 2011 and 2012 is reviving government consumption and economic growth. Kuwait has experienced a 20% increase in government budget revenue, which has led to higher budget expenditures, particularly wage hikes for many public sector employees. Kuwait has done little to diversify its economy, in part, because of this positive fiscal situation, and, in part, due to the poor business climate and the historically acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch, which has stymied most movement on economic reforms. In 2010, Kuwait passed an economic development plan that pledges to spend up to \$130 billion over five years to diversify the economy away from oil, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy.

1. “GDP (PPP). \$165.9 billion (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 60
2. Labour Force. 2,304 million, country comparison to the world: 116
3. Unemployment Rate. 2.2% (2004 est.), country comparison to the world: 16”<sup>306</sup>

## **5.6 Qatar**

### **Governance System**

Ruled by al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar converted itself from a poor British protectorate to an autonomous an autonomous state with huge oil and fuel gas incomes. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Qatari economy might have been handicapped due to nonstop siphoning off for petroleum incomes. Khalifa HAMMAD al Thani, overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995. In 2001, Qatar finalized its

<sup>305</sup> <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/bahrain.htm>

<sup>306</sup> <http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/hhamir/hhamir.php>, Op. Cit.

outstanding issues with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. “Oil and fuel gas incomes empower Qatar to bring per capita income not far beneath the developed modern nations of Western Europe.”<sup>307</sup>

### Statistics

1. “Nationality: Kuwaiti(s) Population: 3.3 million, nationality: Qatari(s). Population: 1.8 million (2012, Official population clock)
2. GNI per capita PPP: \$ 29 607 (year)
3. Ethnic groups: Arab 40%, Pakistani 18%, Indian 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%
4. Religion: Islam (state religion, claimed by virtually all of the indigenous population)
5. Languages: Arabic (official); English (widely spoken)
6. Literacy: 79%.”<sup>308</sup>

### Economy

Qatar has prospered in the shortest time and assumed a very diversified GDP growth. Qatari monetary powers also catered for saving money from neighbouring countries and witnessed stable economy. The discovery of oil has transformed Qatari economy and raised the living standards of common people. In 2010 and 2011, GDP varied due to expansion in oil prices worldwide and Qatar’s expansion of gas sector faced certain periods of difficulties. GDP regulated to 6.3% by 2012 as Qatar's gas sector extension moved at fruition. Financial approach has centered on creating and expanding private foreign investment in the non-energy sectors. Anyhow, oil and gas at present represent more than half of GDP, approximately 85% from fare earnings, and 70% about administration incomes. Oil and gas produced Qatar as the world's most astounding per-capita salary nation and the richest country with the reduced unemployment rate. Known oil stores tantamount to over 25 billion barrels and there are soaring gas exports by Qatar. Qatar's demonstrated reserves from known fuel characteristic gas surpass 25 trillion cubic meters, more than 13% of the reality downright and third biggest. Qatar's 2022 World

<sup>307</sup>Qatr Official Site,

[http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/homepage/!ut/p/c5/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gzA0sjR18Lk9AgHycLA09vD1NTP3cjYwMDM\\_1wkA6zeAMcwNFA388jPzdVvyA7rxwAav-zag!!/dl3/d3/L2dBIS9nQSEh/](http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/homepage/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gzA0sjR18Lk9AgHycLA09vD1NTP3cjYwMDM_1wkA6zeAMcwNFA388jPzdVvyA7rxwAav-zag!!/dl3/d3/L2dBIS9nQSEh/)

<sup>308</sup> <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/bahrain.htm>

Cup will quicken vast scale foundation ventures for example, Qatar's metro system, light rail system, and the Qatar-Bahrain highway.

1. “GDP (PPP). \$189 billion (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 58
2. Labour Force. 1.43 million (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 132
3. Unemployment Rate. 2.2% (2004 est.), country comparison to the world: 16”<sup>309</sup>

## **EVOLVING ARAB SPRING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON STABILITY OF GULF REGION**

Arab Spring has been termed as one of the major political developments at the onset of 21<sup>st</sup> century. The hapless oppressed masses of Arab countries who were wary of their governance system, uneven distribution of wealth, lack of employment opportunities and absence of freedom of expression forced their youth to take control of the situation themselves. Many termed this as a revolutionary change to do away with a century old system of governance existing in the Arab world. Violent processions and street protests were demonstrated all over the Arab World. The countries which could not sustain the pressure from these protests included Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, where the events culminated into change of government. The Gulf States were also affected by the ripple effect of the Arab Spring in the shape of street protests and processions. However, most of these states were able to overcome these through a number of active and passive measures. The Gulf region has immense significance due to its historical importance, geo-strategic location and possession of vast oil wealth. The interest conflicts between powers to dominate the region hence do not come by surprise. Dynamics of the uprising suggest that the unrest has not yet completed its life cycle and internal political future of these countries remain in-flux. The impact of Arab Spring upon the Gulf is quite relevant to this project. As a matter of fact, the Arab Spring impacted upon the internal dynamics of the Gulf States to a great extent. One of the component of the proposed theoretical framework in this study rests upon the “Power within the State” which is dealt under the realm of political science. A state draws power from its people. The dissented population of the Gulf States weakened the Gulf States influence to a great extent. The situation warranted a greater degree of attention towards strengthening themselves on inner front

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<sup>309</sup> Qatar Official Site, Op. Cit.

more than the influence they could exert regionally or globally. Moreover, the strength which the Gulf States draw from its people in the wake of Muslim unity seems to be paradoxical as the strength which the Gulf States draw from its people appears to be weaning away.

### **Evolution of the Arab Spring**

At the same time satellite TV and the web made another general population segment in the Bedouin world, disintegrating the customized cults that encompassed rulers, freer statement didn't interpret under political transform. A risky scenario was inevitable to be created between aged leaders, security-obsessed and apparently stuck over a frosty war paradigm, and the anxious young people they governed. Young minds with newer thoughts and aspirations thought , much has been promised to them but most of the things remain uncertain to those called "generation-in-waiting". Much might not express their disappointment during the elections. While few rulers went so far as to hold no elections at all, "polls that ranged from the fraudulent to the meaningless only fed a belief that leaders and the cliques that surrounded them were not serious about ceding any real political power."<sup>310</sup> When the first Arab Human Development Report was published in cooperation with the United Nations in 2002, it stirred heated debate. While praising countries for combating poverty and raising life expectancy, it outlined three so-called deficits that were holding the region back-the freedom deficit, the women's empowerment deficit and the knowledge deficit. The report revealed that the Arab world had lower literacy levels than the developing countries' average, and invested less in research than most regions of the world. The report was not authored by a team of Western policy wonks but by a group of Arab scholars respected in their own countries and research fields. It echoed a deepening sense of despondency in a civilization. The fact that change was so much talked about inside and outside the Arab world suggests that many had wanted and expected it to happen. Far from being a sudden awakening, the Arab spring capped a decade of protest, political activism and media criticism that had laid the ground for more open political systems. "Foreign investment in real estate was also one driving force behind a property price spike that spread across the region in the

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<sup>310</sup>Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *"The Battle for the Arab Spring Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era"*, Yale University Press, New Haven: London, 2012

years leading up to the Arab Spring. Others included a common reference for investing in bricks and mortar rather than riskier stocks and bonds, natural population growth, rapid urbanization and easier access to credit. “Social trends were also changing, with more and more young couples wanting to move immediately into their own home rather than taking the traditional route of living with the groom’s parents.”<sup>311</sup> The end result was a region-wide property boom in the second half of the 2000, pushing house prices and rents to levels that were out of proportion with incomes. The cost of housing was just one element among widespread price rises that stoked popular discontent; the cost of food also rose much faster than the overall consumer price index between 2005 and 2009.

Inflation was cushioned to some extent by state subsidies, and Arab regimes were all too aware of the potentially explosive effect of removing them. But price rises were also being fuelled by a burgeoning consumer culture and easier access to debt. More and more households took out loans or overdrafts to fund the purchases of TVs, cars, houses or even medical treatment. The value of short-term loans only increased by 5.5 percent between 2001 and 2005, but then soared by 67 percent between 2005 and 2010. High energy prices also took a particularly high toll on many Arab economies because of their reliance on oil and gas for power generation. Perhaps the key difference in the Arab world was the combination of economic hopelessness with political powerlessness. Angry, poor and disenfranchised people in Greece, Spain or Britain had outlets to express their displeasure with policy-makers. They could read and write criticism of their governments, they could watch TV shows and enjoy cartoons that openly mocked their political leaders, they could stage peaceful protests without being shot, and they could ultimately voice their disapproval at the ballot box. They had a belief that they could influence the course of events. The absence of this belief in most of the Arab world fuelled a frustration that was being shared and spread through new forms of media and communication that had already undergone their own revolution in the preceding decade.

## 5.7 Impact Analysis – Bahrain

Ruled by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa since 1999, Bahrain is an absolute monarchy. Like all small states, Bahrain is hostage to its geography and to the wider regional power

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<sup>311</sup> ibid

struggle between Shi'ite Muslim but non-Arab Iran and Saudi Arabia, proponent of *Wahhabi* Sunni Islam. "The divides in Bahrain are not religious in nature – they revolve around universal calls for the Al Khalifa family to relinquish some political power to the people, to empower the elected parliament, to boost transparency and to end discrimination – but by the close of the year 2011, the standoff had taken on sectarian overtones."<sup>312</sup> Al Khalifa family lacked the financial and political clout to survive against a politically active population without Saudi and British help. Despite its poverty, relative to the vast hydrocarbon wealth of its neighbours, its negligible land mass, small population and diminished strategic importance as an oil, pearl, trading or administrative centre, "Bahrain's unusual position as a majority Shi'ite country ruled by a Sunni family saw it once more become a proxy battlefield in the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran."<sup>313</sup> Divisions in Bahrain were further inflamed by the fact that the sectarian divide was broadly mirrored by the class divide. Most of Bahrain's Shi'ites are descended from peasant farmers and have tended to occupy the lower socio-economic classes, suffering disproportionately from unemployment and lower incomes compared to other communities, who tend to hail from wealthier merchant families or be tied to powerful tribes or landowners. Overall economic divisions exacerbate feelings of discrimination among Bahrain's Shi'ites, who point to the dilapidated roads in their villages and the poor state of housing as evidence of institutional preference for their Sunni compatriots. The organizers of the earlier protests were originally young people who did not necessarily belong to the predominantly Shia opposition parties. They did not rise as Shia but as youth who wanted to have a say on their fate through active political participation. The protests were peaceful and initially they sought the implementation of 2001 NAC and an end of the security control over the country's political life. "Shortly after the beginning of protests the mainly Shia opposition parties took over but endorsed the same demands - set forward by the youth - for a new constitution that would shift most powers into the hands of elected officials. They were joined by secular leftist and liberal groups, which include Shia and Sunni members, as the protesters sought to turn the Pearl

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<sup>312</sup>Michelle Pace & Francesco Cavatorta, *Ibid.*

<sup>313</sup> *ibid*

Roundabout into Bahrain's revolutionary Tahrir Square.”<sup>314</sup> The idea of Tahrir square for Bahrain sent a risky sign not just of the country's regal gang as well as to leaders in the Gulf States more for the most part.

In any case of the serene nature of the sit-in - and the certainty that it gazed similar to an end for gang picnics instead of a political protest rally - the pearl incident might have been test of will to an image of the political each one of oil-rich Gulf states. Those requests of the Bahraini protesters to choose authorities were met through polls for electing parliamentarians although under shadow of monarchy. Such plans tested the idea about authoritarian control rehearsed over these nations and went significantly past the parliamentary framework permitted over Kuwait. These actually express a message that might have been sent to the Gulf and other states of Bedouin world. It may be that what happened over Bahrain might have been not be the same for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Rulers established Bahrain's challenges as a Iranian-backed partisan shia "conspiracy" to destabilize the Gulf and rule in the Bedouin globe. The US approach to the Bahrain crises appears to have involved pushing for faster top-down reforms to sap the momentum of protesters and limit the chances of full-scale revolution that would destabilize the region and shake oil markets.

## 5.8

### Impact Analysis – Qatar

Qatar is an important player in GCC and there are visible signs that the Kingdom has made progress in accommodating Doha's international and regional role. Remarkable riches have prompted political indifference and smothering about desires to equitable investment. After seizing control from father in a bloodless coup in 1995, the Emir, Hamad Khalifa Al-Thani, instigated a methodology of top order changes. These included the introduction of competitions for National metropolitan committee (1999) and introduction of constitution (2003). However announced voting on a unicameral parliament (initially booked for 2004) were postponed. Interestingly, these changes didn't come in light of whatever huge inner weights alternately calls for progress. This contrasted with an otherwise-similar trajectory in Bahrain, where another new ruler also sought to impose his stamp on domestic affairs by introducing constitutional and

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<sup>314</sup> ibid

legislative changes in the late-1990s. Asda'a Burson-Marsteller, a Dubai-based public relations company, published the results of its third annual Arab Youth Survey. It found that the proportion of respondents in Qatar "who ranked democracy as important had fallen from 68% in 2008 to just 33% in 2010. Two-thirds of respondents placed greater importance on stability and living in a safe neighbourhood."<sup>315</sup> This remarkable drop demonstrated the premium placed on a strong economy intermixed with feelings of national pride following the success of the World Cup bid. Qatari citizens simply have too much to lose by rocking the boat and disrupting the status quo while the 1.5 million expatriate labourers remain disempowered and unable to mobilize without sanction. "The winds of change blasting so forcefully through the region have instead passed Qatar by."<sup>316</sup>

Qatari officials can thus react to the Arab Spring with expressions of declaratory and material support for opposition movements that are unlikely to rebound domestically. Moreover, such support plays into Qatari efforts to be taken credibly as a responsible international actor and boost still further its reputation for diplomacy and mediation. "Although significant unrest is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future, Qatar is susceptible to reputational damage, either directly or by association."<sup>317</sup> The GCC intervention in Bahrain is one such example, as it underlines how concepts of intervention can mean very different things in different contexts. Indeed, the Qatari Prime Minister justified the move in terms of providing 'assistance and support' within the framework of existing agreements. This leaves Qatar in the sensitive position of explaining support for intervention on behalf of opposition groups in Libya with support for intervention on behalf of the authoritarian status quo in Bahrain.

## 5.9 Impact Analysis – Yemen

Like their counterparts around the region, a younger generation of Yemenis was inspired by events in Tunisia to take to the streets in early 2011. The JMP, frustrated by the meagre progress in reforming the dysfunctional political system, had organized licensed

<sup>315</sup>Ulrichsen Kristian Coates, "Qatar and the Arab Spring" at [www.opendemocracy.com](http://www.opendemocracy.com) (accessed on 5 June 2013)

<sup>316</sup> Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2012

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

rallies in January to demand reform within the system, rather than the removal of the President. From the very start, however, youth activists of the formal political parties, like Tawakul Karman – an Islah party member who would share the Noble Peace Prize later that year – were calling for Saleh to step down. “But it was the electrifying news of Hosni Mubarak’s departure on 11 February that began to transform the organized, relatively moderate rallies into much more organic, spontaneous and large-scale demonstrations calling for Saleh’s downfall.”<sup>318</sup> Thousands of demonstrators marched in several major cities, including the country’s industrial and intellectual centres, considered to be more secular than other Yemeni cities. At this stage, “protesters appeared to be united under the banner of removing Saleh and ensuring that Yemen did not miss out on a historic wave of change that, in mid-February, seemed like the start of a domino effect that might bring down governments from Morocco to Bahrain.”<sup>319</sup> Meanwhile, top-down efforts were also under way to push Saleh out. In April, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), dominated by Saudi Arabia, had drafted a transition proposal in which the Yemeni president would step down within thirty days and give way to a new president, who would be elected within two months. “But recent efforts at external mediation in Yemen – like Qatar’s efforts to brokers a ceasefire in Sa’ada – had borne few fruits.”<sup>320</sup> The year 2013 has seen the removal of a fourth Arab dictator - Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh - following Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Saleh resigned in February and transferred his powers to his Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi, under arrangement brokered by Saudi Arabia that might have been questionable to giving Saleh insusceptibility starting with prosecution, and permitting Al-Hadi with run unopposed for voting. Al-Hadi has since been relentlessly ridding Yemen's military and polity from predecessor's relatives and cronies. However, those organizations in the nation may be plagued by neglecting serious long outstanding issues. These include pressing destitution (it is the poorest Bedouin country), contracting oil reserves, extreme water shortages (its predicted that it will run out of water if not supported financially), expanded unemployment, broad illegal and private firearm ownership, prominent use of the opium, a solid al-Qaeda presence, tribal

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<sup>318</sup>Ibid

<sup>319</sup> Michelle Pace & Francesco Cavatorta, Ibid

<sup>320</sup> Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, Ibid

conflict, a secessionist development in the South, a Shia insurrection in the North, incessant US drone strikes, and a displaced persons crisis from Somalia. None of these issues is likely to be solved before a long time.<sup>321</sup>

### 5.10 Impact Analysis – Kuwait

In spite of Islamic monarchy, Kuwait has the Gulf's most seasoned chosen parliament, the better freedom of expression and best religious freedom. The Emir appoints the administration including the Minister and the Prime Minister which is bound by the constitution. However, feedback of the Cabinet is sought and political framework is workable. However, governmental issues have continued to witness troubles. Protests were held many times and national elections have been conducted. The situation has also resulted into frequent governing crisis and dissolution of parliament. New elections were held in February 2012, which yielded some solid opposition in the parliament. The majority observers remarked that this might have been the main run through the voting reflected the individuals. However, an "Islamist parliamentary alliance might have been framed which pressed for Sharia law to be implemented as a reform agenda. The Emir blocked parliaments law proposals."<sup>322</sup> That blocking power is now at issue. Most Kuwaitis insist on creation of a government dependent on parliament, as in most Western nations. Some Kuwaitis even questioned the monarchy, whose ruling family goes back centuries in this region. The boycott joined tribes, youth, Islamists, liberals, and the opposition. Many of the merchants and well-known people in the commercial sector boycotted. All of the tribes that historically were pro-government boycotted. It was the weakest election in the history of Kuwait. The outraged protesters protested in orange march against the government. On the Friday in the recent past, many Kuwaitis protested against the elections and amendment in laws by government and this was first government authorized rally after many years after a ban by the government. Anticipating a pro-government parliament to be elected in elections they protested calling youths through social media and use of twitter. The post-election demonstrations, for which no permits were requested, were met with force, including tear gas and different arrests. The Emir family dominated government which experiences divisions within, was targeted and

<sup>321</sup>Sharif Nashashibi, "Arab Spring 2013: Revolutionary wave enters a third year", *Al Arabiya News*, 10 Feb 2014

<sup>322</sup> Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *Ibid*

at same time protestors called for disintegration of the new parliament and inversion of the one-vote law. There is even now purpose behind confidence in Kuwait. The personal, family, and social binds which firmly tie large portions of Kuwaitis have not disappeared. Moreover, everybody is mindful that they live in a risky neighbourhood observed undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah, “we are a little organized nation in the comity of many nations and we need to show solidarity.” Kuwait will be no more exhausting desert garden which acquires solidness in the Gulf. “Only divine force knows the place things are heading to,” said Bin-Tefla. Likewise those current political crisis—a expression progressively used—plays out, Kuwaitis might discover themselves with something closer with a chosen legislature. Unfortunately, however, knowledge indicates that this might not make them freer. It appears that “Kuwait will be satisfying those acclaimed Chinese curse: the little Gulf country is existing to “Interesting” times.”<sup>323</sup>

### 5.11 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi society has a number of issues and tensions. A rare independent opinion poll published in 2010 indicated that Saudis' main social concerns were unemployment (at 10% in 2010), corruption and religious extremism. Crime is not a significant problem. However, Saudi Arabia's objective of being both a modern and Islamic country, coupled with economic difficulties, has created deep social tensions. Connections to the West have caused some Saudis to desire the overthrow of the Al Saud. Others want a reformed and more open government and to have more influence in the political process. On the other hand, juvenile delinquency, drug-use and use of alcohol are getting worse. High unemployment and a generation of young males filled with contempt toward the Royal Family is a significant threat to Saudi social stability. Some Saudis feel they are entitled to well-paid government jobs, and the failure of the government to satisfy this sense of entitlement has led to considerable dissatisfaction. Additionally, “the Shiite minority, located primarily in the Eastern Province, and who often complain of institutionalized inequality and repression, have created civil disturbances in the past.”<sup>324</sup> After two years of trying to steer the course of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia is turning inward. The past

<sup>323</sup>Doug Bandow, “The Arab Spring Comes to Kuwait: Will Democracy Arrive and Liberty Thrive?” [www.frobes.com](http://www.frobes.com), (accessed on 4 June 2013)

<sup>324</sup>Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, “The Battle for the Arab Spring Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era”, Yale University Press, New Haven: London, 2012

year has seen the octogenarian King Abdullah usher in a new generation of younger princes to replace rapidly aging and less competent members of the ruling house. Indeed, it's not the ripple effects from the uprisings across the Middle East that occupy the minds of Saudi watchers these days, but the management of the transition from the sons to the grandsons of Ibn Saud, the kingdom's founder. Reform is coming to Saudi Arabia, albeit slowly. The appointment in January of 30 women into the Majlis al-Shura, a 150-member consultative council with the power to draft laws, was long overdue -- but nevertheless a huge step forward for the kingdom, particularly coming less than six months after female Saudi athletes were allowed for the first time to compete in the Olympics. Both moves mark a positive step forward for the country, and ones that will have fundamental and permanent effects on Saudi Arabia's social fabric. In some ways, the Kingdom is far more politically accountable than Arab countries that underwent revolutions in 2011. Traditional government structures in many parts of the kingdom still prevail and the role of the provincial governor in attending the daily Majlis to address the problems and needs of his constituents is still highly important in maintaining ties between the people and the ruling elite. Saudi Arabia is among a very small group of Arab Middle Eastern countries left unaffected by the events of the Arab Spring. With the absence of any immediate consequences for the Kingdom, changes in the regional and international strategic environment represent the real influence of the Arab Spring on Saudi Arabia. The stability enjoyed by Saudi Arabia should enable Riyadh to play a pivotal role in Middle East politics and enhance its status at the top of the fragile regional order. However, this requires the Kingdom to obtain the best of the opportunities and tackle the challenges on the regional level by exercising influence and conducting a more assertive foreign policy. "In order to face current challenges and profit from the available opportunities the Kingdom needs to take certain measures."<sup>325</sup> Effective foreign policy of Riyadh requires continuation of the domestic reforms that target education, enhance the rule of law, assimilate minorities in a comprehensive national framework, and increase the number and the role of elected institutions. The internal, regional, and international Saudi environments are interdependent. However, this interdependence is asymmetrical since the internal environment is the most important. The stability, security, and welfare of the

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<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

domestic environment determine the shape of, and the enthusiasm for Saudi involvement on the regional and international stages. Therefore, “these reforms will help consolidate internal stability and increase the internal environment’s immunity from shocks originating from the regional environment on the one hand, while on the other, adding to the credibility and the weight of Saudi foreign policy initiatives.”<sup>326</sup> Although there are increasing pressures on the government, Saudi Arabia has proved to be immune from the turmoil caused by the so-called Arab Spring. This is because of several reasons that relate to Saudi contexts and others that relate to the Arab Spring itself. However, the real consequences of the Arab Spring on the Kingdom are, as noted, the changes within the strategic (regional and international) environment. These changes require the Kingdom to maximize its opportunities and tackle regional challenges by exercising influence and conducting a more assertive foreign policy.

### 5.12 Impact Analysis – Oman

In contrast to other dictators of the region, Al Said has earned the respect and loyalty of his people by improving quality of life and expanding human rights. This has resulted in al Said easily maintaining, in some cases even consolidating, his power throughout the course of the Arab Spring. This is not to say that Oman experienced no turmoil as a result of the Arab Spring. There were indeed some protests against the government. In the northern city of Sohar, several hundred people gathered to protest against political corruption and low government salaries. The protestors blocked off several roads and set fire to a supermarket. The Sultan responded quickly to these protests. “Almost immediately he fired twelve cabinet ministers and made amends to the country’s already substantial social safety net. He raised monthly unemployment benefits by \$386 for every person in Oman”<sup>327</sup>. This represented a sizable expense, but the government is able to afford these types of measures due to its yearly surplus. When compared to other protests in the Middle East, these were tiny in scale. Demands for higher salaries and a stop to small scale government corruption pale in comparison to calls for regime change. Furthermore, less than a thousand people engaged in the demonstrations, most of which were staged in a port city more than 100 miles from the capital. At no point did the


<sup>326</sup> ibid

<sup>327</sup> Bakri, Nada. *Protests in Oman Spread From Port City to Capital*, 22 Jun 2013

protesters seek to remove the Sultan from power or cause significant personnel change in his government. As long as Sultan al Said remains in power, it is unlikely that Oman will be drawn into any sort of armed conflict. It is also improbable that he will lose the support of his people. The main issue facing Oman in the future is that of succession. There are multiple factors that will complicate any exchange of power in Oman's future. The Sultan has never married and has not yet named an heir. This raises the question of who will be the next person to lead the country. The only precedent that exists for a power exchange is that of a military coup, which the Sultan utilized to overthrow his father in 1970. Military coups are not often seamless and without incident. Both Omani's and foreign leaders would prefer that the next leader instead come to power in a peaceful and uneventful manner. Without a doubt, this is the greatest issue facing Oman and one that will have the attention of world leaders in the next decade.

### 5.13 Impact Analysis – Iran

Over the most recent three decades, as Sunni Islamist developments picked up broad prominent support, the Shi'a also started to mobilize irrespective of restraints forced. Eventually rulers reviewed their particular laws. The anti-Shia assumption has been exacerbated to rise on the political scene of the alleged Salafi movement, whose ideology for Islam predates the religious and social tensions that primary prepared the significant parochial part inside Islam and extreme ideas provided for conception of the different Shi'a Assemblies. The birth of Salfism lies in the nineteenth century, and the Salafi school of thought has been received by Muslims who try to apply conservative interpretations of scripture built upon the teachings of the Prophet and advocate a return to traditions. The Arabic expressions salaf means "predecessors," in which approach follows the Prophet and his earliest companions. Salafists in their thought bear an outlook of seventh century Islam and preach to follow strictly teachings of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. "In the Bedouin uprisings in recent past, two patterns of movement have been identified as "around the Salafists: the individuals who proselytized through *Dawa* or the religious call, a group which is not brutal in approach or politically active; and the



jihadists, who act brutality to accomplish their plans.”<sup>328</sup> The Sunnis treat the Shia similar to inferior citizens,” said Ayatollah Sayed Ali al Hakim, a Shite preacher who hails from Lebanon and whose teachings have found their footprints on the seminaries of Qom, Najaf and Beirut. “In exactly Sunni states, they don’t treat us as equal people. we might be spotted and killed by them [the Sunnis] as similar people who conducted 9/11.”<sup>329</sup> Iran has so far remained relatively unaffected by the winds of change that have swept through the Middle East and North Africa. “The greatest spill over or effect on Iran will be the overthrowing of the Assad Regime. Iran has close ties with Asad’s Syria and losing of a key ally at this critical juncture will be crucial for Iran.”<sup>330</sup>

#### 5.14 Impact Analysis – Iraq

An ethnically diverse society comprising Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%. Arabic and Kurdish as the official languages, Turkmen (a Turkish dialect) and Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic) are official in areas where they constitute a majority of the population, Armenian. Amidst the protests and ceremonies that have overturned various rulers, the protesters have also staged demonstrations against Iraqi government. When the Iraqi leader Nouri al-Maliki moved sentence of execution against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on approval of terrorism charges and uprooting of Saleh al-Mutlaq, it activated a real political emergency that completely uncovered Iraq as an unstable, undemocratic nation legitimising political rivalries and working for control of power. Large scale sectarian violence instantly flared up again, with an arrangement of terrorist strike against Shi’a during 2006. The questionable political agreement "around gatherings and factions arrived at the end of 2010 has broken down. The administration for national solidarity has ceased functioning, and areas that had self-sufficient forces tantamount to Kurdistan have been set up as sovereign putting more pressure on the central legislature. “Unless another political understanding will be arrived at soon, Iraq might plunge under civil war or will have part separated.”<sup>331</sup>

<sup>328</sup>Fulton Will, “After the Arab Spring: Iran's Foreign Relations in the Middle East”, Wikipedia (accessed on 16 Jun 13)

<sup>329</sup>Iran Profile on BBC assessed on internet on 29 May 13

<sup>330</sup> Iran Profile on BBC, Ibid

<sup>331</sup>Sly Liz, “Arab Spring-style protests take hold in Iraq”, <https://washingtonpost.com/world/middleeast> (accessed on 17 Jun 13)

## Fault lines

1. **Sectarian Issues.** Although Iraq has no recent history of Shia -Sunni problem in a Sunni rule, it is after the occupation of US forces that Shia and Sunni problem has surfaced. It will take some time that this issue subsides and life returns to normalcy. Sectarian tensions have been on the rise again ever since start of demonstrations last year in places like Sunni like Fallujah, the tough Sunni town better known as “the graveyard of the Americans”. The protesters have taken their cue from Arab Spring movements elsewhere, claiming that Sunnis, who dominated during the rule of their kinsman, Saddam Hussein, are now second class citizens in the new Iraq, where democracy has enshrined the numerical advantage of the Shias, who have a two-thirds majority. In particular, “they complain of discrimination in government jobs and hassle from the Iraqi security forces.”<sup>332</sup>
2. **Nascent Institutions.** Due to prolonged periods of war, the institutions have either ceased to exist or are in their formative stage. This vulnerability can be exploited easily for foreseeable future.

## Recent Developments

In year 2013 ongoing protests in Iraq have increased markedly in December, particularly among Sunnis who accuse the Shia Prime Minister Nouri Maliki of instituting sectarian policies. "Iraq's politicians seem more interested in factional wrangling than in setting the country to rights," wrote the Guardian's former Middle East editor Brian Whitaker. "Maliki's behavior has become increasingly authoritarian as he seeks to amass power for himself...Not that any of Maliki's opponents would necessarily behave differently."<sup>333</sup>

## Potentials of Spill over of Arab Spring

There is enough potential for spill over of Arab spring in Iraq. “In fact societies and countries like Iraq are the true breeding grounds for the phenomenon like Arab

<sup>332</sup>Freeman Colin, “Could Iraq's 'Arab Spring' lead it back to civil war?” <https://www.blogs.telegraph/news> (accessed on 17 Jun 13)

<sup>333</sup>Sharif Nashashibi , Ibid

spring.”<sup>334</sup> “Situation in Syria will have a direct effect on Iraq and if there is any more of instability in the neighbourhood, Iraq is likely to be the most affected country.”<sup>335</sup>

### 5.15 What the Arab Spring Has Achieved?

A large portion of the Arab autocrats are still in power, and few nations that have experienced overthrow of government are confronting huge upheavals. This has prompted re-discussion if the spring – narrated by Palestinian thinker Azmi Bishara as the "most essential geopolitical action in the area since 1950s" – has turned to winter". "After the fall of dictators and the guarantee of opportunity and equity that was brought," the gone time has been a time of division and mistrust in the Middle East and North Africa," narrated the Independent's defence journalist Kim Sengupta. At the same time, there is much to be worried about, the cynics are ignoring the importance and intrinsic challenges for whatever has been achieved so far. Strongmen have been ousted; decades-old one-group systems have been abolished; establishments taboos have been challenged; and political and financial changes have been promised with unpredictable degrees of execution. If they like it or not, Bedouin rulers are constantly being compelled to regard the hopes, privileges and grievances of their people, and to figure it out that suppressing them will be having an inverse impact. An area long thought as safe to change has become stimulus and impetus for protest movements around the world. Such an enormous undertaking was never easy and simple. Taking on authoritarianism, as challenging as this has been, pales in comparison with the tests of the aftermath: the reinvention and transformation of states, infrastructure, foundations and social orders. With freedom of expression and dissent long banned, opposition movements have had to spring up out of nowhere, organize and articulate themselves almost immediately, learn to govern and democratize with no prior experience, and cooperate with or challenge other groups with different, and sometimes contradictory, visions for the future. “It is only natural, under such circumstances, that the road will be as long as it is bumpy.”<sup>336</sup>

<sup>334</sup>James Zogby, Edward Gnehm Jr., Mustafa Hamarneh, Marwan Muasher, Marina Ottaway, Public Opinion on Iraq and the Arab Spring on Carneige Endowment assessed on 17 Jun 13

<sup>335</sup> Cathy Young, The Arab Spring and Iraq on <http://www.realpolitics.com> assessed on 17 Jun 13

<sup>336</sup>Sharif Nashashibi, Ibid

## 5.16 Impact of Arab Spring on the Regional Balance of Power

The events since the start of the Arab Spring have shifted the regional order. Former power brokers Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad have been sidelined as they focus on their internal affairs. Amid the chaos, Saudi Arabia has stepped forward and exercised its strength, even if it meant contradicting its strongest Western ally, the United States. Over the summer, “Riyadh took regional leadership of support for the opposition to Syrian president Bashar Al Assad, and along with the UAE and Kuwait offered a combined US\$12 billion (Dh44bn) in immediate financial assistance to the military-backed government in Egypt in July.”<sup>337</sup> After winning a United Nations Security Council seat a few months later, Saudi Arabia rejected it in protest against the body’s inaction on Syria and Palestine. These steps have caused concern in Washington for their assertiveness and because at times they run counter to US policy. Saudi Arabia’s stance on these issues has even prompted speculation that 2013 could be the beginning of the end of the decades-long US-Saudi alliance. But the changes ahead are likely less of a break-up and more of a shift in the balance of power within the relationship. While still reliant on the US for weapons, Saudi Arabia is more confident of maintaining its own security. Riyadh appears poised to expand on this independence to distance its foreign policies from those of Washington, particularly on issues close to home. What this means on a practical level is that day-to-day cooperation and coordination will likely remain intact, but Riyadh and Washington will agree to differ on big-picture questions such as who to support in Egypt and what a solution should look like in Syria. For Saudi Arabia, the priority in the coming year is simple: regional stability. Policymakers argue that economies and governments across the region need to consolidate chaotic politics, assure investors and citizens, and foster growth. This explains Riyadh’s investment in the new Egyptian government, its backing of the monarchies in Jordan and Morocco and continued contribution to Bahrain’s economic recovery. Riyadh also sees an urgent need to contain the fallout from the Syrian conflict. Saudi’s King Abdullah has sent humanitarian aid and other assistance

<sup>337</sup>Dickinson Elizabeth, “2013 in review: Events since the Arab Spring shift regional order”, *The National*, 29 Dec 2013

to Jordan and Lebanon, where the magnitude of the refugee influx has stressed already fragile economies and political systems. Sectarian tensions spilling over from the conflict into Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere also raise the spectre of more – not less – turmoil. A goal for stability also explains why Riyadh is sceptical of Tehran, for what it views as undue Iranian influence and even interference in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the GCC have often accused Iran of stirring tensions and unrest in the region. Tehran has strongly backed the Assad government and is also allied with the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki. For this reason, Saudi Arabia lobbied against interim nuclear deal that western powers signed with Iran to curb the Iranian nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions. Time will tell if a call in September by Iran’s reformist new President, Hassan Rouhani, for closer ties with Riyadh will lead to any improvement in relations between the region’s two dominant powers. To Riyadh, a stronger GCC will be a bulwark against at least some of this regional turmoil, perhaps even in the form of a Gulf Union. The proposed grouping, which would be similar to the European Union, would create tighter economic and security cooperation among these countries, which have in common a model of governance that promises economic prosperity and opportunity in exchange for political stability for citizens. The idea of a Gulf Union recently hit a snag when Youssef bin Alawi, Oman’s foreign minister, said this month that Oman was not interested in participating. A subsequent GCC meeting in Kuwait vowed to continue integration. Whether Saudi Arabia can achieve the goals it has ambitiously set for itself is now the question of 2014. Qatar in recent years tried a similar push for influence and is now regrouping after a series of setbacks. Just a year ago, Qatar had placed itself at the centre of nearly every regional foreign-policy question. Doha had carved out a role backing the Islamist-leaning parties and individuals who came to power in Libya, Tunis, Cairo, and among the Syrian rebels. Qatar’s all-in support, however, may also have been a miscalculation. Today, Qatar’s role has won it broad public distrust in Egypt and Libya. Some of Qatar’s allies in the Syrian opposition have meanwhile been side-lined in the western-backed opposition Syrian National Coalition. “Saudi Arabia is bigger, richer, and home to Islam’s most sacred sites. Expect Riyadh to leverage all those assets in pursuit of its increasingly assertive foreign policy goals.”<sup>338</sup>


<sup>338</sup>Al Tamamy Saud Mousaed, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security”,

### 5.17 Concluding Analysis

While the Arab Spring process continues, the days of domino effects are likely to have run their course. If Syrian President Bashar Assad goes, he will be the fifth ruler to be toppled, but elsewhere the demands appear to be aiming lower and the resulting changes look more incremental. The Arab Spring is moving into, as some observers say, a more mature phase. There is Syria, of course. But the rest of the region is moving into a slow burn now. Voices are speaking up against corruption and political arrogance in the Gulf, but also in places like Egypt and Tunisia that went through their revolutions and are still undergoing a political shakeout. As more time passes, ripple effects of the erstwhile transnational 'Arab Spring' will keep reducing. As of now, the phenomenon is more a factor of respective country own dynamics and not a collective cause. These dynamics vary from state to state; common denominator being devolution of power and authority. The vast Arab kingdoms are a demonstrative complicity of kings and emirs comprising more than 40 million subjects stretching from Kuwait to Oman. The rulers are under different pressures against their authority and privileges. The public demands are generally powerless and incoherent to genuinely undermine their rule, however they still convey significance. Each concession offered by the Kingdoms may be an affirmation that they can't protect themselves from the Arab Spring, and that to ensure their long haul survival, they will have to provide people with freedom of expression and like in past seek tacit approval of their chances from Washington. "The conclusion drawn from oppression and compliance is that the Arab spring was brought," al-Ahmed said. "This is the start of constant tipping for regimes in the Middle East". A few of the major significant clash lines might not have occurred if there were no internet and cellular form of mobilizing demonstrators. communication. Authorities are carrying out an internet monitoring and crackdown which provides them broader leeway to arrest web activists which are insulting and mocking rulers. In Abu Dhabi, 94 individuals of the UAE, including scholars, lawyers and members of administering family were held as suspects for plotting coup against the government and their trial begin as part of crackdown. In the

Gulf States, few individual have been detained for having twitter accounts and different online networking messages which contributed towards insult to the ruling elite. Social networking websites have been put under scrutiny and control and answerable for negative remarks presented. To offset the public dissent, the legislatures that could manage it have used intensely to make common administration and services better. Oman has reserved \$180 million to help revive little organizations. Saudi Arabia has earmarked more than \$100 billion, and in spite of its limitless wealth, it is extremely concerned about the unemployment existent in society and poverty and therefore it is repatriating undocumented labour from other countries and employing own citizens on easier jobs.

Gulf authorities have established an excellent intelligence-sharing mechanism in remote areas and have mutually helped each other in this regard, for example, the Saudi troops entered Bahrain to help regime in year 201. Their cooperation has indeed increased on incorporate of government in the neighbourhood, Jordan, which has been progressively brought under the Gulf fold. However, there are other cautionary indications. “Going forward, the developments put into motion because of Arab Spring and its aftermath from the revolutions indicates that next surge for change would be more sweeping is its capacity to challenge status quo.” said Ehsan Ahrari, a Virginia-based Current Affairs Analyst. “But that doesn’t mean that they would be less violent in moulding ways of governance in area in coming days.” One of the main reasons of relatively calm ripple effects of Arab Spring in GCC states has been strength of state apparatus and lack of hostile means available to the affected masses. However reasons of discontentment are there which need to be addressed effectively by the ruling elite without any prejudice. It is imperative for the forces in the Middle East region to realize the dangers, which await their countries if they pursue their political desires at the expense of their fellow citizens. The Arab Spring could bring a positive change; nevertheless, it could also bring destruction and devastation depending upon choices made by political leadership. The leadership must display foresight and adapt to changes in the region and world at large.





# ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS

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## CHAPTER NO. 6

### ARAB AND NON-ARAB FRICTION (AJAM) - HISTORICAL TO CONTEMPORARY TIMES AND IMPACT ON STABILITY OF THE GULF

#### 6.1 Genesis of Arab-o-Ajam

##### Pre-Islamic Arab – Ajam Origin

Pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula hosted two categories of indigenous populations: Nomadic Arabs or Bedouin and settled Arab agriculturists. “South and North Arabia were experiencing a period of decline. A shift in power and influence away from sedentary communities and towards dominant nomadic tribes.”<sup>339</sup> Arabia, which spans an area of 1.25 million sq. miles, is a rugged, arid, and inhospitable terrain. It consists mainly of a vast desert, with the exception of Yemen on the south eastern tip, a fertile region with ample rain and well suited for agriculture. The south-western region of Arabia also has a climate conducive to agriculture. The first mention of the inhabitants of Arabia, or “Arbi,” is seen in the ninth century B.C. in Assyrian script. The residents of northern Arabia were nomads who owned camels. In pre-Islamic Arabia, there was no central political authority, nor was there any central ruling administrative centre. Instead, there were only various Bedu (Bedouin) tribes. Individual members of a tribe were loyal to their tribe, rather than to their families. The Bedu formed nomadic tribes who moved from place to place in order to find green pastures for their camels, sheep, and goats. Since there was a constant shortage of green pastures for their cattle to graze in, the tribes often fought one another over the little fertile land available within Arabia, made possible by the occasional desert springs. Since warfare was a part of everyday live, all men within the tribes had to train as warriors. By the seventh century B.C. Arabia was divided into about five kingdoms, namely the Ma’in, Saba, Qataban, Hadramaut, and Qahtan. “These civilizations were built upon a system of agriculture, especially in southern Arabia where the wet climate and fertile soil were suitable for cultivation.”<sup>340</sup> According to the Political Language of Islam, during the Islamic period, Ajam was originally used as a reference to denote those whom Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula viewed as "alien or

<sup>339</sup>University of Virginia Presentation, people.virginia.edu

<sup>340</sup> “Ancient world History, Pre-Islamic Arabia”, <http://earlyworldhistory.blogspot.com/2012/04/pre-islamic-arabia.html>, (accessed 29 Jan 2013)

outsiders”<sup>341</sup>. The early application of the term included all of the peoples with whom the Arabs had contact including Persians, Byzantine Greeks, Ethiopians, and the somewhat related Nabataeans. The original meaning still exists, and in much of the non-Arabic speaking Muslim world the term does not have a pejorative meaning as the word is understood to mean anyone who does not speak Arabic. According to Clifford Edmund Bosworth, "by the 3rd/9th century, the non-Arabs, and above all the Persians, were asserting their social and cultural equality (taswīa) with the Arabs, if not their superiority (tafzīl) over them (a process seen in the literary movement of the Šo‘ūbīya). In any case, there was always in some minds a current of admiration for the ‘Ajam as heirs of an ancient, cultured tradition of life. Even the great proponent of the Arab cause, Jahez, wrote a *Ketab al-taswiabayn al-Arabwal-Ajam*. After these controversies had died down, and the Persians had achieved a position of power in the Islamic world comparable to their numbers and capabilities, “Ajam became a simple ethnic and geographical designation.”<sup>342</sup> Thus by the 9th century, the term was being used by Persians themselves as an ethnic term, and examples can be given by Asadi Tusi in his poem comparing the superiority of Persians and Arabs. Accordingly: "territorial notions of “Iran,” are reflected in such terms as *irānšahr*, *irānzamin*, or *Faris*, the arabicized form of *Pars/Fars* (Persia). “The ethnic notion of “Iranian” is denoted by the Persian words *Parsi* or *Irani*, and the Arabic term *Ahl-I-Faris* (inhabitants of Persia) or *Ajam*, referring to non-Arabs, but primarily to Persians as in *molk-e Ajam* (Persian kingdom) or *moluk-e Ajam* (Persian kings).”<sup>343</sup>

### Ascent of Islam in a Historic Arab-o-Ajam Divide

The extraordinary genius of the Prophet of Islam, his wonderful personality and the impressiveness of his call to religious unity and universal citizenship as the world – movement of which he was the cause and which in-spite of internal dynastic wars carried his people on a tidal wave of conquest from one end of the globe to the other. Arabia,

<sup>341</sup>Lewis Bernard, “The Political Language of Islam” (Exxon Lecture Series)

"AsadiTusi",

342

و

گفته مشچوديو انهبسيگفتى

Ferdowsi University, JalalKhaleqiMotlaq, اکتونپاسخشنو ايپوده چونديو انبيا بانعبيار چه کنيا هلگر انما يه عجم اچه يو يدشما خود گلغهء غر شتر بان 1357(1978). page 71. *MajaleyhDaneshkadeyehAdabiyaat o Olum-e Insani* (Literature and Humanities Magazine),

<sup>343</sup>Ashraf Ahmad, *EncyclopaediaIranica*, "Iranian identity, Medieval Islamic Period"

hitherto the home of warring tribes and clans, each with its blood-feud of centuries was suddenly animated with a common purpose. The same causes, however, which until the advent of the Prophet had prevented the growth of the Arabs into a nation, - the same tribal jealousies, the same division of clan and clan, the marks of which are still visible throughout the Muslim and particularly Gulf world led to the downfall of the Saracenic empire.

### **The Last Sermon of Holy Prophet (PBUH)**

#### **1. Background**

The farewell Pilgrimage of the Holy Prophet may rightly be called the culminating point in his Prophetic career. It was the sixty-third year of the Prophet's life which coincided with the close of the 10th of Hijra that he decided to perform Hajj, which in history, goes by the name of Hajja-tul-Wada. The Prophet's mission, had, by this time, been completed to all intents and purposes. To a people steeped in ignorance, he gave light and inspired them with belief in Allah, the sole Creator, Master and Sustainer of the Universe. To a disunited mass, engaged in perpetual warfare, he gave unity of thought and action. He had revealed the love of God and His will to mankind and had given it a visible expression by founding a society on the basis of righteousness, piety and God-consciousness, the like of which is not to be found in the whole history of mankind.

#### **2. The Excerpts from the Last Sermon**

The Holy Prophet emphasised on a number of occasion highlighting the importance of Muslim brotherhood. Various excerpts mentioning the importance of Muslim Brotherhood and equality are as under:-


O' ye people! Allah says, O' people We created you from one male and one female and made you into tribes and nations, so as to be known to one another. Verily in the sight of Allah, the most honoured amongst you is the one who is most God-fearing. There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab and for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for the white over the black nor for the black over the white except in God-consciousness.

He went on to say that:

O' People! Every Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim, and all the Muslims form one brotherhood. And your slaves; see that you feed them with such food as you eat yourselves, and clothe them with the clothes that you yourselves wear. In order to allay the perception of superiority of one group of people against the other, the Holy Prophet said that: O' people! Listen and obey, though a mangled Abyssinian slave is appointed your Amir, provided he executes (the Ordinance of) the Book of Allah among you.

3. **Analysis of Last Sermon.**

The Prophet guided the complete mankind during his address. He utilized the term "O People" seven times. He utilized the wording "O Men" in the goodbye address, and didn't utilize the wording "O Muslims" or "O Believer". The prophet purposefully delivered guidance to all kind of people belonging to any kind of religions, colours or times (his message is for the final for his followers till the day of Judgement). The Prophet's message is even now a guidance for each individual all around in the universe. "At the beginning of address, the Prophet approached the individuals to pay attention to what he was going to talk about. He requested that his message should be delivered to all mankind, to be transformed and delivered from place to place and generation to generation. The task of delivering the message was on the shoulders of those who were listening the address to deliver the message to complete mankind.". "The message of the Prophet that he conveyed incorporated essential concept, i.e. , equity of humankind. People are equivalent in the sight of Allah and in front of law. All mankind is from Adam and Eve. Both of these parents and all of us are made of dust, no one is better than the others. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has superiority over Arab, ". "The idea of equity is based on justice: all are equal and no one can claim that he is more pious or righteous except through piety and righteousness." In Islam there are no geological boundaries; one after the other, the Muslim nations are being destroyed and Muslims are being separated on the contexts of Arab and non-Arab. The last address of the Prophet ﷺ stands witness on the matter that all Muslims are



equal, the what is the need of establishing Arab League? this needs to be dissolved immediately and all should get together on the platform of OIC.”<sup>344</sup>

## 6.2 Arab – o – Ajam Divide Leading to Shia – Sunni Divide

The Ajam concept introduction is an indication of ambiguous contrasts present in Arab Muslims starting with the passing away of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) more than 1400 years ago. In the centuries, the differences in these two major communities have solidified and gone against the Last Sermon of the Prophet and mind set of earlier religious and political community. On the passing away of Prophet, there was debate as to who should be chosen as leader of Muslims; a faction demanded that leader be picked up from "around Mohammad's closest companions, best choice to be from his bloodline". "This division continued until the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD which marked the breaking point where Ummayyads killed Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet and the champion of the future Ajam, thus making Shi'a permanently estranged from rest of the Muslim community.”<sup>345</sup>

## 6.3 Arab-o-Ajam Divide in Contemporary Muslim World

### What is Arab World?

The Middle East and the Arab world are often confused as one and the same thing. They're not. The Middle East is a geographical concept, and a rather fluid one. By some definitions, the Middle East stretches only as far West as the western border of Egypt, and as far east as the eastern border of Iran, or even Iraq. "By other definitions, the Middle East takes in all of North Africa and stretches to the western mountains of Pakistan. The Arab world is somewhere in there. But what is it precisely?"<sup>346</sup> The heart of the Arab world is made up of the six founding members of the Arab League--Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The six forked the Arab league in 1945. Other Arab nations in the Middle joined the League as they won their independence or were voluntarily drafted into the non-binding alliance. These include, in that order, Yemen,

<sup>344</sup> Mausovi Agha Hamid, "Speech on Ashura in Nawabshah 2012", <http://www.tnfj.org.uk/ENGLISH-NEWS/2012/Jan/25-01.htm> (Accessed on 15 Jun 13)

<sup>345</sup> Elgood Cyril, "Safavid Medical Practice: Practice of Medicine, Surgery and Gynaecology in Persia between 1500 and 1750", Luzac Publishers, 1971

<sup>346</sup> Tristam Pierrie, "What is Arab World?" [http://middleeast.about.com/od/middleeast101/f/me\\_080204\\_a.htm](http://middleeast.about.com/od/middleeast101/f/me_080204_a.htm) (Accessed on 5 June 2013)

Libya, the Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestine, Djibouti and Comoros. It's arguable whether all people in those nations consider themselves Arab. In North Africa, for example, many Tunisians and Moroccans consider themselves distinctly Berber, not Arab, although the two are often considered identical. Other such distinctions abound within various regions of the Arab world. Hence the divide of Arab – Ajam within Arab world is also pervasive and distinctly felt in some parts”<sup>347</sup>.

“**Ajam** is a word used in Persian and Arabic literature, but with different meanings. In Arabic, Ajam (عجم) has one primary meaning: "non-Arab". Literally it has the meaning "one who is illiterate in language", "silent", or "mute", and refers to non-Arabs in general. In the former sense it is a neutral term meaning "stranger" or "foreign"<sup>348</sup>. Ajam has one primary meaning in Arabic: "non-Arab". According to a traditional etymology “the word `ajam comes from the Semitic root `-j-m. in'ajama: (of speech) to be incomprehensible, ista'jama: to fall silent; to be unable to speak, 'a'jam: non-fluent and musta'jim: mute, incapable of speech”<sup>349</sup>. “During the Islamic period, Ajam was originally used as a reference to denote those whom Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula viewed as "alien" or outsiders. The early application of the term included all of the peoples with whom the Arabs had contact including Persians, Byzantine Greeks, Ethiopians, and the somewhat related Nabataeans. The original meaning still exists, and in much of the non-Arabic speaking Muslim world the term does not have a pejorative meaning as the word is understood to mean anyone who does not speak Arabic”<sup>350</sup>. Throughout the history of the Caliphates, Ajam has been frequently know as a synonym or alternative word "barbaroi" or alternately stranger or non speaker. Ajam was a scornful term used by Arabs indicating their political and social superiority over others in early history of Islam. In the early Islamic periods, it might have been connected to the Persians, same time in al-Andalus it was applied to the speakers of local language and in later Middle Ages turning into "Aljamiado" indicated Hispanic language written into Arabic script . Ajami or Ajmia thus applied for writing African language of West Africa such as Huassa and adaptations

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Sakhr: Multilingual Dictionary

<sup>349</sup> Sakhr: Lisan al-Arab

<sup>350</sup> Bernard Lewis, Ibid

made to transcribe local scripts to Arabic scripts. In Zanzibar *ajami* and *ajamo* means Persia which originated from the Gulf and the urban areas of Shiraz and Siraf. In Turkish and Urdu, there are lot of documents and letters which refer word *Ajam* to Persian such as Iqbal poem Iqbal poem in Persian :*eyjavanan e Ajam Jaan e ma ---* (O youth of Iran (Ajam) I love you and I...). But in late writing the use of the term is not made to any ethnic group, a thought that indicates that term was used by Arabs to show their superiority.”<sup>351</sup>.

#### 6.4 Causes of Contemporary Political / Sectarian Divide

The main reason for contemporary divide lies in the quest for leadership role to be played by various nations of the Muslim Ummah. The Sunni Arab position was stated very clearly by Amr Moussa, a veteran Arab nationalist and candidate for Egypt’s presidency: "The Arab Middle East will not be run by Iran or Turkey."<sup>352</sup> The Iranian leaders also keep on pointing out the follies of the Arab World at the same time. On the issue of the Arab Spring the Iranian ex President Ahmedi Nijad was quoted as saying, “"Today, the people of the region must enjoy equal rights, the right to vote, security and dignity, and no government can deprive them of freedom and justice or refuse their peoples' demands."<sup>353</sup> The rise of sectarianism is being driven today primarily by three factors. First, Arab Islamist ascendancy in Tunisia and, particularly, in Egypt has reignited the sectarian flame that has historically hovered over the Middle East. The Islamist nature of these two governments is a source of empowerment for Arabs and a thorn in the side of the Shia. Some Ajamsee the new Arab Islamist governments in both of these countries as a beginning to what could become an Arab-dominated region if Assad falls to an Arab-led government in Syria and Hezbollah in turn loses power in Lebanon. And with uprisings and widespread opposition to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki’s government in Iraq, the Shia could be in trouble there as well. As the Arabs feel increasingly empowered by the recent challenges to authoritarian Arab regimes, the Ajam feel all the more threatened. Not only is Assad’s likely fall a blow to a potential Ajam ascendance

<sup>351</sup>*EncyclopædiaIranica*, P 700.

<sup>352</sup> The New Middle East: Arab versus non-Arab Muslims; Sunni versus Shia, by Barry Rubin, March 1, 2012, <http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2012/03/new-middle-east-arab-versus-non-arab.html>, accessed on 12 Aug 2014

<sup>353</sup> “Ahmadinejad urges reforms in Arab world”, 07 December 2011, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4094335,00.html>, accessed on 13 Aug 2014

which began in Iraq with Shia leader Nuri Al Maliki becoming prime minister, but the atrocities being committed against the Arab in Syria are a glaring blight on all Ajam in the region. Religion occupies a place in daily life in the Islamic world that the West has not known since the days -- a millennium ago -- when the West was called "Christendom." Thus, non-state identity in the 21st-century Middle East generally means religious identity. And because there are variations of belief even within a great world religion like Islam, the rise of religious identity and the consequent decline of state identity means the inflammation of doctrinal disputes, which can take on an irregular, military form. In the early medieval era, the Byzantine Empire -- whose whole identity was infused with Christianity -- had violent, doctrinal disputes between iconoclasts (those opposed to graven images like icons) and iconodules (those who venerated them). As the Roman Empire collapsed and Christianity rose as a replacement identity, the upshot was not tranquility but violent, doctrinal disputes between Donatists, Monotheletes and other Christian sects and heresies. So, too, in the Muslim world today, as state identities weaken and sectarian and other differences within Islam come to the fore, often violently."<sup>354</sup>

### 6.5 Linkage of Iran as Main Ajam Power and Shia – Sunni Conflict

In the eyes of many Arab, the Arab uprisings have provided an opportunity to undercut the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria axis. Yet, they still see Iran's skilled and often mendacious hands behind every twist and turn, in particular in Tehran's deep involvement in helping Assad cling to power. To listen to many Arab in Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, is to **perceive all Shia as iron-clad Iranian (ajam) loyalists**. This association serves many purposes<sup>355</sup>. First, it is an instrument with which to demonize the Ajam and to portray them as being in cahoots with the regional culprit, Iran, which is at odds with many Arab governments. No matter how much Khamenei has tried to convince the world of a coming pan-Islamic awakening, many Arab states are seeking to further distance themselves from Tehran. Meanwhile, the Muslim street remains conflicted. "In religious

<sup>354</sup> Kaplan Robert D. "Why So Much Anarchy", [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/why-so-much-anarchy?utm\\_source=freelist-f&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=20140206&utm\\_term=Kweekly&utm\\_content=readmore](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/why-so-much-anarchy?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140206&utm_term=Kweekly&utm_content=readmore) (Accessed on 9 Feb 2014)

<sup>355</sup>Nasr, Hossein, *Islam and the Plight of Modern Man*

terms, the assertion of an Iranian connection is also an effective Arab tactic for casting doubt on the Muslim credentials of the Shi'a"<sup>356</sup>. Likewise, Arab intellectuals think that the uprisings have made the states responsible for sectarianism which undermines the dictator regimes that once held them under control. "When states are weak, sectarianism rises," the prestigious Lebanese religious researcher Hani Fahs spoke in an interview in June 2012. "People exchange with their essential characters and the additional religiosity for a society, if the states may be powerless."<sup>357</sup>."

## 6.6 Further Developments

Over the most recent three decades, as Arab Islamist developments picked up broad prevalent support, the Ajam also started to mobilize, regardless of restraints forced by their particular laws. As stated by Max Weiss, as the Shia of Lebanon turned into better skilled for articulating their political demands, they changed themselves from a "sect-in-itself to a "sect-for-itself." "<sup>358</sup> Comprehensively speaking, the Shia, once a apparently feeble and estranged group inside Arab Islam, are currently requesting their privileges and arriving at for more amazing political influence, from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and Kuwait. Just how profound are the challenges still facing the Ajam was recently documented in an opinion survey conducted by the Pew Forum, a Washington-based research institute. "The study showed a widespread belief in most Arab countries that Shia are not real Muslims" <sup>359</sup> . This was true particularly in countries where Ajam represent only a small minority. According to the survey, "at least 40 percent of Arab do not accept the Ajam as fellow Muslims. In many cases, even greater percentages do not believe that some practices common among Ajam, such as visiting holy shrines and praying to dead religious figures, are legitimate Islamic traditions" <sup>360</sup> . Wary of rapprochement between the US and Iran, Saudi Arabia has also re-aligned her policy towards engagement of Iran. In a recent development Saudi Arabia has invited Iranian

<sup>356</sup> Qureshi Saeed, "The Unbridgeable Shia-Sunni Cleavage in Islam", December 6, 2011, <http://saeedqureshi42.blogspot.com/2011/12/unbridgeable-shia-sunni-cleavage-in.html>

<sup>357</sup> Fahs, Hani. Interviewed by Genevieve Abdo. Beirut, June 26, 2012

<sup>358</sup> Weiss, 187

<sup>359</sup> In this context it is worth noting that the rhetoric of militant Arab movements, such as al-Qa'ida, reserve at least as much venom for the Ajamas they do for America and its allies

<sup>360</sup> Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity," PewForum.org. (August 9, 2012). <http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary.aspx>. (Accessed 20 Nov, 2012)

Foreign Minister to Riyadh for the first senior meeting between the regional heavyweights since the start of the Arab Awakenings in which the two countries have engaged in a proxy war for influence. The Saudi foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, contacted his counterpart in Tehran after months of lower level communications between the countries, “aiming to bring an end to a series of regional crises in which both are invested, principally in Syria”<sup>361</sup>.

### **Rise of Salafism**

This anti-Ajam sentiment has been exacerbated by the emergence on the political scene of the so-called Salafi movement, whose idealized notion of Islam predates any of the religious and social tensions that first produced the major sectarian split within Islam and ultimately gave birth to the various groups. The origins of Salfism lie in the nineteenth century, and the Salafi school of thought has been adopted by Muslims who seek to apply literalist interpretations of scripture based upon the teachings of the Prophet and his immediate circle. The Arabic word *salaf* means “predecessors,” in this case referring to the closest companions of the Prophet. Salafists generally seek a return to their vision of the seventh century, when they believe Islam was practiced in direct keeping with the teachings of Mohammad. Before the Arab uprisings, attention focused on two primary trends among the Salafists: those who proselytized through *dawa*, or the religious call, and were neither violent nor politically active, and the *ihadists*, who practiced violence to achieve their aims.

### **Salafi’s Ascent – Etching of Arab-Ajam Divide**

Salafists have emerged as politically relevant in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, and Lebanon, although the movement in Lebanon has not received as much attention as in these other countries. As is evident from the Salafist participation in politics in Egypt, Salafists now are intimately involved in political debate and tend to force more centrist Arab groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to compromise and move to the right in order to accommodate the Salafists’ conservative religious stances. The fact that the Salafists are participating in elections is a dramatic shift in their doctrinal position. The confessional nature of the conflict in Syria and in Lebanon has also worked to the

<sup>361</sup> Martin Chulov, “Saudi Arabia moves to settle differences with Iran”, The Guardian, 13 May 2014

advantage of these emerging Salafist activists. As the conflicts increasingly become fought along sectarian lines, the Salafists gain support in advancing the notion that a Shi'a-Alawite-Iran axis is the single greatest threat to the Arab ummah, a claim that resonates with centrist Arabs across the region. "Just as the Ajam have proclaimed Israel to be the primary threat in the region, now the Salafists are using a similar strategy in positioning their movement as one that will counter the Ajam and their backers in Iran, which by implication is even more threatening to all Arabs than the threats posed by Israel and the West"<sup>362</sup>.

### Syrian War


The Syrian war is evidence of the Ajam drive for power over the Arabs, no matter the cost. During an interview with the BBC Arabic Service, the sheikh was asked if he believes there is an "Ajam invasion" of Arab communities. Al Qaradawi answered: "I have much evidence, such as Egypt. Egypt never had any Ajam... and there is not a single Ajam person who existed. Today, there are Ajam in Egypt who write in the press, and who write books, and who make appearances on television. Isn't that enough proof? "This is also happening in other Arab countries where there was no previous presence for Ajam at all. I am not fabricating this information"<sup>363</sup>. Although, every country's situation is unique, but to a great extent the regional ferment has been stoked by Syria's civil war as it spills across the border and ignites Arab and Ajams in neighbouring states to also attack one another. The conflict began more than two years ago as peaceful protests against President Bashar al-Assad, a member of the minority Alawites, a Shiite sect. "Now with 100,000 Syrians killed, Sunnis across the region have become incensed by Mr. Assad's brutality against the mainly Sunni opposition, while Shiites from outside Syria have joined the fight to defend Mr. Assad. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar — Sunni countries with broader strategic interests — are backing the Syrian opposition, while Iran and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, both Shiite entities, are backing Mr. Assad"<sup>364</sup>. Many now see this sectarianism as the new master narrative rewriting regional

<sup>362</sup>International Crisis Group. "Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition." CrisisGroup.org. October 12, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/131-tentative-jihad-syrias-fundamentalist-opposition.aspx>.

<sup>363</sup> "Al Sameem." *BBC Arabic Service*, February 4, 2010.

<sup>364</sup> NYT Editorial 18 June 2013

politics, with Syria the frontline of a sectarian cold war permeating every corner of public life. The Sunni-Shiite divide<sup>365</sup>, argues Brookings Institution fellow Geneive Abdo in a report released last month, "is well on its way to displacing the broader conflict between Muslims and the West ... and likely to supplant the Palestinian occupation as the central mobilizing factor for Arab political life." Arab leaders (and Washington) often found labelling their rivals as "Shiite Ajams" a valuable way to undermine the popular appeal of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah "Resistance Axis." This isn't to say that some leaders don't genuinely dislike Ajams -- Saudi King Abdullah famously distrusted <sup>366</sup> Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as an Iranian agent -- but their personal beliefs aren't really necessary to explain their behaviour. Recent thaw in relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran – in the backdrop of invitation extended by Saudi Arabia to Iranian Foreign Minister – the conflict in Syria still remains a bone of contention between the two countries more than three years into the war, Riyadh remains committed to seeing the end of Bashar al-Assad as president. Tehran is just as committed in ensuring the Syrian leader, or at least the systems and structures of his regime, remain in power, allowing it to continue project its influence from Tehran, through Baghdad, Damascus and southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah remains a key tool of Iranian foreign policy. Both countries have invested heavily in arming and funding the opposing forces in Syria's war: "Iran has been Assad's principal benefactor, directly supporting Hezbollah and an 11,000-strong Iraqi militia, as well as sending ammunition and money to Syrian forces. Saudi Arabia has supported rebel groups in southern Syria and near the Turkish border, where one of the two main factions, the Syrian Revolutionary Front, is a key beneficiary."<sup>367</sup> However, warming up of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and easing out their stances against one another bring a ray of hope for future of Syrian Crisis.



<sup>365</sup>Lynch Marc, "The War for the Arab world", *Foreign Policy*, 23 May 2013

<sup>366</sup> "The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia. -- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office." <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09RIYADH447.html>

<sup>367</sup> Martin Chulov, "Saudi Arabia moves to settle differences with Iran", *The Guardian*, 13 May 2014

## CHAPTER NO. 7

### NUCLEARISATION IN THE GULF AND ITS IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE REGION

The Gulf, a lasting hotspot in early history, is of vital strategic importance due to its geographic location, its enduring volatility and energy assets. Roughly 60% of the world's oil reserves are detected here. “Moreover, the nation’s hold the world's second, third, fourth and fifth natural gas reserves after Russia”.<sup>368</sup> The worldwide economy may be vigorously subject to the Gulf's energy assets and additionally the area serves as a paramount global shipping course. “The region's unstable security will be under sharp focus because of new worldwide security dangers posed by internationally dynamic terrorist groups, the mushrooming of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conceivable nuclearization of Iran.”<sup>369</sup> “Most countries in the region are facing the danger of potential extremist and terrorist activity on their territory, with perhaps profound implications for the stability of the whole Broader Middle East”<sup>370</sup>. Iran, beyond question, the most populous country, is developing as a capable state in the region. An atomic skilled Iran with ballistic missiles can portray a situation which has immense terrifying possibility. Therefore, developments in the Gulf and the “Broader Middle East” can have probably a progressively paramount effect with respect to world security. The recent breaking of ice between the US and Iran followed by Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear enrichment in November 2013 is another important development which merits attention. This development indicates that politics in Middle East is going to take a sharp turn in the near future. Realignment of interests, creation of new alliances and fate of old alliances will be decided in the coming years.

<sup>368</sup>RuprechtPolenz, “NATO and Persian Gulf Security”, <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676> (assessed on 21 Jan 13)

<sup>369</sup> ibid

<sup>370</sup> ibid

## Presence of ERF in Gulf with Nuclear Capability

### 7.1 ERF in the Gulf

Owing to the strategic importance of Gulf, there has been considerable Western, primarily US, military presence in the Gulf for decades. After 9-11, the perception of the region's pivotal international security role has further increased. US has basing agreements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while Bahrain and Qatar host US facilities and serve as important bridgeheads. Furthermore, in the context of the "war against terrorism", forces from NATO member countries have been operating in the region. For example, a US Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) team has conducted a series of exercises in the Arabian Sea in the context of the *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*. Until late 2003 Germany had an NBC battalion in Kuwait, which was stationed there before the Iraq war to provide protection from a potential Iraqi biological and chemical weapons attack. The German battalion was part of a multinational NBC contingent based in Doha, Qatar, which also comprises Czech forces, among others. "Following the 2003 war, 16 NATO Allies have troops deployed in Iraq. Moreover, all 26 NATO countries are now contributing to NATO's training mission there, either inside or outside of Iraq. For example, German forces are training Iraqi police and soldiers in the UAE, as the Political Committee learned during a visit to the Emirates in June 2005."<sup>371</sup> "NATO is co-operating in the Broader Middle East region within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) agreed upon at the 2004 Istanbul Summit"<sup>372</sup>. The initiative's primary goal is to enhance security and regional stability through actively promoting NATO's co-operation with interested countries in the field of security. In the ICI context, NATO is helping to develop the ability of interested countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance. Areas of particular interest are: tackling internationally active terrorist groups, *helping prevent WMD proliferation* and illegal arms trafficking, as well as contributing to NATO-led peace operations. Similar to what NATO is offering the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue, ICI provides tailored advice on defence reform, defence

<sup>371</sup>Ibid

<sup>372</sup> Rick Rozoff, *The Persian Gulf, From Third World War to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-in-the-persian-gulf/12190> (assessed on 24 Jan 13)

budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations to interested countries in the Broader Middle East, starting with the Gulf States. The ICI is still a "work in progress" and has to date been formally joined by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. The perception of NATO in the Broader Middle East region is generally that of something like "a foreign policy arm of the US". NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer views that NATO needs to do more sustained public diplomacy in the Arab world. Therefore, the role of this transformed Alliance and how it can contribute to Middle East security is still well determined. To that end, NATO might consider appointing a special representative to the Gulf region.

## 7.2 US Extended Deterrence in the Gulf

Before reaching a deal to halt its nuclear programme with Iran, "The U.S. used to see Iran with its ballistic missiles and potential of developing a nuclear weapon as a direct threat to the GCC and also poses a threat to all friends and allies in the Middle East region".<sup>373</sup>

The U.S. administration has stated that the full range of U.S. military capability in both conventional and unconventional weapons will be available and ready to be committed to defending its allies and friends against any threat. The U.S. has started implementing a strategy to influence the decision making bodies in Iran as to the devastating consequences if the GCC, and any other allies are attacked or threatened. Citing the Iranian threat, the Obama administration shifted from the Bush administration's plans to place missile defence sites in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic to an approach that would in four phases place closer to Iran some Aegis class Navy missile defence vessels, ground radar and eventually land based Navy Standard Missile interceptors. Should deterrence fail, the U.S. will have already provided the GCC countries with Ballistic Missile Defence Systems which have all the Early Warning and Command Control facilities. This will limit the damage should they be attacked, and to enhance the conventional deterrence capability of the GCC. In addition to providing modern technology combat aircraft that can be launched within a very short window of time to block any first attack wave and to have the capability to move the war into enemy

<sup>373</sup>McGeorge Bundy, Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47142/mcgeorge-bundy/nuclear-weapons-and-the-gulf> (assessed on 14 Jan 13)

territory, in the shortest time period, using both Defensive and Offensive Counter Air Missions. The U.S. is currently involved in building a Defensive Shield against a massive Iranian Ballistic Missile attack targeted at the GCC states. “The defensive shield consists of a MultiTier Ballistic Missile Defence System consisting of Terminal High Altitude Air Defence (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability, PAC3, missile systems supported with the most advanced Radar and Command and Control facilities.”<sup>374</sup> “Ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems have been provided to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, as well as stationing Aegis equipped warships in the waters of the Gulf. The U.S. has been developing an integrated early warning radar system across the GCC states that could help U.S. and GCC forces to quickly respond to an Iranian missile attack.”<sup>375</sup> US has the capability to carry out preventive strikes however US seeks to negotiate an end to the threatening aspects of Iran’s nuclear programs. It, in fact, shows just how dangerous any war in the Gulf could be to the world’s economy – although Iran is more vulnerable than any of its Southern Gulf neighbours. The U.S. also needs its Gulf allies as key partners and must consider the “law of unintended consequences.” Preventive military strikes could push the presently volatile Middle East region into a war with far reaching global political, military, and economic consequences.

### 7.3 Recent Developments

The United States and five other world powers announced a landmark accord that would temporarily freeze Iran’s nuclear program and lay the foundation for a more sweeping agreement in Nov 2013. It was the first time in nearly a decade, American officials said, that an international agreement had been reached to halt much of Iran’s nuclear program and roll some elements of it back. “The aim of the accord, which is to last six months, is to give international negotiators time to pursue a more comprehensive pact that would ratchet back much of Iran’s nuclear program and ensure that it could be used only for peaceful purposes.”<sup>376</sup> Whether or not this development will have lasting effect on easing

<sup>374</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke and Abdullah Toukan, “*Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities*”.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid

<sup>376</sup> GordonMichael R. “Accord Reached With Iran to Halt Nuclear Program”, *The New York Times*, 23 Nov 2013

out relations between the U.S. and Iran, U.S still continues to maintain its presence in the Gulf Region.

#### **7.4 U.S. Strength in the Gulf**

“Troops are deployed for the Gulf region, in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Diego Garcia and Turkey for necessary future build-up. Military might concentrated here is more than 300 battle aircraft, 30 ships, and personnel numbering around 35,000, including sailors, soldiers, marines and airmen.”<sup>377</sup>. The details are placed at Annexure A.

#### **7.5 The Gulf Co-Operation Council as a Cooperative Regime with ERF or Otherwise**

The GCC was built in 1981, in response to regional turmoil and the Iraq-Iran war and include the states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It has regional security committee to regulate security matters in the region. Security issues have remained common inside the GCC, particularly the making of a territorial security framework for security matters. Since its origin, the GCC has held joint military exercises and coordination in the field of military industries and also considered Joint Defence Framework. In spite of the GCC states have agreed for a framework, however, little progress has been made in this regard. For example, the desired joint protection power Dira' Al-Jazeera ("Peninsula Shield") remains two brigade-strong force mostly Saudi dependent. Difference over various issues and "hesitance on the part of states to relinquish some power have hampered further improvement of the GCC. The smaller states have been continuously influence by Saudi Arabia, beyond question the biggest GCC member. In December 2006, Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), announced the intention of the six GCC states to establish a joint nuclear research program. The announcement came as a surprise for many observers of the Gulf political scene. The GCC states have a long history of rejecting any sort of nuclear activity. All the Gulf States are members of the NPT; most, if not all, are signatories to the IAEA Safeguard Agreements and qualified to the status of Small Quantity Protocol (SQP) that allows its member states a strictly limited possession

<sup>377</sup> “U.S. Strength in the Persian Gulf” by Washington Post accessed on 23 Jan 13.

of certain radioactive materials. During the last few decades, the Gulf States had voluntarily abandoned the nuclear option; their policy of ‘zero nuclear option’ demonstrated that they intended to refrain from using nuclear power for civilian or military purposes. The December 2006 decision, therefore, is significant. It indicates that the Gulf States are now ready to re-consider their traditional policy and go on the nuclear path. As part of the Council leadership’s decision, the GCC Secretariat initiated a feasibility study in cooperation with the IAEA to explore possibilities of establishing a joint research program under the supervision of the GCC general secretariat. At the same time, some GCC states chose a second, and more independent path; while being part of the GCC joint initiative, UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait also decided to begin bilateral negotiations with IAEA and consider the establishment of their own separate civilian nuclear programs. Saudi Arabia, by far the largest and most influential member country of the GCC. Saudi Arabia has plans to spend more than \$100 billion to build 16 nuclear energy plants over the next few years. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next 20 years spending an estimated \$7 billion on each plant. “The \$112 billion investment, which includes capacity to become a regional exporter of electricity, will provide one-fifth of the Kingdom’s electricity for industrial and residential use and, critically, for desalination of sea water. Saudi government has also announced the development of a nuclear city to train and house the technical workforce that will be needed to achieve these ambitions.”<sup>378</sup>

NATO is developing its relationship with the region. NATO's ICI aims at establishing mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the countries of the Broader Middle East, starting with the GCC. Some of the GCC countries have already contributed to Euro-Atlantic security. For example, the UAE have committed troops to NATO-led operations in the Balkans. NATO forces and those of NATO member and partner countries are currently deployed in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further development and deepening of NATO's relationship with the Gulf States should emphasize building trust and confidence among the littoral states. Although the Saudis remain close American allies, the nuclear accord is the culmination of a slow mutual disenchantment that began

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<sup>378</sup>Cordesman Anthony, “Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

at the end of the Cold War. For decades, Washington depended on Saudi Arabia — a country of 30 million people but the Middle East’s largest reserves of oil — to shore up stability in a region dominated by autocrats and hostile to another ally, Israel. “The Saudis used their role as the dominant power in OPEC to help rein in Iraq and Iran, and they supported bases for the American military, anchoring American influence in the Middle East and beyond.”<sup>379</sup> But the Arab uprisings altered the balance of power across the Middle East, especially with the ouster of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, a close ally of both the Saudis and the Americans. The United States has also been reluctant to take sides in the worsening sectarian strife between Shiite and Sunni, in which the Saudis are firm partisans on the Sunni side. At the same time, new sources of oil have made the Saudis less essential. And the Obama administration’s recent diplomatic initiatives on Syria and Iran have left the Saudis with a deep fear of abandonment. “We still share many of the same goals, but our priorities are increasingly different from the Saudis,” said F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of Middle East studies at the University of Vermont. “When you look at our differing views of the Arab Spring, on how to deal with Iran, on changing energy markets that make gulf oil less central — these things have altered the basis of U.S.-Saudi relations. The United States constantly required vital contrasts for the Saudis, including on the Israeli-Palestinian clash and the spread about fundamentalist strains of Islam, Mr. Gause said. “Yet the Obama administration’s determination to streamline long alienation with Iran’s religious authority has touched a particularly crude nerve: Saudi Arabia’s profound established threat against its Shi’a rival for heading of the Islamic ummah. ”<sup>380</sup>

### **Israel’s Nuclear Capability and Posturing**

Israel’s nuclear programme has been driven mainly by its vulnerabilities, threat perception and historical experiences. Despite its political instability and economic constraints, Israel embarked upon its nuclear programme soon after its inception i.e. in 1950s”<sup>381</sup>. While an accurate assessment of Israel’s nuclear capability has remained

<sup>379</sup>Worth Robert F. “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift as Power Shifts”, The New York Times, 25 Nov 2013

<sup>380</sup>Worth Robert F. “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift as Power Shifts”, The New York Times, 25 Nov 2013

<sup>381</sup> Joshi, Sharad, “Israel's Nuclear Policy: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Institute ForDefence Studies and Analysis, <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar00-6.html> (accessed on Feb 3, 2013).

difficult due to its ambiguous posture.”<sup>382</sup> “The nuclear policy has evolved from secrecy to ambiguity to opacity.”<sup>383</sup> The policy is again on the cross roads “owing to the threat dynamics and limited success of other means of threat mitigation.”<sup>384</sup> It is therefore pertinent to briefly outline the threat perceived by Israel.

## 7.6 The Iranian Threat

Israel has shown important concern over the preliminary U.S.-Iranian agreement, which in theory will lift sanctions levied against Tehran and end its nuclear program. That was to be expected. Less obvious is why the Israeli government is concerned and how it will change Israel's strategic position. Israel's present vital position may be fantastic. After a considerable length of stressful time, its peace settlement with Egypt stays working. Syria may be deeply involved in a civil war that stays insoluble. A certain danger of terrorism is existent there but there are no vital risks involved for Israel. In Lebanon, so far, there exist no additional possibilities or inclination for another war with Israel. Additionally, at same time the group's rocket ability has grown, Israel seems capable to hold the danger they pose without creating a strategic threat to Israeli national interests. The Jordanian regime, which is aligned with Israel, probably will withstand the pressure put on it by its political opponents. In other words, the situation that has existed since the Camp David Accords were signed remains in place. Israel's frontiers are secure from conventional military attack. In addition, the Palestinians are divided among themselves, and while ineffective, intermittent rocket attacks from Gaza are likely, there is no Intifada underway in the West Bank. Therefore, Israel faces no existential threats, except one: the possibility that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon and a delivery system and use it to destroy Israel before it or the United States can prevent it from doing so. Clearly, a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv would be catastrophic for Israel. Its ability to tolerate that threat, regardless of how improbable it may be, is a pressing concern for Israel. In this context, Iran's nuclear program supersedes all of Israel's other security priorities. Israeli officials believe their allies, particularly those in the United States, should share this view. As a strategic

<sup>382</sup>SvenskaLakare Mot Karnvapen, “Learn About Nuclear Weapons”

<http://www.slmk.org/larom/wordpress/en/geography/geography-advanced-level-israel/> (accessed Feb 3, 2013).

<sup>383</sup> “Israel's Nuclear Policy: A Decision Making Analysis”

<sup>384</sup> Ben-Meir, Alon “Israel's Posturing: Behind Netanyahu and Barak's Threats to Attack Iran”, Huffington Post, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/israels-posturing-behind\\_b\\_1817959.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/israels-posturing-behind_b_1817959.html) (accessed Feb 3, 2013).

principle, this is understandable. But it is unclear how Israel intends to apply it. It is also unclear how its application will affect relations with the United States, without which it cannot cope with the Iranian threat. Israel understands that however satisfactory its current circumstances are, those circumstances are mercurial and to some extent unpredictable. Israel may not rely heavily on the United States under these circumstances, but these circumstances may not be permanent. There are plenty of scenarios in which Israel would not be able to manage security threats without American assistance. Thus, Israel has an overriding interest in maintaining its relationship with the United States and in ensuring Iran never becomes a nuclear state. So any sense that the United States is moving away from its commitment to Israel, or that it is moving in a direction where it might permit an Iranian nuclear weapon, is a crisis. Israel's response to the Iran talks -- profound unhappiness without outright condemnation -- has to be understood in this context, and the assumptions behind it have to be examined.”<sup>385</sup>

## 7.7 Threat from Non State Actors (NSAs)

IDF planners and strategists also consider the cumulative capabilities and intentions of Israel's non-state enemies -- that is, the entire configuration of anti-Israel terrorist groups. Such assessments offer more than a simple group by group inventory of their assets and intentions. “These groups also are considered in their entirety, collectively, as they may interrelate with one another vis-à-vis Israel”<sup>386</sup>. These several hostile NSAs also have interactive relationships with core enemy states, for example, possible synergies with Iran and Syria. NSAs alone or their anti-Israel activities do not merit a response in nuclear domain. However, many analysts have pointed out that Iran could also potentially deliver a nuclear weapon to Israel through a proxy, for example Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel might have to face a heightened prospect of nuclear terrorism.

## 7.8 Israel's Development of Nuclear Capability

**Nuclear Programme.** “The Israeli atomic weapon programme was started in 1965 with the help of France. There is no evidence suggesting that it an atomic test in spite of some reports suggesting that Israel cooperated with South Africa in the cold test in Southern

<sup>385</sup>Friedman George, “Israel's New Strategic Position”, *Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly*, 23 Dec 2013

<sup>386</sup>Beres, Louis Rene, “The Samson Option: 'Palestine' and Israel's Nuclear Strategy”, *American Thinker*, [http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/05/the\\_samson\\_option\\_palestine\\_and\\_is.html](http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/05/the_samson_option_palestine_and_is.html) (accessed on Feb 3, 2013).

Indian Ocean on 22 September 1979. Israel has undoubtedly, two atomic research centres with capability of reprocessing atomic waste with weapon-grade plutonium. Some sources additionally claim that this nation has enriched uranium for atomic weapons..”<sup>387</sup>

**Nuclear Arsenal.** “Israel’s atomic mystery reveals that it had been involved in stealing atomic material and secretly making atomic weapons. There has been reports that Israel had stockpiled few weapons. There have been various indications including the Vanunu information that after 1973 war, Israel chose to equip itself with additional atomic weaponry. With reference to Vanunu revelations, it can be safely assumed that Israel has 100 to 200 atomic weapons. While on the same issue, Seymour Hersh alludes on exactly 300 or even more number of atomic weapons held with Israel. Additionally, in recent time, various reports by US intelligence agencies, refer to a much smaller and stable arsenal, perhaps in the neighbourhood of 100 weapons, possibly even fewer than that.”<sup>388</sup>

**Fissile Material.** “The amount of Israeli fissile material for nuclear weapons use is also surrounded by uncertainties. A 2005 global fissile material inventory makes an estimate possible; according to which, at the end of 2003, Israel had 0.56 tonnes of military plutonium and 0.034 tonnes of civil highly enriched uranium. However, the amount of weapon-grade uranium or plutonium needed to produce a bomb depends on the technical capacity of the producers and the desired yield.”<sup>389</sup>

**Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** “Despite some claims that Israel produced, and even possibly deployed, tactical nuclear weapons, it is generally believed that while Israel might have completed the research and development required for such weaponry, it ultimately decided against the production and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. If true, that decision demonstrates Israel’s view that nuclear weapons have a distinct and very limited existential deterrence role in its national security posture.”<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Joshi, Sharad, *ibid*

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>389</sup> SvenskaLakare Mot Karnvapen, *Ibid*

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid*

**Delivery Means.** “Israel concurrently developed delivery means for its strategic weapons. According to news reports, Israel tested Jericho II (with a range of 2400 km) in the late 1980s and moved into deployment mode around early 1990s”<sup>391</sup>.

**Missile Defence System.** “An improved Israeli interceptor called "Block 4" contains new software designed to intercept Iran's Shahab and Sajil missiles. Israel is also concerned about Iran's newest version of the Conqueror rocket. The centrepiece of Israel's active defence plan for Iran remains the Arrow anti-ballistic missile program, which was recently tested successfully. Iron Dome, a complementary system, is intended primarily for intercepting shorter-range rocket attacks. Still under development is David's Sling, which would be intended for use against medium-range rockets and cruise missiles”<sup>392</sup>.

**Second Strike Capability.** “By July 2000, Israel took conveyance about three Dolphin-class submarines from Germany; which it needed requested then afterward those 1st Gulf War. After for 2006 Israel Additionally put an request to two additional submarines starting with Germany. Over completing so, it is expected that Israel need moved fundamentally at securing survivable second-strike atomic ability. By constantly on indications, Israel is currently on the way to finalizing the restructuring of its atomic powers under a triad type. It is likewise presumed that to later A long time Israel need altogether modernized its vital summon Furthermore control frameworks..”<sup>393</sup>

### **Doctrine Development - Traditional Opacity/ Ambiguity**

1. In the shadow of the Holocaust, Israel made a resolved exertion should get atomic weapons. However, in the same way that the dread of genocide may be those magic on seeing Israel's atomic resolve, that expect need Additionally energized An degree about atomic limitation. Concerning illustration an aftereffect of a could be allowed atomic arms race, if Israel's enemies also obtained those bomb, it could great face destruction, provided for its little size Also helter shelter number thickness.

<sup>391</sup> Joshi, Sharad, Ibid

<sup>392</sup>Beres, Louis René and Chain, John T, “Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran?”, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/could-israel-safely-deter-a-nuclear-iran/260947/> (accessed on Feb 3, 2013).

<sup>393</sup>Beres, Louis Rene, Op. Cit.

2. In reacting to this basic atomic dilemma, “Israel picked a posture in view of certain trade off that included components about both purpose What's more caution; those atomic obscurity or, clinched alongside Hebrew, amimut.”<sup>394</sup> Those Israeli legislature declines to say anything true around Israel's atomic activities, and Israeli subjects are encouraged, both by law What's more Toward custom, will stick to this same pattern. Such obscurity permits Israel to keep the strain between intention and alert unobservable.
3. The approach and act of atomic obscurity might have been arranged in 1969 for an uncommon mystery accord the middle of Israeli leader Golda Meir What's more US President Richard Nixon. As stated by the Nixon-Meir pact, concerning illustration long as Israel didn't promote its ownership about atomic weapons Eventually Tom's perusing publicly declaring or trying them, the united states might endure also shield Israel's atomic project. Those basics about this set of principles made with this day. “Initially, those Israeli shell might have been just tolerated but, over the decades, it turned into acceptable, possibly much quietly supported. Washington also guaranteed that it might proceed with supply Israel for those important accepted arms something like that it might not must depend upon its atomic weapons store.”<sup>395</sup>
4. Following the approach about Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Israel concluded to family its dedication with non-burgeoning through territorial methodology (as contradicted of the widespread approach of the NPT). Israel concluded to submit itself of the dream of nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ).
5. In the mid-to-late 1960s Israeli resistance intellectuals interpreted about “last resort”. Specifically, four different vital scenarios were distinguished for such utilization:-
  - i) An effective Arab military saturation into populated areas within Israel’s post-1949 borders.
  - ii) The devastation of the Israeli air force.

<sup>394</sup> Cohen, Avner and Miller, Marvin, “Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement”, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66569/avner-cohen-and-marvin-miller/bringing-israels-bomb-out-of-the-basement> (accessed on Feb 3, 2013).

<sup>395</sup> Ibid.

- iii) The disclosure of Israeli cities to huge and overwhelming air attacks or to possible chemical or biological attacks.
  - iv) The use of atomic weapons against Israeli territory.”<sup>396</sup>
6. It might have been apparent that constantly from claiming these situations were greatly doubtful. Another realization that emerged through those discussions was the deficiency of nuclear ambiguity for deterrence purposes. How could Israel effectively deter if it could never acknowledge possessing the nuclear bomb?” It also became evident that it would be politically impossible for Israel to resort to nuclear weapons without an explicit warning, and this could render the very idea of the bomb as a “last resort” impractical. “So the Israeli doctrine considers a “demonstration” use an act that must precede real use.”<sup>397</sup>

### Analysis of Nuclear Opacity Policy

1. “Israel has been capable to extricate those profits of administering existential atomic discouragement posture, without those requirements considerably to recognize atomic possession, let will issue unequivocal atomic danger. As for example might have been the viable path Israel utilized its atomic discouragement posture in the To begin with Gulf War.”<sup>398</sup>
2. Against those worries that the coming for Israeli atomic weapons might further polarize What's more destabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict, those political actualities from claiming Israel’s atomic discouragement under obscurity might have been presumably more considerate over any individual anticipated. The majority Israeli investigators trust that Israeli atomic discouragement under obscurity need really helped territorial soundness.
3. The greater part genuine concern in the 1960s might have been that the Israeli atomic venture might mix up a hazardous territorial atomic weapons contest. This might have been those alarm underlying the drive to atomic alert. However, the territorial outcomes of the Israeli atomic shell under obscurity demonstrated with a chance to be that's only the tip of the iceberg. It turned out that under obscurity

<sup>396</sup> Cohen, Avner, “Israel – A Sui Generis Proliferator”, Ibid

<sup>397</sup> Ibid.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid.

Israel might have been equipped with support of a favorable restraining infrastructure.

### **Iranian Nuclear Ambitions and Impact on Gulf Security**

“The greatest threat to U.S. and global security is nuclear proliferation by an increasing number of states”<sup>399</sup>

#### **President Barack Obama**

“Perhaps no subject currently receives more attention from the nuclear non-proliferation community than the potential threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. Over the past several years, Iran’s nuclear program has presented a tricky problem for both the international community as well as non-proliferation regimes. Multiple rounds of economic sanctions, diplomatic pressures and threats of military strikes have not yielded results as Iran continues to pursue nuclear proliferation. The international community has been unable to forge a consensus against Iran with respect to the potential nuclear danger.”<sup>400</sup> Without such a consensus, little meaningful economic pressure can be brought on Iran in an attempt to thwart her nuclear ambitions. Particularly troubling is Russia’s insistence on resuming the nuclear cooperation program begun by the former Soviet Union. As the reality of a nuclear-armed Iran comes into full view, the international community has become more cohesive in its approach to deter Iran from its nuclear ambitions. During the 2012 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama stated, “—Let there be no doubt that America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.”<sup>401</sup> On the contrary economic, diplomatic, and military pressures have caused Iran to accelerate its nuclear weapon development to safeguard its regime’s survival. The international community realizes that Iran’s success in becoming a nuclear-armed state may destabilize the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran poses national security challenges and risks of profound economic and political instability to neighbouring states. Iran’s rise as a nuclear power also creates a more dangerous strategic environment and sets the conditions for a

<sup>399</sup> Address by President Barak Obama on 6 April 2012 at Prague. <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

<sup>400</sup>Strain Frederick R., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, “Discerning Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: An Examination of Motivations, Strategic Culture, And Rationality”

<sup>401</sup>President Barak Obama’s State of the Union Address, January 24, 2012. Red Lines on Iranian Nuclearization at <http://carnegieendowment.org> .

potential regional nuclear domino effect. Failure to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would severely damage the non-proliferation regime's support and the ability to prevent other regional states from acquiring nuclear weapons too. Although, Iran's declaration of achieving a nuclear weapon may elicit a global reaction, this paper considers only the regional implications that a nuclear-armed Iran will have in pursuing nuclear proliferation to balance the Iranian existential threat. Before discussing the regional responses, it is important to understand Iran's nuclear history and changes in Iran's strategic environment that contributed to its decision to develop a nuclear capability.

## 7.9 Iranian Nuclear Background

The genesis of Iran's nuclear program emerged with the building of its first nuclear reactor under the United States' sponsored —Atoms for Peace program in 1957. In 1958, Iran became a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in 1968, was one of the original signatories to the 1968 Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that became effective on March 5, 1970. This treaty, commonly referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was created to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear weapon states, and to ensure that member states cooperate in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. "During the 1970s, Iran was provided technical, scientific and materiel resources by the United States, West Germany and France to facilitate its peaceful nuclear energy projects."<sup>402</sup> Shortly after the Islamic revolution in 1979, many nuclear scientists departed Iran, while the United States, West Germany, and France froze agreements and withdrew their support for Iran's nuclear program. As a result, Iran abandoned its nuclear program. "The motivation behind Iran restarting its nuclear program in the 1980s and developing its nuclear infrastructure in the 1990s, was to deter Iraq's another military aggression and safeguard its regime's survival. The first significant change in Iran's strategic security environment came as a result of its eight year Gulf War with Iraq (1980-1988). Iraq initiated the war without an official declaration or announcement. After years of fighting a war which eventually turned in

<sup>402</sup>Lowe, R., and C. Spencer, "Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises". Chatham House Report, (2006)

Iran's favour, Iraq employed missiles and chemical weapons against Iranian forces. "This resulted in thousands of Iranian soldiers' deaths without Iran having any worthwhile response or deterrent, to either deter or retaliate in kind to Iraq's employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)".<sup>403</sup> After learning about Iraq's nuclear ambitions in 1985, Iran restarted its nuclear program, turning to North Korea and China for assistance. The 1991 Gulf War further revealed that Iraq had come extremely close to becoming nuclear capable. Concerned about a potential nuclear-armed Iraq along its borders, Iran initiated an effort to develop an advanced nuclear infrastructure with potential military application. At the turn of the Century, Iran saw more changes in its strategic security environment that heightened growing concerns for protecting its regime. Over the last decade, Iran had become more ambitious in advancing its nuclear program to produce nuclear weapons and deter the United States from attempting a regime change.

In 2001, the United States initiated OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan along Iran's eastern border in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks which made Iran uncomfortable. During the 2002 State of the Union address, "President George W. Bush labelled Iran as one of the three rogue regimes that created an —axis of evil along with Iraq and North Korea."<sup>404</sup> Iran's perceived threat by the United States became abundantly clear and its survival overtly threatened by the world's reigning super power. Furthermore, the United States executed an unprovoked invasion of the sovereign state of Iraq along Iran's western border in 2003. "The ultimate purpose was regime change."<sup>405</sup> It reconfirmed mounting Iranian fears of strategic encirclement and provided evidence to Iran that the United States had the military capability and political will to undertake regime change. With the United States Armed Forces conducting combat operations along the Iranian borders coupled with a growing United States military presence throughout the Gulf and Middle East, the sum of the Iranian fears was conceivable. United States rebuffed a May 2003 Iranian government conciliatory proposal for direct, comprehensive negotiations about all major issues, grievances, and conflicts to include Iran's nuclear program. Iran now viewed the United States as its new

<sup>403</sup>Coleman M. B. "*Iran Goes Nuclear: Predictive Responses to a Wicked Problem*"

<sup>404</sup>U.S. President George W. Bush , 2002 State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002

<sup>405</sup>Iran, China's Rise, And American Strategy , April 6th, 2012, <http://www.raceforiran.com>

existential threat. “The regime change in Iraq and the strategic positioning of United States Armed Forces in the Gulf and the Middle East only contributed to Iran’s security concerns. These changes in Iran’s strategic security environment intensified the need to make nuclear proliferation a vital protective undertaking for the current Iranian regime’s survival.”<sup>406</sup>

### 7.10 Iranian National Security Interests

1. **Survival of Regime.** Iranian primary national security interest is survival of present regime under Velayat e Faqih. Sense of threat to existing regime heightened after US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Iranians became even more concerned after information regarding using Iranian opposition during 2009 elections to destabilize the regime. Iran perceives multidimensional threats from US i.e. political, military, economic, cultural and ideological etc. Besides US, Iranian regime feels threatened from Saudi supported Sunni Baloch and Kurds incursions.
2. **Protection of Homeland.** The next sensitivity of Iranian government is protection of territorial integrity against all external threats.
3. **Maintaining and Expanding of Regional Influence in ME and Beyond.** Iranian strategic culture is its perception of great power since Persian Empire of 550 B.C. This perception motivates it to be a dominant power at least in Gulf region. “It also wants to be viewed as a resister of western and US imperialism in the region as well as through alliances globally.”<sup>407</sup>

**Iranian Compulsions for Nuclear Program.** The “hierarchy of nuclear motivations” model illustrated the predominant reasons why nations might pursue nuclear weapons. These included: *survival, deterrence, prestige, security/hegemony, grand autonomy and superpower status.* Iranian nuclear ambitions can be viewed in the light of aforementioned model. A few significant dimensions are as follows:-


1. The motivation behind Iran restarting its nuclear program in the 1980s and developing its nuclear infrastructure in the 1990s, was to deter Iraq’s military

<sup>406</sup>Coleman M.B, Ibid

<sup>407</sup>US Strategic Competition With Iran: Energy, Economics, Sanctions, And The Nuclear Issue by Anthony H. Cordesman, Jordan D’Amato , Mar 11, 2011

aggression and safeguard its regime's survival. A further catalyst for Tehran has been Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran in 1983, during their bitter eight-year war. Iraq was developing nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Although the Israeli air force bombed the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, Saddam was able to revive his country's nuclear weapons program. Iran feared the threat of survival from Iraqi nuclear capability and had to counter balance the same.

2. Iran and the United States have been at odds since Tehran's revolution in 1979. The United States' "pre-emptive" war for regime change against Iraq further justified Iran's quest for a nuclear deterrent
3. Israel's acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is an open secret. Although Tel Aviv may feel safer with this ultimate security guarantor, it had the opposite effect on its Arab and Persian neighbours. Iran's development of a counterbalance in kind could be a natural response.
4. At the turn of the Century, Iran saw more changes in its strategic security environment i.e. arrival of US in the region, that heightened growing concerns for protecting its regime. Over the last decade, Iran had become more ambitious in advancing its nuclear program to produce nuclear weapons and deter the United States from attempting a regime change. Later, Iran's stated rationale shifted to deterrence of the United States. In 2001, the United States initiated OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan along Iran's eastern border in response to the September 11 attacks which made Iran uncomfortable. During the 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush labelled Iran as one of the three rogue regimes that created an —axis of evil along with Iraq and North Korea. Iran's perceived threat by the United States became abundantly clear and its survival overtly threatened by the world's reigning super power.
5. It is often argued that in states relationship, nothing lasts for ever. Iran seems to be conscious of the fact that if U.S. could realign its strategy in the Middle East with respect to its engagement with Iran, she cannot be out rightly trusted for long term continuation of this policy. At this point in time, Iran might have eased out her stance on nuclear enrichment in the backdrop of her economic bankruptcy, however, the chances of her pursuit of nuclear ambitions cannot be ruled out.



**ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS**

### Iran's Known Nuclear Infrastructure

1. "Enrichment facility at Natanz
2. Uranium conversion plant in Isfahan
3. Bushehr nuclear power plant
4. Heavy water plutonium production plant in Arak
5. Enrichment facility in Qom"<sup>408</sup>

### Iran's Visualized Future Nuclear Postures

1. Iran's pursuit of nuclear capacity is a matter of superiority. Those Islamic republic emphasizes independence, stand out amongst its elementary destinations. Atomic field gives Iran those much necessary assurances. Subsequently the administration need incentives over securing atomic proficiencies and need sufficient specialized ability. Different alternatives could be:-
  - i) **Japanese Option.** Iran might decide on support a 'Virtual Capability' to create an atomic weapon, yet should not proceed to manufacture.
  - ii) **Israeli Option.** Iran might manufacture, but does not test or recognize its ownership about atomic weapons (nuclear ambiguity).
  - iii) **North Korean Option.** Iran might develop, test also openly recognize ownership from claiming atomic weapon – termed concerning illustration north Korean choice. "<sup>409</sup>
2. It is accepted that Iranian authority has not yet concluded on how a wide margin will make Iran's atomic project.
  - i) **"Internal Factors.** While reformists are likely to oppose weaponisation, the principalists and revolutionary guards shall seek declaration of nuclear capability as it shall enhance their legitimacy with Iranian population.
  - ii) **External Factors.** The regime is susceptible to external pressures specially sanctions. Iran may not weaponise its nuclear programme if it thinks doing so shall undermine regime's longevity."<sup>410</sup>

<sup>408</sup>Iran | Country Profiles | NTI - Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org>

<sup>409</sup> Forecasting the Future of Iran, Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy by Eric Jesse, RAND

3. **Visualised Iranian Nuclear Posture.** For over specified motivations a virtual atomic ability for which Iran administers the capacity on make weapons (Japanese Option) may best suit of reinforcement those regimes hobbies. Iran might limit global weight, eventually showing up to stay inside the limits of NPT and at the same time keeping up the ability to manufacture bomb.

### 7.11 Implications of Iranian Nuclearization on Regional Countries

1. A nuclear-armed Iran should expand the national security worries of the neighboring states in the Middle east. A percentage time permits alternatives once how these neighboring states might react to a nuclear-armed Iran:-
2. **Self-Help.** In this situation exactly about Iran's neighbours choose that they can't spot their particular nation at those leniencies about Iran's mullahs. Also can't spot their trust in the United States alternately those aggregate will from claiming putative security partners, along these lines choose on improving their guard. Eventually enhancing their customary weapons competencies or securing their atomic arsenals.
3. **Bandwagoning.** In In this the event Iran's neighbours (with the special case of Israel) move on tailor their domesticated and remote approaches to suit Tehran's inclination.
4. **Balancing.** In this case Iran's neighbours (including Israel) move closer to the United States or form some type of collective security arrangement (perhaps with the United States as a member) as a way to resist and counter the increase in Iranian power.<sup>411</sup>

**7.12 Concluding Analysis.** Security regime established in the Gulf in the backdrop of nuclearization is a complex phenomenon. Various stakeholders are playing their cards very cautiously in pursuit of their respective national interests. The US and her NATO allies are maintaining their presence through staging their forces on mil bases and nuclear capable ERF in the Gulf. Previously the pretext used for legitimizing the presence of these forces was to counter the Iranian nuclear designs. However, the change of regime in


<sup>410</sup> Iran and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Middle East by [AlirezaNader](http://www.armscontrol.org), <http://www.armscontrol.org>

<sup>411</sup> Implications of a nuclear-armed Iran on the Middle East by Shams-uz-Zaman, <http://www.issi.org.pk>

Iran has softened the Iranian stance of pursuit of nuclear energy. Now there seem to be no tangible reason for staging these forces in the Gulf specially after the American withdrawal from Iraq, planned draw down of forces from Afghanistan and the recent strategic shift in American policy from Middle East to the Pacific region. Keeping these forces in the Gulf can be dubbed under the pretext of safeguarding economic interest and uninterrupted oil supply from the Gulf. US and NATO's seem to be following the neo-conservatives policy of realism, whereby a state maximizes her power for pursuit of national interests. *The same aspect has also been highlighted in the proposed Stability Instability Regime Theory proposed in this research project. Under the realm of "power beyond the state" which is dealt under IR, the western nations are likely to maintain their presence in the Gulf Region to safeguard their national interest and to ensure that the balance of power remains in their favour in the near future.*

As far as Iran is concerned, there has been a considerable change in Iran's political landscape after departure of Ahmedi Nijad from the office of the presidency. It seems as if the Iranians have realized that their inflexibility on nuclear issue has caused them a huge loss in the economic sphere. Economic sanctions and estrangement at international level have had a great impact upon the internal dynamics of Iran. The dissent in Iranian population remained quite visible during previous Iranian regime. It was in this backdrop that Iran under President Rouhani has softened the stance of pursuit of nuclear energy. *This change in Iranian stance can be easily explained under the Stability Instability Regime Theory. The pursuit of "power beyond the state" has cost Iran quite heavily in terms of economic loss and weakening the other prong of "power within the state". Now Iran seems to create a balance between both these prongs.*

The Gulf States are watching the growing nexus between Iran and the West with grave concerns and suspicions. On one hand they view Iran's decision not to follow the path of uranium enrichment positively. This will help retain the balance of power in the region. While on the other hand there is a sense of alienation amongst the Gulf States, as they view this partnership counter to the their interests in general and Saudi interests in particular. The Stability Instability Regime Theory fits in the Gulf States interests as now they can focus more on "power within the sate" than maximizing "power beyond the state.



## U.S. Strength in the Gulf<sup>412</sup>

### 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet

Troops are deployed throughout the Gulf region, with the following countries involved in some aspect of the build-up: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Diego Garcia, Turkey. As of Feb. 23, the total U.S. military force had grown to more than 300 combat aircraft, 30 ships, and personnel numbering about 35,000, including sailors, soldiers, marines and airmen.

### U.S. Naval Forces in the 5th Fleet

The 5th Fleet is currently deployed in the Gulf, and as of Feb. 23, the naval forces included: two carriers, 20 ships, 103 strike aircraft, approximately 20,000 sailors and marines.

The military sealift command forces in the gulf include: 18 ships, 189 U.S. Navy personnel, 844 civilian mariners and 64 oceanographers. Naval forces enroute to the 5th Fleet include: five ships, 30 aircraft, 4,740 sailors and marines.

Currently, two U.S. naval battle groups are in the Gulf, each led by a carrier:

**USS George Washington:** Crew: 5,500 – Carrier Air Wing I

Squadron	Type	Aircraft	No.
VF-102	Fighter	F-14B	14
VFA-82	Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	12
VFA-86	Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	12
VMFA-251	Marine Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	10
VAQ-137	Tactical Elec. Warfare	EA-6B	4
VAW-123	Carrier Early Warning	E-2C	4

<sup>412</sup> “U.S. Strength in the Persian Gulf” by Washington Post accessed on 23 Jan 13.

HS-11	Helicopter	SH-60F	4
HH-60H			2
VQ-6	Fleet Air Recon.	ES-3A	3
VS-32	Sea Control	S-3B	8

- **USS Independence:** Crew: 5,000 – Carrier Air Wing 5:

Squadron	Type	Aircraft No. (Approx.)	
VF-154	Fighter	F-14B	10
VFA-27	Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	12
VFA-192	Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	12
VFA-195	Strike Fighter	F/A-18C	12
VAQ-136	Tactical Elec. Warfare	EA-6B	5
VAW-115	Carrier Early Warning	E-2C	4
HS-14	Helicopter	SH-60F	4
HH-60H			2
VQ-5	Fleet Air Recon.	ES-3A	3
VS-21	Sea Control	S-3B	8
VRC-30	Fleet Logistics Support	C2-A	2

**Note:** The Navy reports that a carrier air wing is usually loaded with more than 4.6 million pounds of air launched missiles, laser-guided bombs, general purpose bombs and ammunition including: Harpoon, HARM, Maverick, Sidewinder, Sparrow, Walleye, AMRAAM, Shrike, SLAM, Phoenix, and Vulcan 20mm shells.

- **Accompanying Vessels**

- **Cruisers**

*USS Bunker Hill*: Ship's company of 358; is Tomahawk-capable.

*USS Normandy*: Ship's company of 358; is Tomahawk-capable.

- **Destroyers**

*USS Barry*: Ship's company of 300; is Tomahawk-capable.

*USS Carney*: Ship's company of 300; is Tomahawk-capable.

*USS Ingersoll*: Ship's company of 339.

*USS John S. McCain*: Ship's company of 300; is Tomahawk-capable.

*USS John Young*: Ship's company of 339; is Tomahawk-capable.

- **Guided Missile Frigates**

*USS Reuben James*: Ship's company of 200.

*USS Samuel B. Roberts*: Ship's company of 200.

*USS Ingersoll*: Ship's company of 339.

- **Attack Submarines**

*USS Annapolis*: Ship's company of 133; is Tomahawk-capable.

*USS Charlotte*: Ship's company of 133.

- **Fast Combat Support Ship**

*USS Seattle*: Ship's company of 600.


*USS Samuel B. Roberts*: Ship's company of 200.

*USS Ingersoll*: Ship's company of 339.

- **Mine Countermeasures Ship**

*USS Ardent*: Ship's company of 81.

*USS Dextrous*: Ship's company of 81.



### USS Guam Amphibious Ready Group

- **USS GUAM:** Is a multi-purpose amphibious assault ship which essentially acts as a small aircraft carrier that serves to put troops on hostile shores.
- Ship's company numbers 900, including 2,000 combat-ready Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is also capable of Special Operations. The ship also has an Aviation Combat Element Reinforced section which includes:
  - Super Cobra Attack Helicopter Squadron – 6 AH-1Ws.
  - Combat Assault/Cargo Helicopter Squadron – 12 CH-46Es.
  - Combat Assault/Cargo Helicopter Squadron – 2 HH-46Ds.
  - Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadron – 6 CH-53Es.
  - Ship to Shore Utility – 3 UH-1Ns.
- **USS Shreveport:** Is a versatile ship which acts as an amphibious transport used to land Marines, their equipment and supplies. Landings are achieved through the use of embarked landing craft or amphibious vehicles augmented by helicopters in amphibious assault. Ship's company of 420.
- **USS Ashland** (ship's company of 340) and **USS Oak Hill** (ship's company of 340): Are both Dock Landing Ships which serve to support a variety of amphibious operations and landings onto hostile shores.

(Source: U.S. Navy)

### U.S. Air Force

As of Feb. 24, Air Force officials reported that personnel in the area numbered close to 8,000. The 100 aircraft based in Saudi Arabia for patrols over southern Iraq has seen the addition of two dozen F-15 and F-16 fighter jets to Bahrain. The Air Force has also authorized the dispatch of 12 F-117 stealth fighter jets to Kuwait, three B-1 bombers to Bahrain and 14 B-52 bombers to the island of Diego Garcia. It also has diverted dozens of support aircraft to the region for refuelling, surveillance, and electronic jamming and search-and-rescue missions.

- **Jabir Air Base, Kuwait.** 36 aircraft, including F-117 stealth jets and several A-10 ground attack planes and F-16 fighter jets.

- **Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.** 50 aircraft, 24 of which are combat aircraft, including F-16s, F-15s, refuelling planes and 3 electronic warfare planes.
- **Sheik Isa Airfield, Bahrain.** About 40 warplanes, including A-10s and 2 B-1 bombers.
- **Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.** More than 100 aircraft, including F-16s, F-15s, A-10s, electronic warfare and refuelling planes.

### U.S. Army

Approximately 7,000 combat ground troops have been deployed to Camp Doha in Kuwait.

### British Forces


Britain has eight Tornado attack planes in bases in Kuwait.

The British Navy has also moved the carrier *Invincible* to the Gulf. The *Invincible* carries six Royal Air Force Harrier attack jets, eight other planes and 11 helicopters. It is now equipped with more than 540 Tomahawk cruise missiles—more than twice as many as were launched during the entire Gulf War.

ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS



Map 2: Unified Command Map <sup>413</sup>



Map 3: Location of US Bases in the Gulf <sup>414</sup>

<sup>413</sup> Unified Command Map available at [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Unified\\_Command\\_map\\_s.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Unified_Command_map_s.jpg) accessed on 22 Jul 2014

<sup>414</sup> Available at [http://www.ukfpi.org/images/usbasesintheGulfregion\\_000.jpg](http://www.ukfpi.org/images/usbasesintheGulfregion_000.jpg) accessed on 22 Jul 2014

## CHAPTER NO. 8

### IMPLICATIONS OF STABILITY AND INSTABILITY ON PAKISTAN

“There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in peace, and develop our own country according to our own likes”

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah

The Middle East has become an international flashpoint. Presently, low-evaluated energy supplies, security / help for Israel, a key US partner in the region, control of the key routes to trade / keeping up territorial dominion and the reason that largely due to fact mostly revered places of the world's three biggest religions lie here provide some of open realities that grants this area extra noteworthiness. “It is the home of numerous countries possessing the huge volume of energy (Oil and Gas) resources, junction of international economic and other political activities”<sup>415</sup>. The role of regional and international actors and the future course of the regional dynamics in upsurge against the established regimes have made Middle East a place where in future an open war could erupt at any time because of these increasing politico-military tensions. World sees the region as one of the most likely tension-ridden, conflict-prone and heavily armed regions of the globe. The Middle East has now become the genesis of the interests of foreign stake holders / powers due to these and many others obvious reasons. The risks of internal military uprising, arms transfer to civilian populace by foreign powers, the balance of power, quest of Iran to become Nuclear and long term trend of Israelis to interfere in the Arab world are the few international issues which further divert the attention of the globe. “Pakistan due to its historic dependence and widespread concoctions, close proximity of sea lines of communications and ideological cum religious affinities cannot afford to remain oblivious of recent development in this region having great security and politico-economic implications. Any conflict in Middle East would definitely harm Pakistan’s

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<sup>415</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, “Emerging Dynamics of Energy security of the Gulf Region: Prospects and Challenges”, Center for Pakistan and Gulf Studies.

interests so it needs to be avoided. Or, if instability / conflict occur, such a conflict needs to be limited and the Pakistan needs to be prepared to cope with the effects”<sup>416</sup>.

**8.1 Pakistani Diaspora.** “About 8 million Pakistani diaspora is spread round the globe with majority in Saudi Arabia (1.5 Million), UK (1.2 Million), UAE (1.2 Million) and US (1 Million).”<sup>417</sup> “In the Gulf besides Saudi Arabia other countries having appreciable Pakistani diaspora include Kuwait (0.1 Million), Oman (0.08 Million) and Qatar (0.05 Million).”<sup>418</sup>

### **Pakistan Diaspora in Gulf and Remittances**

The statistical data supporting the argument of Pakistan’s high stakes in the Gulf region are elaborated here. “In fiscal year 2012-13, Pakistan’s remittances from the Gulf region reached \$10 billion, which constitute about 61 percent of its total remittances. Remittance from Saudi Arabia alone stood at \$3.68 billion during 2011-12. According to Saudi trade minister, trade volume between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was at about \$4.8 billion in 2012. Based on an interview that Pakistan’s Ambassador to UAE Jamil Ahmed Khan gave to Khaleej Times in 2011, the volume of Pakistan’s trade with GCC is expected to increase from \$59 billion to \$350 billion by year 2020. On the other hand, trade volume between Pakistan and Iran is estimated to reach \$5 billion by 2015. Aside from the future benefits of the Iran Pakistan gas project, the economic calculation is clearly in the favour of GCC. Other than economics, Pakistan’s second concern has to do with geopolitics; the country does not have direct borders with the Gulf region, but it has with Iran. A conflict involving Iran and Saudi Arabia will create acute ethnic tensions within Pakistan; some of these are already at work.”<sup>419</sup> Though the exact size of expatriate communities in the GCC is difficult to establish, “it has been estimated there are around 6 million Indians and 3 million Pakistanis in the Gulf. In some GCC countries Indians and Pakistanis make up more than 60% of the population.”<sup>420</sup> “With such a large numbers of expatriates working in the region, the amount of money being sent home is enormous. Last year it is

<sup>416</sup> “Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations”, Pakistan Observer, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, Available at <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=196997>

<sup>417</sup> Gilani, Dr IjazShafi, “A Case Study of Pakistani Labour Force in the Gulf”, Jan 2008

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Ansar, [Arif](#), “Pakistan, Gulf region and Iran”, Monday, 7 Jan 2013

<sup>420</sup> Malik Talal, “India-Pakistan trade with Gulf hits \$36bn”, <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/india-pakistan-trade-with-gulf-hits-36bn-57549.html> (Accessed on 15 Jun 13)

estimated that remittances of around \$9 billion was sent back to the two countries, the central banks' figures show.”<sup>421</sup> In the fiscal year 2012-13, Pakistan expected a strong double-digit growth in remittances from Gulf region to achieve its overall target of \$15 billion. “Remittances from GCC states to Pakistan are expected to hit \$10 billion in current fiscal year as a result of fresh measures taken by the government to boost inflows from UAE and Saudi Arabia. Overseas Pakistanis residing in GCC countries sent home a record \$8 billion in remittances in financial year 2011-12, reflecting 60.77% share in total remittances of \$13.18 billion. About four million overseas Pakistanis residing in Gulf States remitted \$6.573 billion in fiscal year 2010-11.”<sup>422</sup>

“The remittances inflow from Gulf States rose about 21.71% in last fiscal year. Remittances from GCC may reach between \$9.5 billion and \$10 billion in current fiscal year amid hopes that same growth trend will continue. Remittances from GCC states rose to \$730.56 million in July 2012 compared to \$677.60 million in same month last year. Total remittances also climbed 9.89% to \$1.20 billion last month, indicating a strong growth for rest of the year. “Pakistan has been witnessing a growing surge in remittances since democratic government took over in 2008. From mere \$6.4 billion remittances in 2008, fiscal year 2011-12 saw record remittances of \$13.18 billion. Hopefully, we expect to achieve \$15 billion remittances target for the year 2012-13,” Pakistan Ambassador to the UAE Jamil Ahmed Khan told Khaleej Times.”<sup>423</sup> Saudi Arabia remained a leading source of remittances for Pakistan in Gulf region with a “leading share of \$349.66 million in July. The remittances inflow from UAE stood at \$240.54 million and other GCC states contributed \$140.36 million last month. The administration advertised new incentives for overseas Pakistanis and implemented changes for ensuing that financial framework will quicken remittances inflow from with GCC, United States and United Kingdom – top three contributors of remittances.”<sup>424</sup> “Saudi Arabia (\$3. 68 billion) and UAE (\$2. 84 billion), the highly developed Gulf countries show a remittance volume sent by people

<sup>421</sup> International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Saudi Gazette, 21 Feb 2013, <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130221154045>

<sup>422</sup> “Pakistan expects to achieve overall target of \$15 billion remittances in current fiscal year 2012-13”

Available on <http://business.onepakistan.com.pk/news/general/10788-pakistan-expects-to-achieve-overall-target-of-15-billion-remittances-in-current-fiscal-year-2012-13.html>

<sup>423</sup> “Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations”, Pakistan Observer, Ibid

<sup>424</sup> FarrayalLeghari, Ibid

working in those two nations as \$6. 52 billion in 2011-12 as against \$5.267 billion for monetary year 2010-11. Previously, overseas Pakistanis in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman remitted \$1. 495 billion in a financial year that would end in June. Pakistani diaspora in UAE sent again home \$2. 84 billion in year 2011-12, making UAE second biggest resource after Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The said expansion is attributable to utilization by official channels, great cash conversion scale is also done through other means; which has been controlled through appropriate legislation by Pakistan,” envoy said. “I might additionally in particular specify phenomenal framework formed eventually perusing UAE administration and remote trade organizations for helping smoothened remittances transform.”<sup>425</sup>

## 8.2 Pakistan’s Dependence on Gulf

**Economy of Pakistan critically dependents on imported oil from the Gulf countries.** “A large number of workers from Pakistan migrated to the Gulf countries. This constituted an important source of foreign exchange. The GNP in terms of foreign exchange not only helped Pakistan economy in sustaining a reasonable rate of economic growth but also significantly improved the balance of payment position of the country”<sup>426</sup>.

**Gulf has large significance as a market for Pakistani products.** “Pakistan is also interested in Arabian Sea to keep her sea lanes open for trade. Pakistan also wants to gain contracts for reconstruction of Middle East countries.”<sup>427</sup>

**Military Interests.** “Help from Saudi Arabia and other friendly countries is of paramount importance for our nuclear programme and acquiring latest military equipment. Maintaining military pacts / ties with the Gulf countries particularly revival of defence pact with Saudi Arabia is of paramount importance. Pakistan's relations with Iran are also of great importance keeping in view the threat perception from our eastern as well as western borders (though negligible).”<sup>428</sup> By maintaining stronger ties with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan can exercise indirect pressure on USA, particularly once it comes to aid

<sup>425</sup>Talal Malik, Ibid.

<sup>426</sup>FarrayalLeghari, Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

<sup>428</sup>*Security in the Persian Gulf*, Farah Naaz, IDSA, March 2001 (Vol. XXIV No. 12)

to India. Security structure is enhanced by the economic muscle of the country. Pakistan having been denied economic assistance from USA in the past, is now more dependent on economic assistance from Muslim bloc. Pakistan is trying to enhance its potential in local production of arms. We should also look towards Middle East as a market of arms produced by us.”<sup>429</sup> Mutual dependency is also a major factor in Pak-GCC ties. Pakistan has its troops stationed in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for training purposes. Recently, Major General Matar bin Salim bin Rashid Al Bulushi, Commander of the Royal Army of Oman called on Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif to “enhance defence cooperation including assistance from Pakistan specially with regards to training.”<sup>430</sup>

**Iran Factor.** “Fact that the ethnic and sectarian division in Iraq will destabilize the country and would further exacerbate the tensions and could ultimately result in destabilizing the relationship between the Shite majority and Sunni minority. Consequently, Iran’s influence over the Shite population in Iraq will remain strong and she may tend to extend its influence on Iraq by capturing some of the territory which again can cause de-stabilization in Middle East.”<sup>431</sup>

### **Pakistan Trade with Gulf**

From economic point of view, Middle East is important for Pakistan for the following reasons: trade, oil, investment, and remittances from the overseas Pakistanis workers. Foremost of them are oil requirements, notably from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, besides remittances, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the oil-rich Middle East countries into Pakistan. Shared strategic concerns and thrust for development always pushed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Emirate of Kuwait to offer oil concessions in the forms of credit and deferred payments to Pakistan, particularly whenever Pakistan confronted acute shortage of foreign exchange during the 1980s and 1990s. “Cordial and personal contacts of Pakistan with the Arab leaders are additional advantage and asset of Pakistan in the region and Arab countries usually offered a helping hand to Pakistan in the hour of

<sup>429</sup>Pakistan and Gulf Economist, <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/>

<sup>430</sup>Pakistan and Oman discuss bilateral ties on military cooperation, <http://www.pakistaninewspapers.info/archive/05/pakistan-and-oman-discuss-bilateral-ties-on-military-cooperation/> (accessed on 29 May 2014)

<sup>431</sup>International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Saudi Gazette, Ibid.

need.”<sup>432</sup> So Pakistan’s leaders and people accord high regards to their relations with the Arab world that are based on common perceptions and shared-cultural values.

**The Evolution of Economic Cooperation.** Historic trade links existed between present day Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. From times immemorial, the Indian Sub-continent and the Arab countries linked together through three vital trading routes: “(1) the ancient Silk Route that stretched from China into Himalayas, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and went through Iran and then upward to the Mediterranean via Middle East. (2) Another land route originated from Sindh, the ancient centre of cotton and went through Baluchistan, two provinces of Pakistan, into Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine.”<sup>433</sup>

Most of Pakistan’s trade with the Middle East is with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries because of: (1) Pakistan’s heavy reliance on oil import (2) close geographical proximity with the Gulf, and (3) because there are close commercial, security, and diplomatic ties besides linkages between Pakistan and GCC. As a result of this, there are fewer trading links with the rest of the Middle East countries such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and North African countries namely Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are the focal points of Pakistan trade in the Gulf. “GCC textile imports alone are over US\$ 5 billion at present. With increasing oil prices and sound management of oil revenues, GCC is expected to emerge as a hub of services industries comparable to Singapore and Hong Kong. Therefore, interaction with GCC economy has enormous advantages for Pakistan.”<sup>434</sup>

“The strong economic indicators of a country depict the status of its prosperity, security and stability.”<sup>435</sup> Thus, the substantial trade arrangements between states indicate the stable and successful nature of their bilateral relationship. “The Oil and Gas sector of the Gulf States leaded its total GDP at \$1.5 trillion according to Vision Economic Report 2013. Currently, Pakistan and Indian trade with GCC, by contrasting shows a tilt towards India. The current trade with Pakistan stands at \$59 billion, which is evidently less than India i.e. \$130 billion annually by 2013-14, according to the Associated Chambers of

<sup>432</sup> Melisa Iqbal & Teresita Schaffer ‘Pakistan, the Middle East, and Central Asia’, in *South Asia Monitor*, (Washington) No. 30, I February 2001.

<sup>433</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> “Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations”, Pakistan Observer, Ibid

<sup>435</sup> *Security in the Persian Gulf*, Farah Naaz, IDSA, March 2001 (Vol. XXIV No. 12)

Commerce and Industry of India.”<sup>436</sup> “In spite of the fact, Muslim brotherly states have benefited Pakistan in the past. This cooperation mainly stems from the concept of Muslim brotherhood.”<sup>437</sup> This would not be a positive approach in the longer term. There is a need to explore more possibilities and opportunities for the bilateral trade and cooperation for mutual benefits. “Pakistan has a long history of friendly relations with Gulf countries but ironically the focus of Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been the US. In this changing international scenario there is a strong need to reshape Pakistan’s foreign policy to make it proactive, multidimensional, encompassing and in accordance with its long term national interest.”<sup>438</sup> In this regard although Pakistan’s relations with all regional and extra regional states are equally important, however, Gulf region has its own unique significance. This significance can be measured in a sense that Pakistan’s remittances alone from the Gulf region are expected to reach \$10 billion, which constitute about 61% of its total remittances.”<sup>439</sup> Pakistan and Gulf countries share common history, cultural, religion and strong civilizational bonds that translate in many common challenges, which both share at national, regional and international levels. Some of the challenges are counter terrorism, energy security, trade, and political harmony. The only thing need to be done is to re-evaluate the existing status of relationship and to endorse each other’s efforts to boost up the existing level of mutual dependency for better results. “Dependency is a common phenomenon, but even a common man would not like to become dependent.”<sup>440</sup> At state level, throughout in human history, nations had struggled hard to achieve their independent status and wanted to be sovereign. Every individual regardless of its origin, cultural and ancestral affiliation will endorse the idea of liberty and independence without any doubt. In this contemporary world order, which emerged after the Cold War, no state or nation can remain completely independent in an ideal status. It has to compromise, to some extent, on its sovereignty and it has to fall in the realm of mutual dependency. “This type of approach not only brings the betterment in

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<sup>436</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

<sup>437</sup> Farrayal Leghari, Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> Pakistan and Persian Gulf, Lt Col Nadim Qamar, USAWC Class of 1991

<sup>439</sup> Future of Pak-Gulf relations, Ikramullah Khan, Pakistan Observer, 22 May 2013

<sup>440</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

bilateral relations of countries, but it also creates a productive environment full of peace and stability in the region and beyond.”<sup>441</sup>

This strategic mutual dependency can only be achieved, if both sides are in a give and take position, otherwise it does not work. In post 9/11 environment, US leadership, well aware of the ground realities, and due to Pakistan’s favourable geo-strategic position for US war objectives, “invited Pakistan to support its global war on terror”<sup>442</sup>. “Pak-US joined the hands and converged on a “strategic partnership” against terrorism. In return Pakistan achieved some palpable benefits in all fields including economic and defence. In return, US enjoyed the shortest and cheapest land supply route through Pakistan to support logistically its forces, stationed in Afghanistan. Now US is preparing to leave this region, arguably, it will have less interest in maintaining the strategic partnership with Pakistan in post 2014 scenario. Pakistan has not been able to achieve tangible benefits from US, as it should have, during this era of close strategic partnership in various fields, especially in energy sector.”<sup>443</sup> Interestingly at other hand, India which was not as close to US as Pakistan was, achieved some significant benefits. Even Indo-US nuclear deal was formulated during this era of Pak-US strategic partnership in 2005. Unfortunately, Pakistan remained unable to convince US led Nuclear Supplier Group for the same kind of nuclear deal. In post 2014 environment the chances of such a deal are least possible due to likely reduced level of interdependence between Pakistan and US. In this situation Pak-Gulf strategic cooperation is much needed on priority base. US-Taliban peace talks were only possible due to Pakistani arbitration. In future the Gulf country (s) can play a crucial role for prolific peace talks between Pakistan and Taliban due to its spiritual influence on Taliban and political influence in Pakistan. “Pakistan has been supporting the Gulf countries in the field of defence & security, science and technology, and moreover by providing its trained manpower in various fields.”<sup>444</sup> The GCC is the third largest trading partner of Pakistan while the UAE is the single largest investor in the country.”<sup>445</sup> “The increased interaction and trading activity in the region will accelerate

<sup>441</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Pakdefence.com, <http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=2079>

<sup>442</sup>“Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations”, Pakistan Observer, Ibid.

<sup>443</sup>Arif Ansar, Ibid

<sup>444</sup>Imranullah Khan, Ibid

<sup>445</sup><http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/177867-pakistan-keen-sign-agreement-gcc-gulf-countries.html#ixzz2U2xt3gA7>

the process to finalise the deal in near future.”<sup>446</sup> Middle East is just next door to Pakistan, but there are no Free Trade and Preferential Agreements (FTAs & PTAs) signed between these countries so that Pakistan should promote trade hitherto blocked by the typical trade policies of the past. Pakistan-GCC trading links could have further expanded provided PTA & FTA were signed between them. However, negotiations are already underway between Pakistan and GCC. “If agreement was signed, Pakistan can have a better market access for its fresh agricultural products such as vegetables and fruits including dairy products because one of the focus areas of GCC is cooperation in agriculture.”<sup>447</sup> Besides vital strategic considerations and interests, Middle East is highly crucial for Pakistan’s ever-increasing economic necessities and interests. Economic relations between Pakistan and the Middle East have gradually developed and strengthened over the past six decades from 6 percent insignificant share of Pakistan’s total global trade with that region in 1950 to as high as 24 percent in 2004. This made those area profoundly indispensable for Pakistan’s remote trade. “A much robust establishment for budgetary relations might have been laid down throughout the 1970s and got to be a significant wellspring about oil necessities and remittances for Pakistan ahead. “The vicinity of a huge Pakistani work force may not be main reason for remittances; it further strengthens Pakistan’s bonds from claiming fellowship with those nations of the Middle East.”<sup>448</sup> Pakistan gives due weightage to relations with each member of the GCC. Recently, “Pakistan and Bahrain signed on six documents relating to mutual cooperation in various sectors during the visit of Bahrain’s King Sheikh Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa to Pakistan in Mar 2014.”<sup>449</sup> “Saudi Arabia has given \$1.5bn to Pakistan to bolster the country’s falling foreign currency reserves and help cement security ties between the two countries in Mar 2014.”<sup>450</sup> Pakistan Chief of Army

<sup>446</sup>Pakistan and Gulf Economist, <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/>

<sup>447</sup>Malik, Dr Ahmad Rashid “Pakistan’s Economic Relations with the Middle East”, *IPRI Journal*, Volume VI Summer 2006 Number 2

<sup>448</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, *Ibid*.

<sup>449</sup>MateenHaider, “King of Bahrain in Pakistan; six agreements on cooperation signed”, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1093974> (accessed on 29 May 2014)

<sup>450</sup>FarhanBokhari, , “Saudi Arabia gives financial aid to Pakistan”, March 14, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d40980de-aa88-11e3-9fd6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3360G80BH> (accessed on 29 May 2014)

Staff, General Raheel Sharif also visited Saudi Arabia in Feb 2014 to strengthen defence ties between both the countries.

### 8.3 Impact of Gulf on Pakistan in Post 9/11 International Order

Pakistan additionally restrained from inter-Arab dispute effectively and embraced a non-partisan profile. "Pakistan's arrangement at the Middle East encouraged solid investment opportunities through enhance trade, workers' remittances, and additional ventures."<sup>451</sup> "The role of security requirement in the Gulf has remained central to Pakistan since its freedom. Pakistan's role in security related domain as old as diplomatic relations with these countries. Sources of continuous tensions and instability prevailing in the region and conflicts have moulded specific security environment."<sup>452</sup> The issues of peace and security in a nuclearized world and unapproved or unsolved incidents that might introduce vague dangers such as deteriorated situation in Middle East "have an immediate impact with respect to Pakistan security environment."<sup>453</sup> Thus measures are necessary to avoid the risk of an undesired situation. Moreover, "due to conflicts on its border country like Afghanistan & Iran has been a continuing source of concern to Pakistan. Pakistan has suffered more than any other country from the continuation of the conflict there. For us, vital security interests are linked to stability in Middle East."<sup>454</sup>

**Relations with Islamic Countries.** Pakistan attaches a special value to its relations with Islamic countries and is committed unreservedly to all Muslim causes and the strengthening of cooperation among Islamic countries. "This has been an unshakeable pillar of our foreign policy."<sup>455</sup> Pakistan has earned the esteem of the Islamic world for its consistent and effective advocacy of Muslim causes. The relations are numbered by mutual trust and confidence that have stood the test of time. The Arab states have always shown sympathies towards Pakistan's Security issues like support for our position on Kashmir and support after Indian Nuclear Tests in May 1998. During the Kargil crisis, the GCC states renewed their call for the UN to take up its role to solve the dispute in

<sup>451</sup>Imranullah KhanIbid.

<sup>452</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid

<sup>453</sup> Lt Col NadimQamar, Ibid

<sup>454</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

<sup>455</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. “Hence any deteriorated condition in Middle East affects Pakistan in its diplomatic, economic and security concerns”<sup>456</sup>.

**Pakistan – An Active Member of Global Organizations.** Pakistan is member of all global organization of Islamic Block like OIC and ECO etc. Moreover, as part of other International Organization where mutual interests of Muslim Block are also shared, Pakistan have to be adamant of the fact that support from Muslim Block is a major battle winning factor. For all these reasons, the deteriorated security situation would be having definite concerns for Pakistan.

**Religious Sentiments.** Pakistan is Muslim country which has come into existence on the name of Islam. People of Pakistan are sentimentally attached with all other Muslims of the World. Pakistan is considered as a Fortress of Islam, hence the insecurity in Middle East will definitely have a negative effect on Pakistan’s internal situation.

**Globalization and Economic Development.** The end of the cold war signified the beginning of a new era in international relations in which the political and economic ideologies of the market economy gained ascendancy. “Liberalization, privatization and monetary-fiscal discipline were promoted as a panacea for developing and developed countries alike.”<sup>457</sup> The social and economic impact of globalization calls for a coherent approach to be adopted by the community. In this case, Pakistan has a benefit of being part of Muslim block to get facilitated on its support from Muslim Block. “Any Political or Military insecurity in any part of Middle East will definitely impart a negative and everlasting effect on Pakistan’s economic and political security.”<sup>458</sup>

**Iran.** Iranian ambitions in the region and the world are rooted in its 5000-year-old historical aspirations. Iranian intentions most of the time remains undefined for the reason that they at times become inseparable from their political and religious aspirations but on other times would completely defy these. Iranian interests in the region and in Pakistan may vary according to Iranian capabilities, situations and intentions as they don’t follow a universal pattern. Their policy objectives can be enumerated under the following headings: Revolutionary aspirations or realpolitik Iran, although initially

<sup>456</sup>Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik, Ibid.

<sup>457</sup>Imranullah Khan, Ibid

<sup>458</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

poised to export its Shite ideology through revolution across the region, has reconciled with the reality after Khomeini's death. "The post-Khomeini Iran is not much different from any other democratic state, with a policy of "neither East nor West"<sup>459</sup>, "while serving its national interest and boosting its national image through diplomacy, economics and display of hard power."<sup>460</sup> While the internal political hierarchical system of Iran is dominated by religious theocracy; in essence, "the Iranian state political system pivots around the modern democratic values and thus except for unusual circumstances it pursues its national policy under the famous jargon of realpolitik."<sup>461</sup> Its strategically important location in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz provides it with a unique capability to oversee the world's busiest oil shipping route. "Iranian capability to block the Strait of Hormuz remains susceptible due to the U.S. presence in the region."<sup>462</sup> However, "Iranian capability to disrupt the oil supply from the gulf even for limited period of time is acknowledged and its devastating impact for the global economy also remains beyond any question."<sup>463</sup> After change in the US policy in engagement of Iran, Pakistan has also revisited her relationship with Iran. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with his team of finance, petroleum and interior visited Iran on 29 May 2014 to improve bilateral relations between both the countries. "He also assured Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, that Pakistan will continue Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline, besides enhancing trade between both the countries to \$ 5 billion."<sup>464</sup> President Rouhani's reciprocal visit to Pakistan in 2016 is testimony of growing mutually beneficial relations in the evolving strategic environment.

#### 8.4 Pakistan's Stakes in Gulf

Pakistan-Gulf security establishment are more concerned about security situations emerging in the region along with political and diplomatic developments. "The greater part of the GCC states have depended intensely on Pakistan's help in enhancing their

<sup>459</sup>Shams-uz-Zaman "Implications of a nuclear-armed Iran on the Middle East", <http://www.issi.org.pk> (accessed on 23 Jan 13)

<sup>460</sup> Lt Col Nadim Qamar, Ibid.

<sup>461</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid

<sup>462</sup>Imranullah Khan Ibid

<sup>463</sup>Shams-uz-Zaman, Ibid.

<sup>464</sup> "Pakistan Iran agree to complete Pak-Iran Pipeline", Daily Times Pakistan, 29 May 2014

capacity against security challenges prevailing in the region”.<sup>465</sup> There is long historical background of security relations between Pakistan and a few Gulf nations. In the past in 1970s and 80s, a number of Gulf nations flushed with oil money bought state of the art equipment but local population lacked technical skills.”<sup>466</sup> “A number of Pakistan Army and Air Force personnel were deputed to these countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. A much smaller number of naval officers also served in UAE training local naval force.”<sup>467</sup> Those fundamental part of Pakistani officers was in training local security forces although they also manned complicated security equipment such as radars. Afterwards, the recent Arab Spring and resulting situation and their fundamental motives have provided opportunity to Gulf nations to come further closer Pakistan. Pakistan through its military and bilateral cooperation has always tried to protect these nations from various internal and external threats. “The GCC is presently looking towards East and recent joint military activities between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Al- Assam IV) are a standout examples of its own”.<sup>468</sup> Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are leading members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Saudi Arabia has always supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir and encouraged both the countries to start confidence building measures. Both the countries were at same wave-length at the time of Afghan War and remained closed allies fighting against communism during 1980s. “During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Pakistan on request, sent troops to protect the Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia rescued Pakistan in May 1998 (nuclear test) and promised to supply 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help Pakistan cope with likely economic sanctions in the aftermath. In turn up to 1980 almost 15000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia to defend the holy land.”<sup>469</sup> Pakistan has important interests in the Gulf for religious, strategic, political, and economic reasons. The Gulf countries are a leading source of energy imports, and remittances from Pakistan’s approximately 2 to 3 million expatriates are a major source of foreign exchange. “According to the State Bank of

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<sup>465</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>466</sup><http://pakistanpal.wordpress.com/2011/07/14/pakistan-and-arab-world-security-cooperation/>

<sup>467</sup> Lt Col NadimQamar, Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

<sup>469</sup> Riedle Bruce, “Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan”, *Brookings* (January 2008), see at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/01/28-saudi-arabia-riedel>

Pakistan, the loss of remittances caused by the 1991 Gulf War was a serious concern to Pakistan. Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were strained during the 1990 -91 crisis in the Gulf.”<sup>470</sup> Although a member of the United States-led international coalition, Pakistan played only a limited role, sending a force of 11,000 troops tasked with "protecting" religious sites in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, during the war a vocal segment of public opinion in Pakistan supported ousting the Kuwaiti monarch and approved of Saddam Husain's defiance of the United States-led coalition. “The then chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, also expressed support for Iraq, resulting in further embarrassment for Pakistan's government.”<sup>471</sup>“Following the Gulf War, Pakistan undertook successful diplomatic efforts to recover its position in the region. Many Pakistani expatriate workers also returned to their jobs, and cooperative defence training activities have resumed.”<sup>472</sup> “Both Saudi Arabia and the smaller GCC countries have continued upon a significant arms build-up that has included the purchase of both armoured vehicles, artillery, SAMs (Surface to-Air Missiles) and Patriot ATBMs (Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles) as well as a range warships to which may perhaps be added submarines. Above all, the GCC states have bought sophisticated aircraft in large batches.”<sup>473</sup> Pakistan considers its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to be major strategic ties. During the 1960s and 70s Pakistan had arrangements with Iran and some Gulf sheikhdoms to provide rear bases and refuelling for combat aircraft in the event of hostilities with India. Pakistani governments have also been successful at cultivating close personal relationships with the ruling monarchs. Several sheikhs from the U.A.E. have residences in Pakistan and like to go on hunting vacations there. “Pakistan has traditional military relationships with several of the Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia.”<sup>474</sup> “These include arrangements where Pakistani officers are seconded to the military of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the U.A.E.”<sup>475</sup> These have been major aid donors to Pakistan over the years, through governmental funds and through the personal generosity of the rulers. Pakistan has occasionally asked them for

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<sup>470</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid.

<sup>471</sup>Talal Malik, Ibid.

<sup>472</sup>Arif Ansar, Ibid.

<sup>473</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>474</sup> Lt Col Nadim Qamar, Ibid.

<sup>475</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid.

major political favours. For example, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was in exile in Saudi Arabia for a prolonged period at the request of the Pakistani government. "Pakistan has a security agreement with Saudi Arabia under which Pakistani army elements serve in the Saudi National Guard, tasked principally with the protection of the King and ruling princes."<sup>476</sup> There has been some speculation in 2006 and 2007 about Saudi interest in countering eventual Iranian nuclear weapons with a "dual key" deterrent with China providing modern replacements for the Silkworm missiles it supplied in the mid-80s, with Saudi Arabia holding the keys, and arming them with Pakistani nuclear warheads, to which Pakistan would hold the keys. "This seems rather farfetched in the current international environment"<sup>477</sup>. Pakistan's Muslim population has a natural bond with those in the Gulf, and in some cases, notably Oman, there are traditions of trade, smuggling, and migration that go back hundreds of years. India and Pakistan tend to keep a wary eye on each other's activities, and try to avoid being upstaged in their relationships with the region. India, home to one of the world's largest "Muslim populations, had sought Saudi support for its effort to gain observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Saudi Arabia however deferred to Pakistan's opposition to the move."<sup>478</sup> Pakistan also had some success in generating sympathy from the Gulf countries for its position on Kashmir. In recent years, however, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan's closest friend in the Gulf, has called for bilateral settlement of this dispute, rather than the international mediation that Pakistan traditionally preferred."<sup>479</sup> Being the sixth largest army in the world and sole nuclear Muslim state, Pakistan proposed to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) the setting up of a formal 'security bloc' to combat any external or internal security threats in the region."<sup>480</sup> The creditable policy initiative also stressed the need to have a "strategic partnership which would also ensure food safety; further economic integration. Functional security would be epicentre of the proposed security bloc."<sup>481</sup>

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<sup>476</sup>ImranullahKhan,Ibid.

<sup>477</sup>ArifAnsar Monday, Ibid.

<sup>478</sup>International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Ibid.

<sup>479</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>480</sup> Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid.

<sup>481</sup>FarrayalLeghari, Ibid.

Extended military cooperation would be essential for GCC ongoing socio-economic prosperity and production. Pakistan can provide common military/security bloc to GCC which would be paradigm shift in the region. “It would be curial for the GCC short and long terms geo-political and geo-strategic interests. The existing Peninsula Shield in the GCC would be further strengthened and streamlined.”<sup>482</sup> “Pakistan and GCC nations can supplement one another great because of their close proximity and common interests. Moreover, there is need to chalk out joint strategy against terrorism, extremism, human and drugs trafficking and last but not the least against sea piracy”<sup>483</sup>. Human trafficking and sea piracy have become significant security worries affecting socio-investment stability, investment inflow and most importantly energy security in the region. The Somali pirates incidents happening recently have seriously uncovered territorial vulnerabilities and security pitfalls. Therefore, Pakistan-GCC security alliance might mutually adapt to this broad hazard in the times to come. Energy security is the main issue of various organizations around the world. Oil and gas reservoirs are constantly on decrease in the world. New alternative/renewable energy are being explored and utilized at fast pace. Public use of solar, wind, biomass, geothermal and atomic energy is being contemplated and executed. It may also be acknowledged that these progressively applied resources not only provide alternative resources but also reduce carbon foot-notes. The energy sector provides Pakistan adequate chances of cooperation with GCC states. “It must progress through socio-investment boom coming up in the region. United Middle Easterner Emirates and Saudi Arabia have helped Pakistan genuinely in coordinating and meting it energy requirements.”<sup>484</sup>

### 8.5 Maintaining Stability in Gulf

“In a bigger context, Middle East region has toughest challenge of its survival. From human point of view, the political map of the Middle East is, no doubt redrawn. Middle East has been swinging between the exceedingly anticipated notions of spring and harvest time in the recent periods.”<sup>485</sup> “Diehard supporters for existing conditions and upbeat prompters from claiming transformation are doing a tug of war in the region. The

<sup>482</sup> Pak-GCC Security Bloc, Mehmood-Ul-Hassan Khan, Daily Mail, September 16, 2011

<sup>483</sup> Ibid, pp 74

<sup>484</sup> International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Ibid.

<sup>485</sup> Melisa Iqbal & Teresita Schaffer, Ibid.

suggested Pakistan-GCC security alliance might be instrumental in devising support for law and order, peace and security.”<sup>486</sup> Think-tanks are fighting for survival against each other. People’s protest and marital power is staggering to dominate in Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Egypt. Tunisia and Algeria are still feeling the heats of grand change. Bullets are being brutally used to stop the transition of ballot. The Federal National Council’s elections 2011 has stood tall and emerged as ideal and suitable way of bringing real change. Pakistan-GCC security bloc would be custodian of governance, traditions, culture, civility, and economy in these countries afterwards. The regional manoeuvring, external aggressions, disguised infiltration and chances of proxy wars would be minimized. “The waves of change (Arab Spring) have already produced serious dents in the socio-economic plains and physical landscape in the region. Even the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is feeling the pinch of ongoing Arab Spring and has already lost billions of dollars.”<sup>487</sup> The Middle East the land of sacred shrines and shining stars of today’s imperialism drive, hub of diversity, dignity and hope of ongoing global economic recession is under transformation. “Emerging geo-political and geo-strategic security concerns loom large and demand immediate solutions and the projected security bloc between the Pakistan and the GCC would be useful for all the participatory countries.”<sup>488</sup> In order to create an atmosphere leading to a peaceful environment within which states can pursue national interests without going against global strategies, “the first step is to recognise the roots of instability which in the case of the Gulf mainly arise out of frontier disputes, territorial claims, ideological differences and supranational intervention, and take measures to remove them” <sup>489</sup> . It is important for the Gulf region to be well integrated in order to reduce the chances of conflict, the slowing down of the socio-economic development and curtail the high defence expenditures.

**Confidence Building Measures (CBM).** The development of CBMs has been a notable feature of most regional attempts to develop more stable relations amongst former antagonists. Such CBMs have taken many forms. Some are specifically military, while others seek to develop a wider range of contacts in academic, cultural, economic and

<sup>486</sup>Talal Malik, Ibid.

<sup>487</sup> Pakistan and Gulf Economist, <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/>

<sup>488</sup>Rafique Adnan; Ibid.

<sup>489</sup> Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid.

other areas. Consideration of the application of CBMs to the Gulf is timely and necessary. Recent political changes in Iran, and the response to those changes from the region indicate that the possibility of serious dialogue is now greater than it has been for some time. CBMs can create confidence only when there is a desire to change the basis of the relationship. It must culminate in each side coming to see the other as a partner instead of an adversary.

**Non Offensive Defence (NOD):** “The uprising and protests have given opportunity for solidness of region to build upon NOD. As the Gulf region is the focus of recent conflicts, one ought to search for a stable circumstance to which known three corners of the triangle, i.e. Iran, Iraq and the GCC, could feel secure, preferably significantly without outside aid. ” In this Non Offensive Defence, i.e. simultaneous build-up of offensive and upgrading of defensive capabilities can be useful “It is indeed possible to strengthen one’s defence while building down offensive capabilities as defence form of combat is inherently strong.”<sup>490</sup>

## 8.6 Impact of Instability in Middle East on Pakistan

**Effects on Pakistan Strategic Assets - Nuclear Program.** In case of unrest in Middle East, the Americans as usual will blindly doubt the insecurity of Pakistan Nuclear Assets.”<sup>491</sup> America has always shown its concerns towards nuclearization of Islamic States and propagated that they can fall in the hands of extremist Muslims who then can use them against Western Powers for any motives (terrorist activities). Israel has generally attempted to harm the Pakistani Atomic Project however failed; presently it is attempting once more through the Americans that Osama like incidents will place pressure on Pakistan and make a genuine danger to its atomic installations. “The US through Israel may be utilizing its corporate networking to spread negative publicity around the safety of the Pakistani atomic possessions and few reports have indeed gone suggesting that if situation becomes unstable in Pakistan, the Americans will physically move in to secure the atomic assets.”<sup>492</sup>

<sup>490</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>491</sup>Farah Naaz, IDSA, Ibid.

<sup>492</sup> Melisa Iqbal & Teresita Schaffer, Ibid.

**Economic Impact of Middle East Crisis on Pakistan.** Crude oil prices have been rising for some time but the fears of the spread of the political unrest have accelerated the rate of increase. “The price of crude has already crossed the crucial \$100 a barrel mark with the Libyan crisis in full bloom.”<sup>493</sup> Any further spread of the unrest into GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, could have a huge impact on the health of Pakistan who is already running significant current account deficits, and experiencing high rates of inflation exacerbated by rising food and energy prices since late 2010. “The economic hardship, particularly high food prices and unemployment, could become a catalyst for serious political turmoil in Pakistan”<sup>494</sup>.

**Impact of workers' Remittances from the Middle East on Pakistan's Economy.**

Pakistan is among the few countries which include worker's remittances separately in their gross national income estimates. Attention is directed in some detail to the period after 1976-77 when worker's remittances from Middle East countries began to have a significant impact on the domestic economy. The remittances from the Middle East contributed as much as 75% to the overall balance of trade and financed 35% of the merchandise imports and non-factor services. It warrants that any instability in Middle East will cause reduction on remittances with serious impact on our economy.

**The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East.** The recent rise in global demand for energy and the resulting spike in energy prices have illustrated just how important Middle Eastern energy exports are. It explores the possible future causes of major interruptions in supply and failures to maintain and expand export capacity and will adversely affect already deteriorated Pakistan energy crisis.

**Terrorism and its Effects on Pakistan.** In the hot disputes of the world, Muslims are being isolated and discriminately treated in the conflicts. Ineffectiveness of UNO and double standards of the West have further aggravated the security of Pakistan. Jihadis were projected as heroes and then became terrorists, distrust between Muslims and the westerns and extremist activities by some terrorist groups. This distrust has affected Pakistan's trade and strategic partnership with world dominating allies for which India is now getting advantage.

<sup>493</sup>Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik, IPRI Journal, Ibid.

<sup>494</sup>International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Ibid


**Implications of Afghanistan Situation.** Pakistan shares borders with Afghanistan and hence our security is directly affected by instable condition in Afghanistan. Following factors seems to be our concern in this regards.

**Americans in Afghanistan.** “Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies, under Operation Enduring Freedom, violence increased by 543 percent till 2012. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country has become “no-go areas for security forces, government officials and aid workers.”<sup>495</sup>

**NATO’s presence in Afghanistan.** The presence of NATO forces has dual effects on the internal situation of Pakistan. Isolated actions of NATO like Salalah Check Post incident affect the nation’s morale and psyche.

**Suicide Bombers.** The dark complexity of suicide attacks has exposed inadequacies of security forces, moral philosophers, psychologists and theologians alike.

**Effects of External Players in Afghanistan.** “The Washington’s interests is the potential oil resources of the Caspian Basin region, Russia worries to protect the vulnerability of bordering the CARs, Iran concerns in protecting the interests of Shite minority and India wishes to exploit the prevailing international anti-terrorism sentiments to her advantage have deteriorated the security situation”<sup>496</sup>.




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<sup>495</sup>FarrayalLeghariIbid

<sup>496</sup>Ibid

## FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research began with two hypotheses that “the stability regime established in the Gulf Region in post 9/11 International Order is unstable with serious implications on Pakistan” and “the stability regime established in the Gulf Region in post 9/11 International Order is stable and without serious implications on Pakistan.” These hypotheses were investigated through an academic approach investigating following research questions:-

1. How the International Order in the contemporary Gulf is shaping its domestic, regional, and international environment making it relevant for the great power politics?
2. How the concept of Collective Security (under GCC Peninsula Shield Force) and competing interests of regional powers are shaping the security environment of the Gulf region?
3. What is the political structure and system of governance of Gulf countries, their vulnerabilities with reference to evolving Arab Spring and how it shapes the security environment in the region?
4. What are the potential implications of nuclearization in the Gulf and how it will shape the future security environment of the Gulf Region?
5. What will be the potential implications of stability and instability of Gulf region on Pakistan?

This chapter will mainly focus on findings about the hypothesis after logically building arguments through previous chapters and empirically answering research questions. The answers accrued during the process have been termed as findings which have been transformed into conclusions in the shape of implications of GCC stability regime on Pakistan and certain tangible recommendations. The recommendations are two fold; firstly regarding stability regime in the Gulf, and secondly regarding course of action to be adopted by Pakistan for maintaining stability in the Gulf.

## Part - I

### Findings

This research project was a focused research in which an effort was made to prove the hypotheses developed in the beginning; within the purview of proposed Stability Instability Regime Theory. In the succeeding paras a linkage has been drawn between analysis of answers accrued from the research questions, the hypotheses and the proposed theory.

#### 9.1 The Prevalent International Order

Evolving international order has seen two distinct periods; first post-World War II until disintegration of former Soviet Union, and second from that point onwards till to date. The first period witnessed a bipolar world order with the United States and Soviet Union acting as two major power players in world politics. For a significant and considerable length of time the cold war characterized the global world order. Territorial clashes and proxy wars between two superpowers created effects. Additionally, the World Order lacked a focal power. In those two superpowers, their hegemonic impact served in that ability to practically territorial frameworks and secured states starting with one another. The Soviet Union disintegration altered a bipolar international system to a unipolar one thus making the United States the only remaining global power.

**Stability.** “Major Powers have maintained presence in and around the Gulf region, apparently to further trade, but actually to maintain influence and stability, and to establish military presence that would protect their respective national interests.”<sup>497</sup> The energy rich resources of the Gulf States have in fact obligated the international and regional players to keep the region under the umbrella of stable environment. A safe and stable security environment to promote their national interests in the wake of energy demands have been the focus of all World Powers; whether it is the bipolar world order before Russian disintegration or post 9/11 unipolar world order. “Despite the Gulf area’s importance, it was never much of a theatre in the U.S.-USSR Cold War. This was partly due to the fact that the Gulf was far more of an American than of a Soviet sphere of

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<sup>497</sup>Waltz Kenneth N., Robert J. Art, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman& Littlefield, 2004, p116.

influence. While Moscow had a close relationship with Iraq, it never really penetrated the region. There was virtually no direct tension between the war time allies”.<sup>498</sup> “In comparison, the United States had an alliance with Iran and Saudi Arabia, while U.S. or British influence was preeminent in all the smaller Arab states of the region.”<sup>499</sup> Waltz argues that “the international system induces states to engage in balancing behaviour.”<sup>500</sup> His claim is that a state’s first concern is “not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”<sup>501</sup> In 1973, the Yom Kippur war between Israel and its neighbours polarized the entire Middle East and led to the oil crisis where major oil producers cut off oil supplies to those who supported Israel, including the US. This incident alone convinced all future US policy makers that control of the energy resources in the Middle East remained critical for the vital national interests of the US. This mind-set would lead to almost four decades of US policy in favour of stability. The key factor for them was that they wanted some level of American protection against local threats from radicals, internal upheavals, or perhaps any Soviet actions. As Walt argues that balancing is more common than bandwagoning because states prefer to “join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers.”<sup>502</sup> The world community in a bipolar order witnessed what can be called a careful approach to avoid conflicts. During the Cold War, bitter and long standing inter and intra state disputes were placated under duress from the two super powers to avoid a direct confrontation between the US and the USSR, which could only lead to a nuclear war carrying a doom's day scenario. The beginning of unipolar order also demonstrated a period of relative calm and ease, as the new order was difficult for the United States to conceive. It was not until the watershed events of 9/11 that United States decided to flex her muscles in pursuit of national interests.

**Instability.** A unipolar system was too new to devise an alternative and the United States too inward looking and enjoying the dot com boom to provide adequate leadership. As a result, the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, Iraq's occupation of

<sup>498</sup>John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, Ibid.

<sup>499</sup>Spykman NJ, 1942. Ibid.

<sup>500</sup> In contrast to balancing, bandwagoning occurs when weaker states seek to maximize power by aligning with stronger states. Waltz and Mearsheimer address the differences in *Theory of International Politics*, 126 and *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 267-333, respectively.

<sup>501</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Ibid, p126

<sup>502</sup>Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," Ibid, p5.

Kuwait, the civil war in Somalia were some of the salient symptoms of the aforementioned phenomena. “Out of those mentioned, the occupation of Kuwait due to its obvious economic value received a disproportionate US and international response where President Bush uttered the famous warning 'this will not stand.’”<sup>503</sup> However, the most significant events were taking place in Afghanistan. Al Qaida had recruited 20 odd young men to carry out a suicide operation on mainland United States. 9/11 will be remembered as one of the most significant event of the century. It changed the world forever, instigated the so called ‘War on Terror’ but most importantly gave the world used to a system of nation states, “the rude awakening of the power of non-state actors with multiple if not unknown postal addresses and most modern and innovative means to spread their message.”<sup>504</sup> A relative balance of power existed in bipolar world order prior to the disintegration of Soviet Union. Both power blocs ensured restraint to avoid an all-out nuclear conflict and catastrophe. Major issues and sources of conflicts were mostly brushed under the carpet. This balance of power ensured stability in the region. However, emergence of unipolar world order saw a relatively peaceful beginning, but this uneasy peace soon disappeared after frequent involvement and meddling in internal affairs of smaller states in pursuit of national interests by the United States. This encouraged emergence of non-state actors and changed the dynamics of power politics as witnessed in a decade long war on terror. The post 9/11 era of unipolar world order can be termed as an era of uneasy peace and instability, especially in the Gulf Region.

**Stability- Instability Regime Theory.** The analysis of prevalent international order and its impact on security regime in the gulf has proved the Stability - Instability Regime Theory. Countries of weak political system with strong strategic interests in their regions find regular backlash because of great power politics, who enjoy strong political institutions back at home. The countries with strong political institutions are playing their cards better as compared to those who experience weak political institutions. According to researcher’s observation, it is inevitable for a state even with strong political institutions to confront great power’s interest in its country and strategic politics in the region.

<sup>503</sup><http://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110704>, Ibid

<sup>504</sup>John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, Ibid, p. 75.

**Paradox.** While remaining within the folds of prevailing international order, major powers have always endeavoured to keep the security regime in the Gulf stable in order to pursue their national interests. However, this stability remained paradoxical as the Gulf States with weaker institutions have always sought balance of power, with reliance upon foreign forces to act as security guarantors. This in turn proved to be an inherent element of instability in light of above discussion.

**9.2 Major Powers' Interests.** The first Gulf war (1990) and later the overthrow of Saddam Husain in second Gulf war (2003) has provided a vivid illustration of the national interests of major powers at play in the Gulf region. The United States, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, all have manifested differing levels of engagement in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular. However, the nature of their involvement in the Gulf and equally important, with each other is primarily dictated by what each perceives to be in its national interest. Beyond energy security, the Palestine dispute, nuclearization of Iran and threat to Israel are the major issues of interest for major powers making Gulf States as “pivotal actors in the global rebalancing between West and East.”<sup>505</sup> A recent addition to the list is the growing threat of piracy in vicinity of region which threatens the arteries of global commerce.

**Stability.** Dependence on the Gulf oil resources have placed high premium for US interests in the region which has kept changing with times. Before the 1991 Gulf War, the US administrations sought a relative power balance between Iran and Iraq. However, in 1993 the Clinton administration concluded that both Iran and Iraq were hostile to American interests in the Gulf and announced a policy of “dual containment”<sup>506</sup>. The White House policy shifted to maintaining military presence in the region, containment of Iraq and Iran, and security partnership with allies like Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, to preserve a balance of power in the favour of US in the wider Middle East region. The United States has active arms sales relationships with all of the

<sup>505</sup>Ulrichsen, Kristian C, *Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era*, Ibid, 9

<sup>506</sup>On May 18, 1993, Martin Indyk, the special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, outlined the dual containment policy in a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said that the United States would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. The strength of the United States and its friends in the region, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the GCC, would allow Washington to "counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other." <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49686/f-gregory-gause-iii/the-illogic-of-dual-containment>

GCC states, intended from a U.S. perspective to improve their capabilities to defend primarily against Iran. In some cases, such as the UAE, the United States is selling the most sophisticated missile defence system in the U.S. arsenal (Theatre High Altitude Air Defence system—THAAD). Two of the Gulf states—Bahrain and Kuwait—are designated as Major Non-NATO allies (MNNA). From an American point of view, there are today new actors whose influence may rein in US hegemony in the region. Apart from their traditional rival Russia, the US must today also contend with the growing involvement of Asia-Pacific countries in the Gulf. These are the fastest growing energy consumers in the world and are becoming increasingly reliant on Gulf oil. Competitive interests of the Asia-Pacific countries and the West in the Gulf may threaten US interests to make the region unstable. The US will thus ensure safeguards by exercising proactive diplomatic options. The West, especially in the United States, and in the Arab world maintains that “balance of power<sup>507</sup>” is the major guarantee of security and stability in the Gulf region.” Before Soviet Union disintegration, USSR maintained the policy of working against the interests of NATO in the region. The pursuit of reach to the warm waters of the Gulf in order to fully utilize the potentials of oil resources of Caucasian region was the major factor towards adopting such policy. Syria, Egypt and Iraq were the major beneficiaries of Russian interests in the region. However, after the disintegration much of Russian efforts have gone in looking inwards for improving upon its economic and social infrastructure rather than looking outwards. This contributed towards a tilt in the balance of power in the U.S favour for considerable period of time. Moreover, after the demise of Reza Shah Pehalvi’s regime, Iran also lost U.S support, with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States emerging out were to be the sole beneficiaries of conflicting interests of international powers. With balance of power already in U.S favour and growing cooperation between the U.S and GCC, Russia subdued its level of interest in the Gulf Region. According to the realist theorists, the balance of power shifting in the U.S favour with status of sole super power has guaranteed security in the region to a great extent. China’s rise is shaping up to be the most noticeable development of international politics and economics in the early 21st century, and Beijing is increasingly searching for stable sources of energy to power its ballooning economy. This has meant that China’s relations

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<sup>507</sup>Yetiv Steve A., “*The Absence of Grand Strategy : The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005*”, Ibid

with resource-rich Gulf States have become more intensive even as Beijing has become more pragmatic in its approach. The Chinese involvement in the Gulf Region for strengthening its economy has also provided stability to the region. Most of Europe's fuel needs come from the Gulf. That is why oil has become a matter of national security for the EU, the world's second largest consumer of the precious fuel after the US. Despite the importance of the economic and commercial relations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), European countries have taken a back seat in the Gulf's international relations, which have seldom deviated from the line set by Washington. "The ongoing commitment between major EU countries is also a guarantor of stability in the region."<sup>508</sup>

**Instability.** On the other hand, when seen from the outside perspective, the heavy dependence of the international system on the Gulf state's energy resources has conditioned their international relations, "making them highly complex and subject to the establishment of alliances with Gulf countries to defend or challenge the status quo and to address security dilemmas which often lead to paradoxes and contradictions."<sup>509</sup> Accordingly the Arab countries in the Gulf have chosen to outsource their security by resorting to seeking the protection of foreign powers, mainly the US, thus opening the door to foreign military presence in the region. One of the paradoxes is that this dependence on foreign powers undermines the internal legitimacy of the petro-monarchies and encourages local opposition movements against the major powers (such as Al-Qaeda) which complicate interest-matrix of major powers. At present Russia has been able to strengthen its economy to an extent that it can now play a significant role in the world politics. In his determination to muscle back into the region, Putin has few scruples about forging unholy alliances with anti-Western countries on the basis that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' as well as mutual interests and shared ambitions. Unlike most of the world, Moscow has little fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. Indeed, it stands out as most significant weapon supplier to Tehran and for a considerable length of time has given Iran, the atomic and missile technology. It has additionally placed itself as a cushion against any endeavour by world powers for major diplomatic pressures or

<sup>508</sup> Haizam Amirah-Fernández, *Ibid*

<sup>509</sup> Richard D. Sokolsky, "United States and the Persian Gulf; Re-Shaping Security Strategy for the Post Containment Era", *Ibid*


military interventions to end violence in Syria and actively supports Iran's closest associate President Bashar Al-Assad. All these developments coupled with the U.S. strategic shift towards Asia Pacific region impinge negatively upon the security regime in the Gulf States. Israel's bitter antagonism towards Palestinians and her refusal to give any concessions to them sits at the heart of Arab People's antagonism towards West in general and US in particular. The same feelings are easily exploitable by any government, be it monarchy or democracy. Furthermore, her arch rivalry with Iran impinges negatively on the stability in the Gulf. Israel's rivalry and security dilemma with reference to Iran casts even a greater shadow on the stability of Gulf. The pursuit of national interests by China has invited competitive response from the regional actors specially India. The presence of Chinese naval basis in the Gulf, which is a part of 'Strings of Pearls Strategy as perceived by India and other like-minded countries, and her naval exercises with Saudi Arabia are the developments taken negatively in overall Indian designs. Competitive interests of the regional players are thus proved to be prelude to instability in the region.

**Stability - Instability Regime Theory.** Apropos to the discussion above, it is an established fact that all major powers in the world have had varying levels of interest in the Gulf Region in different time periods. Whether it is indirect involvement in the shape of diplomatic overtures or direct involvement in the shape of stationing their military forces, all these developments have had a direct impact on the security regime established in the region. Therefore, Stability - Instability Regime Theory stands proved that politically weaker Gulf States with greater strategic interests have invited outside power's interference in the regional affairs. While this interference guaranteed some level of short term stability, in the longer run the stability regime established has largely been unstable.

**Paradox.** It is established that while interests of international players and regional actors are contributing towards stability of the region, these are also causative of instability. Hence, hypothesis stands proved that stability regime established in the Gulf region due to prevalent world order is paradoxical in nature.

### 9.3 Regional Powers' Interests

**Stability.** In 2006, the Bush administration began the Gulf Security Dialogue to coordinate "common defence initiatives between the United States and the GCC and to



promote more robust cooperation among the GCC states themselves.”<sup>510</sup> The GCC States have also realized the importance of self-help to strengthen their security apparatus in the backdrop of stability in the region. Large scale arms purchase deals done by Saudi Arabia and UAE, introduction of modern, sophisticated and state of the art weaponry, the exchange of training teams between most of the Gulf States with Pakistan are few steps which indicate that the Gulf States now want to come out of the stigmatic dependence on outside powers for security and stability in the region. During Iran-Iraq war, members of the GCC formed a standing coalition force, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). “It is a land force comprising infantry, armour, artillery, and combat support elements from all GCC countries. It is mandated for defending GCC states.”<sup>511</sup> It had shown moderate performance in the beginning due to problems in operational readiness, weapon systems, interoperability and manning. Nevertheless, it has achieved some milestones such as establishment of a permanent Headquarters, annual military exercises, and two deployments to Kuwait as a “show of force” during Iran-Iraq war and in 1994 in response to an Iraqi troop build-up on the Iraq-Kuwait border. More recently, Peninsula Shield action in Bahrain depicts the willingness of the Gulf States to take on the security challenges themselves.

**Instability.** There are three potential poles in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia along with the other GCC states, Iran, and Iraq). While, in the past, Saudi Arabia has preferred the strategic and political power status-quo, Iran and Iraq have not. Neither one is content with the existing balance of power nor with the American sword of Damocles that preserves it. At times, it is not clear that even the largest equity holder in the status-quo, Saudi Arabia, welcomes U.S. intervention to preserve regional security. Iran feels that its rightful position as leading power in the Gulf has been denied; Iraq of the Saddam era had both ambitions to be a major player in the Arab world and deep insecurities resulting from the fact that actual and potential enemies sit astride its oil export routes. How the present day Iraq will respond to the Gulf dynamics is yet to be seen; however an independent decision making by Iraq is yet a decade down the road. The GCC remains a generally digressed organization, with Saudi Arabia representing about half of the coastal

<sup>510</sup> CRS Report for Congress, “The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals”, Ibid

<sup>511</sup> Military Cooperation brief on GC website, available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/> accessed on 20 June 2013.

length of the Middle Eastern Peninsula, two-thirds its population, and four-fifths of its landmass. Notwithstanding recent efforts for examining plausibility in GCC for transitioning region into a Gulf union, this asymmetry makes a structural demand on the eagerness for a few of the more diminutive states to take part in a further territorial integration. May not be accidentally, it will be those more modest Gulf States—Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain—that have some moderately bigger expectations in the Union having poor urban setups due to deindustrialization, technical underdevelopment, government issues and military issues particularly because of post 9/11 U.S presence. Due to strengths of Saudi Arabia within the Gulf region, mistrust and misgivings prevail as overriding factors in the interstate relations. Some past evidences explain that even with a wider regional call for cooperation and discourse, the thought of territorial conquest, exchanges of politically detrimental propaganda, militarization and mistrust on the real intention of every country's policies continue to dictate in many political, security and economic agenda in the Gulf States. In the beginning of 1980s, Iraq waged war on Iran and in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In addition, since the revolution in Iran in 1979, the littoral Arab countries started to keep distance from Iran due to conflicting views on regional security paradigm. The above situation along with Iran's nuclear ambitions have worsened the security matrix in the Gulf. The Arab Gulf leaders perceive that Iran in its current form of political dispensation cannot be perceived as the reliable partner. The Gulf can be conceived as a "Regional Security Complex" i.e. a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved by separating from one another. Another fact is abundantly certain with regards to the Gulf region; for a foreseeable future, it will remain a centre of power struggle among the major powers irrespective of the primacy of hydro-carbon resources. As far as inter-Arab and intra-regional cooperation is concerned, distrust and suspicion will prevail as dominant factors despite a wider regional call for cooperation and dialogue. "The militarization and suspicion on the real intention of each other's policies and priorities will continue to dominate the political, security and economic agenda of the Gulf littoral States."<sup>512</sup> In spite of the creation of regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in

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<sup>512</sup>Henelito, Sevilla, Ibid

1981, the Gulf “security” has been the product of largely uncoordinated national efforts. Iran and Iraq have always acted as independent powers. Each of the southern Gulf States has pursued its own path to national security, and the smaller Gulf countries have relied on the power projection forces of the United Kingdom and the United States for security and as a counterbalance to their neighbours.

**Stability - Instability Regime Theory.** Applying classical realist’s explanation on Gulf States behaviour, we could see that GCC states are now inherently antagonistic and obsessed with security and their territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing powers. This antagonistic build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma whereby increasing one’s security may bring along even greater instability as an opposing power builds up its own arms in response (an arms race). Thus, security becomes a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made. Balance of power theory suggests that states in anarchy tend to balance rather than bandwagon. States seek to increase their power; they seek to decrease the power of their enemies. It is a great irony that the regional countries have played as pawns in the hands of super powers of the time to lead in the security effort in the Gulf Region. Over and over again, the interested powers chose one against another and kept the pot boiling. This arrangement has worked up to this day, only to the benefit of the outside powers not the Gulf itself. In light of above analysis, it can be safely concluded that ~~Stability - Instability Regime Theory has been proved.~~ Considering the Gulf States as one unit, they have yet not been able to foster a strong bond within themselves which could manifest the power within the state. It is due to this lack of cohesiveness that the Gulf States will take some time to evolve “self-help”. Till the time the Gulf States are able to conserve “power within state” they will not be able to extend the “power beyond state”. Hence it is proved that the stability regime established in the Gulf region in the wake of regional developments is unstable with serious implications on the region as a whole.

#### 9.4 Internal Dynamics of Gulf Countries and Arab Spring

**Stability.** The Arab monarchies are of two distinct types. In Morocco and Jordan, Kings rule as individuals. In the GCC States, it is extended families that govern; in these dynastic monarchies, the monarchs are part of a larger cooperative ruling body. The Arab Spring has largely affected the Republican style of Monarchies, like Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya and Morocco. If Syrian President Bashar ul Assad goes, he will be the fifth ruler to be toppled. Its impact on dynastic monarchies has not been much pronounced with exception of Bahrain only. While the Arab Spring process continues, the days of domino effects are likely to have run their course. The Arab Spring is moving into, as some observers say, a more mature phase. Voices are speaking up against corruption and political arrogance in the Gulf. With the passage of time the ripple effect of Arab Spring seems to be over. "The process is now taking shape of being specific from country to country, rather than a collective cause. These dynamics now vary from state to state depending upon devolution of power and authority and reform measures undertaken from state to state."<sup>513</sup> The Arab royal kingdoms are a close-knit alliance of kings and emirs ruling more than 40 million citizens from Kuwait to Oman. All face various pressures seeking to share their powers and privileges. The demands remain generally too weak and disjointed to seriously threaten their rule. One of the main reasons of relatively calm ripple effects of Arab Spring in GCC states has been strength of state apparatus and lack of hostile means available to the affected masses. Various forms of electronic communication, often transmitted by smartphones, can empower the crowd against a hated regime, as protesters who do not know each other personally, they can find each other through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. "But while such technology can help topple governments, it cannot provide a coherent and organized replacement pole of bureaucratic power to maintain political stability afterwards."<sup>514</sup>


**Instability** Arab Spring was an eye opener for almost all the Gulf countries. The fact remains that despite breeding on the oil wealth, Arab societies still have a number of fault lines. Unemployed youth, sectarian divide, rights of women and authoritarian regimes are few to mention. The administrations that could manage these have gone through have introduced common administration jobs and other steps. Oman has a \$180 million reserve to help small organizations. Saudi Arabia has earmarked more than \$100 billion, and notwithstanding its limitless wealth, it is concerned about unemployment and feels an

<sup>513</sup>Barton Greg, "Reflections on the 'Arab Spring': Introduction", <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cicm20>, (accessed on 30 May 2013)

<sup>514</sup>Kaplan Robert D. "Why So Much Anarchy", [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/why-so-much-anarchy?utm\\_source=freelist-f&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=20140206&utm\\_term=Kweekly&utm\\_content=readmore](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/why-so-much-anarchy?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140206&utm_term=Kweekly&utm_content=readmore) (Accessed on 9 Feb 2014)

urge to deport undocumented foreign workers in order to open up employments for its own nationals. In short a major chunk of oil wealth of Gulf States, which could have been utilized in human, infrastructure and political development has been diverted to check the spread of Arab Spring. The Gulf States were quick enough to meet the challenges of spread of Arab Spring into the Gulf. The action by Peninsula Shield Force of the GCC sent a strong message that any attack on one Gulf Arab ruling family would be considered an attack on all. What the Gulf States failed to realize was that this is just a temporal arrangement which can suppress the peoples' uprising for short term only. Use of force and that too massive one of the kind from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait cannot stem the root cause of a popular revolt in the longer run. The GCC remains a generally digressed organization, with Saudi Arabia representing roughly a large portion of coastal belt of the Middle Eastern Peninsula, two-thirds its population, and four-fifths its landmass. The recent movement of Peninsular Shield force in Bahrain has further intensified the contention about asymmetry, indicating that at whatever point these interests for rulers will be threatened, such movements might proceed vigorously in future also. It is fundamental for authorities in the Middle East region to understand the dangers, which are anticipated to be confronting their nations, whether they seek after their political longings during the liability of their kindred nationals. The Arab Spring might have achieved a sure change, but it might additionally achieve decimation and destruction depending upon decisions thought by political enterprise. The leadership must display foresight and adapt to changes in the region and world at large.

**Stability - Instability Regime Theory.** This fact has been established that the Gulf States have weaker political institutions with a number of fault lines affecting their societal and political strength. Two main components of the theory as already proposed in introduction are; “concept of power within state”, and “concept of power beyond state”. Although abundance of natural resources has helped the Gulf States to strengthen their economies – which is only one component of power within the state – weak political system, hierarchical transfer of power, people’s resentment and social fault lines have contributed towards weakening the power within the state. Hence it is proved that counties (Gulf) with weak political institutions are vulnerable and may face challenges to their security within the states and in the region.



**Paradox.** The main issue in the Gulf is of security ranging from State security on one end to the Human security on the other. It is a paradox in gulf that whereas countries are besieged by the crisis of State security, they are being stretched on the seams from pressures emanating from Human security such as being witnessed during the Arab Spring. To deal with this twin crisis, a revival of the Gulf Security system is required which can allow regional countries a more amenable platform to hammer out their mutual security concerns. This will diminish the chances of an all-out inter-State confrontation allowing the Gulf countries to spend more resources on Human development and political reforms to reduce pressure on the inner front as well. With the departure of US from Iraq and ongoing draw-down from Afghanistan, it is an opportunity of the century which must be capitalized.

### 9.5 Contemporary Arab -o- Ajam Relations

**Stability.** On one side of the Gulf, GCC has a fortuitous base, which few if any, other regional entities share. Geographic propinquity and shared interest are buttressed by the extraordinary scale of cultural and religious homogeneity instituted in the six states. Peter Mansfield the famous Arab historian identified the depth of this homogeneity, shared by no other group in the Islamic world of a billion adherents, “justifies the use of the term “Arabians” as distinct from the “Arabs”, in his book *The New Arabians*, first published in 1981.”<sup>515</sup> The essence of Islam is the message of brotherhood. Even Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) while delivering his last sermon emphasized that “*O’ People!* “Every Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim, and all the Muslims form one brotherhood.” The geographic contiguity of Muslim states is such that they can form a formidable cooperative bloc. Considering the sensitivity of Muslim-West conflict, Iran has mostly been in favour of the Muslim unity to work against and lodge out anti-Islam and Western forces. If essence of Islam as a religion is followed in true letter and spirits, Muslim identity can become guarantor of peace and stability in the region.

**Instability.** The threats to stability of Gulf countries go beyond the conventional risks associated with the use of military force and include ideological and asymmetric threats, related to the transnational identities in the region, religious threats (different

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<sup>515</sup>Braibanti Ralph, *Ibid*, p206.

interpretations of Islam, “some opposed to the official version of each country) and, lastly, ethno-sectarian threats (divisions between Sunnis and Shias, and between Arabs and Kurds etc).”<sup>516</sup> “These identities have proved to be useful for leaders and ideologues as cross-border social mobilization drivers, thus generating mistrust between neighbours and manoeuvres to anticipate or counterattack in ideological battles.”<sup>517</sup> Foreign policy of Saudi Arabia clearly states that “security and stability of the region is the responsibility of the states of the region.”<sup>518</sup> “Saudi Arabia, the biggest shareholder in the oil trade out of Gulf States, does not enjoy good relations with Iran.”<sup>519</sup> Saudi Arabia-Iran relations have been mixed throughout its history. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have aspiration for Islamic leadership and both countries possess different vision of regional order based upon sectarian overtones. Iran, which after the Islamic Revolution strictly followed an anti-US policy, always deemed Saudi Arabia as extra friendly to the US in the Gulf region that speaks for the US interests. Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran on the other side are mainly associated to its plans of expanding Shia influence to other parts of the Gulf region, notably in post-Saddam Iraq, and the quest to build its own nuclear arsenal. The mistrust and hostility breeds danger for instability in the Gulf. This legacy of Iranian ambitions to attain regional hegemony, alongside the presence of Shite communities in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have tied the external threat posed by Iran to issues of internal security within the GCC. “As the threat of sectarian spill-over from Iraq became securitized by ruling elites between 2005 and 2007, local discourse on the nature of the Shite threat often conflated questions of Shiite loyalties and Iranian meddling into one amorphous threat.”<sup>520</sup> The conventional regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arab on the concept of regional imperialism under the pan Islamism and pan Arabism banners has divided the region into two different blocs on a permanent bases. Because of such rival tendency among two leading military powers could potentially destabilise the region due to power politics by changing their foreign policies to counter threats coming towards them. It erupts visible and invisible differences and political disputes among them. One of the important development in-terms of insecurity got fresh competition in-context of

<sup>516</sup> Robert E Hunter, Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Amirah-FernándezHaizam, Ibid.

<sup>518</sup> The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, available at [www.mofa.gov.sa](http://www.mofa.gov.sa) accessed on 12 June 2013.

<sup>519</sup> Cordesman Anthony, “Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region”, Ibid

<sup>520</sup> Toby Jones, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Ibid, p. 25.

arms race. Almost every state in the region has started securing its political and strategic interest by indulging into arms race under the security umbrella of great powers. However, in doing this they disregard what Waltz opines “power is simply a means to the greater end of achieving security for the state. Indeed, power maximization might be counterproductive by persuading other states to join forces to counterbalance against the power maximizing state”.

**Stability - Instability Regime Theory.** The quest for power and regional hegemony has enforced the regional powers to mould the teachings of Islam to their own interests. The Arab o Ajam divide in the Muslim world is a serious source of concern which manifests divergent interests of the Gulf Countries and regional powers namely Iran, Lebanon and Syria. These divergent interests are hampering the “power within the state” – considering Gulf Countries as one unit. Hence the stability-instability theory in the light of assumption that States with weak political structure and strong divergent interests are vulnerable and may face challenges to their national security within the states and in the region.

**Paradox.** It is also established that a false sense of security and cooperation in the name of Pan Arabism is paradoxical due to inherent Sunni – Shia divide within the Muslim States.

## 9.6 Nuclearization in the Gulf Region

**Stability.** Owing to the strategic importance of the Gulf, there has been considerable Western, primarily US, military presence in the Gulf for decades. After 9-11, the perception of the region's pivotal international security role has further increased. US has basing agreements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while Bahrain and Qatar host US facilities and serve as important bridgeheads. Furthermore, in the context of the "war against terrorism", forces from NATO member countries have been operating in the region. The presence of large number of ERF in the Gulf is an indicative of their present and future interest in the region. These forces are conventional forces but each of them is capable of demonstrating nuclear capability. The nuclear capable ERF forces presence in the Gulf is considered as a measure of stability in the region.

**Instability.** Iranian nuclear program although commenced apparently with the objective of addressing energy needs, however it was reinitiated presumably with military orientation owing to security challenges emerging from within the region i.e. Israel and Iraq as well as intrusion in the region of extra regional forces. “On February 17, 2012 Iranian President Ahmadinejad said that all problems facing the region are result of presence of Extra Regional Forces in the Gulf.”<sup>521</sup> On 13 April 2013, he again reiterated during military parade that “Presence of foreign forces in the Gulf is causing insecurity and instability in the region.” Pursuit of nuclear interests by Iran can thus be presumed as a counter to the presence of Extra Regional Forces in the area. Iranian nuclear advancements shall have grave implications particularly on regional security calculus. While most of the states shall seek nuclear umbrella of nuclear states, a few major players are visualized to pursue nuclear capability for them, thus initiating proliferation. Saudi Arabia is the most likely to acquire a nuclear weapon without violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and minimizing fracturing its relationship with the West. The greatest danger for a potential regional nuclear proliferation chain reaction in the Middle East would come from Israel making a formal nuclear declaration in response to a nuclear-armed Iran. If that happens, the chance of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East increases exponentially. The United States will be in precarious dilemma to defend its policy position towards Iran, when Israel has publicly declared being nuclear-armed. Middle Eastern countries would leverage the United States to either persuade Israel to disarm or deal with a nuclear-armed Middle East. This above all would severely damage the non-proliferation regime and potentially result in other countries across the globe to follow suit.

**Stability - Instability Regime Theory.** Nuclearization of the Gulf region is a ticking bomb for security of the region. Concept of power beyond the state, which is one of the components of the proposed Stability – Instability Regime Theory, comes into play in the context of nuclearization of the region. While presence of nuclear capable ERF antagonizes a nuclear capable Iran, the probability of the Gulf States to pursue their

<sup>521</sup><http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/95545-foreign-intervention-root-cause-of-all-regional-problems-ahmadinejad-> (accessed 24 Nov 2013)

nuclear ambitions cannot be ruled out. This pursuit of balance of power to exert influence beyond the state has rendered the Gulf region considerably insecure and unstable.


### 9.7 Scholar's Coined Theory "Stability-Instability Regime Theory Application"

It has been empirically proved that Stability- Instability Regime Theory would become one of the reliable lens to deal with political science and international relations by emphasizing the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international system. Together they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest. Stability- Instability Regime Theory stresses on domestic and international anarchy along with the interest of a state and its vulnerability to cooperate or confront with the prevailing system. Main proponents of realism like Thomas Hobbes, Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Thucydides; who altogether under 'classical and neo-realism' have discussed state reactions and international anarchy as the main pillars of international politics. But the Stability- Instability Regime Theory discusses the issues of state power politics under the umbrella of its domestic political system. Considering the Stability- Instability Regime Theory explanations as the most suitable paradigm in analysing the Gulf's security, economic, and political environment; the analyst might effortlessly portray global undertakings in the region as well as a battle for control "around self-interested" states and is disenchanted over the prospects for eliminating clash or war. Legitimacy overwhelmed in the cold war for a long time thus indicating that capable demonstrations to war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles on cooperation, and other universal phenomena, and consequent accentuation of conflict have been in line with the national interests of the American-Soviet rivalry. Here the researcher finds a unique opportunity to bring the Cold War rivalry of Russia (erstwhile Soviet Union) and USA in the Gulf region by changing the bi-polar realism to multi-polar realism where China and GCC countries also got strategic impetus contradicting the interests of traditional Cold War competitors.

### 9.8 Implications for Pakistan.

Ever since its inception, the Pakistan has always given due weightage to the prevailing international order and its relations with the world and regional powers. After independence, Pakistan had an option of joining either the U.S bloc or the Soviet bloc. Taking cognizance of the prevalent international order and Pakistan's interests, the then

Pakistani leadership decided to join the U.S bloc and remained stuck with this decision till today. The troika of U.S, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan worked reasonably well in dislodging former Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Although Pakistan could not fully utilize the potentials of its commitments with the United States, but her relations with the Gulf States have always been very fruitful. Pakistan not only shares cultural and religious values with the Gulf States, but also relies heavily upon the energy resources of the region. Provision of oil on deferred payments by Saudi Arabia in 1998 is a case in point. Moreover, Gulf States have always provided moral support for the Kashmir cause. The Gulf States have invested heavily in Pakistan especially in the field of infrastructure development and rehabilitation of tribal areas. Pakistan shall also remain highly indebted to the support provided by Saudi Royal family to resolve Pakistan's internal political turmoil after standoff between Musharraf Government and Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani diaspora working in the Gulf States is a major contributor towards Pakistan's GDP. Above factors in view, Pakistan places its relationship with the Gulf States in a very high esteem. While Pakistan has reaped the benefits of its relationship with the Gulf States, there is a negative aspect with grave implications for Pakistan as well. After successfully dislodging former Soviet Union from Afghanistan with the help of military assistance from the United States and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has virtually been playing as pawn in the hands of these powers. As far as United States is concerned, Pakistan was forcefully pulled as an ally in the war against terror, terrorists being the heroes of Afghan-Soviet War. Whereas, commitments with Saudi Arabia have embroiled Pakistan into a precarious societal divide. Pakistan's religious political parties mostly nurtured and funded by Saudi Arabia act as one pole in this societal divide, whereas moderate liberal Pakistani youth acts as the other pole. Another aspect of Pakistan's relations with the Gulf States is the Iran factor. Iran shares common borders with Pakistan, and is also blessed with enormous energy resources. Iran over the past few years, especially after sanctions in the wake of its nuclear programme has offered cheap energy to Pakistan on a number of times. Whether it is Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline or independent agreements, Iran has always been forthcoming to explore the possibility of Iran-Pakistan cooperation in the field of commerce and energy. In an effort of not antagonizing the Gulf States, Pakistan could not optimally utilize the potentials of her



relationship with Iran. Moreover, being Sunni majority country, Pakistan plays its cards very cautiously once it comes to choosing between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Detailed implications of security regime in the Gulf States upon Pakistan will be discussed in the next part in detail.


### **Hypothesis Proved**

After having gone through complete course of research, it is established that the security regime in the Gulf region is paradoxical, as the factors contributing towards stability in the GCC States are also the reason for instability in the longer run.

“The stability regime established in the Gulf Region in post 9/11 International Order is unstable with serious implications on Pakistan.”

### **Stability - Instability Regime Theory Proved**

It is also established that the stability regime in the Gulf is paradoxical in nature. In an attempt to find the answers to the proposed research questions it was established that the same factors which are responsible for bringing stability in the region are a cause of instability. Moreover, it has also been established that power cannot be dealt under the realm of International relation only; that is to say that “power beyond the state” has to be complemented with “power within the state”. Therefore, scholar’s coined theory stands proved as viable lens to deal with both aspects of power.



## Part - II

### Conclusions

The future stability of the Gulf region is of vital concern to entire world due to obvious sensitivities. It is a lesson from history that common threats, common interests and common aims and objectives are the primary ingredients for any meaningful political cooperation. In today's environment, common threat to everyone is from terrorism / extremism; common interests are economic development and common aims / objectives are the human development. Whereas this formula may be applicable worldwide, nowhere else in Gulf its applicability is more desired due to sensitivities and the range of issues involved. The main issue in the Gulf is of security ranging from State security on one end to the Human security to the other. It is a paradox in Gulf that whereas countries are besieged by the crisis of State security, they are being stretched on the seams from pressures emanating from Human security such as being witnessed during the Arab Spring. To deal with this twin crisis, a revival of the Gulf security system is proposed that allows the regional countries a more amenable platform to hammer out their mutual security concerns. This will diminish the chances of an all-out inter-State confrontation allowing the Gulf countries to spend more resources on Human development and political reforms to reduce pressure on the inner front as well. With the departure of US from Iraq and ongoing draw-down from Afghanistan, it is an opportunity of the century which must be capitalized. "It is in this backdrop that the prevailing security apparatus in the Gulf States is considered outdated and redundant. There is a dire need to revive and evolve a workable security system, which can work towards stability of the region, even after departure of the United States from the region. Many alternative models can be conceived."<sup>522</sup> Such as old-fashioned balance-of-power approach with US trying to impose liberal democracy in the region on the tide of Arab Spring, or multilateral effort led by the trans- Atlantic alliance of US and EU, together with political reforms with the consent of Gulf States/ people, or a combination of all. The complexity of the Gulf dictates that no single model will work here. In a nutshell, "a Gulf security system needs to be constructed from three interlocking elements: balance of power, reform, and

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<sup>522</sup> Kenneth M. Pollack, Ibid.

multilateralism”<sup>523</sup>. This combined strategy has the potential to ensure progress and sustained stability needed for ensuring security, while also creating equitable role for all major stakeholders. Throughout the human history, countries have battled diligently to attain their free status and tried to remain sovereign. Each case is extraordinary in its origin, social and historical relationship and supports the faultless freedom and freedom without any question. In this contemporary world order, no state or country can remain totally autonomous in a perfect status. It has to compromise, to some extent, realizing its potential and it has to part of a domain to share common reliance. “This kind of methodology may not best suited for seeking the improvement in bilateral relations of countries, in any case it makes a profitable nature's domain capable of ensuring peace with strength in the region.”<sup>524</sup>

### 9.9 Need of Pak-GCC Strategic Cooperation in Prevailing Geo-Political Environment

In post 9/11 environment, US leadership, greatly mindful of the ground realities, and Pakistan’s positive position to US war objective due to Pakistan’s geo-strategic position; “welcomed Pakistan to back it global war on terrorism.”<sup>525</sup> Pak-US joined hands and converged a “strategic partnership” against terrorism. In exchange, Pakistan attained a distinctive profits in many fields including financial and military equipment. In return, US acquired shortest and least expensive land supply route through Pakistan to logistically sustain its forces in Afghanistan. Currently, US is getting ready to pull out from region, arguably, it will show less interest and enthusiasm to maintain same relationship with Pakistan. Whereas, Pakistan has not been ready to accept substantial reductions from US, especially military field. Interestingly on other hand, India which was not as close to US as Pakistan was, achieved some significant benefits. Even Indo-US nuclear deal was formulated during this era of Pak-US strategic partnership in 2005. Unfortunately, Pakistan remained unable to convince US led Nuclear Supplier Group for the same kind of nuclear deal. In post 2014 environment, the chances of such a deal are least possible due to likely reduced level of interdependence between Pakistan and US. In

<sup>523</sup>Rathmell, Andrew et al, Ibid.

<sup>524</sup>Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Pakdefence.com, <http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=2079>

<sup>525</sup> “Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations”, Pakistan Observer, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=196997>

this upcoming situation, Pak-Gulf strategic cooperation is much needed on priority basis. US-Taliban peace talks were only possible due to Pakistani arbitration. In future the Gulf country (s) can play a crucial role for prolific peace talks between Pakistan and Taliban due to its spiritual influence on Taliban and political influence in Pakistan. Pakistan has been supporting the Gulf countries in the field of defence & security, science and technology, and moreover by providing its trained manpower in various fields.”<sup>526</sup> By maintaining stronger ties with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan can exercise indirect pressure on USA, particularly once it comes to aid to India. “Security structure is enhanced by the economic muscle of the country. Pakistan having been denied economic assistance from USA is now more dependent on economic assistance from Muslim bloc.”<sup>527</sup> Pakistan is located in the close neighbourhood of the Gulf. Stability regime in the Gulf has direct implication on security dynamics of Pakistan. Pakistan and Gulf countries share common history, cultural, religion and strong civilizational bonds that translate in many common challenges, which both share at national, regional and international levels. Some of the challenges are counter terrorism, energy security, trade, and political harmony. The quest for security has always remained at the heart of Pakistan’s Policy since independence. “Pakistan’s security environment derives its origins from the circumstances in which Pakistan was created. Source of continuing tensions and conflicts have shaped the unstable and tense security environment in the region.” <sup>528</sup> The issues of peace and security in a nuclearized world and unauthorized or unexplained incidents that could minimize unclear risks like deteriorated situation of Middle East have a directly influence on Pakistan’s security situation. Thus measures are necessary to avoid the risk of an undesired situation. Moreover, conflicts on Pakistan’s bordering country like Afghanistan & Iran has also been a continuing source of concern. Pakistan has suffered more than any other country from the continuation of the conflict there. For us, vital security interests are linked to stability in Middle East. The end of the cold war signified the beginning of a new era in international relations in which the political and economic ideologies of the market economy gained ascendancy. “Liberalization, privatization and monetary-fiscal

<sup>526</sup>ImranullahKhan, Ibid

<sup>527</sup> Pakistan and Gulf Economist, <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/>

<sup>528</sup> Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Pakdefence.com, <http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=2079>

discipline were promoted as a panacea for developing and developed countries alike.”<sup>529</sup> The social and economic impact of globalization calls for a coherent approach to be adopted by the community. In this case, “Pakistan has a benefit of being part of Muslim block to get facilitated on its support from Muslim Block. Any Political or Military insecurity in any part of Middle East will definitely impinge negatively on Pakistan’s economic and political Security.”<sup>530</sup> The transformation of Israel and the grand design of Zionist expansionism to seize all the oil-rich lands affects Pakistan’s security. The nuclear deterrence of Pakistan, plus the advance missile technology and highly well-trained and ideologically-motivated armed forces pose a great threat to Israeli cum American interests. This is creating deterrence in Israel’s planning to wage a grand war in the Middle East to fulfil its plan of creating what it calls a ‘Greater Israel’. This is the reason that Israel will be trying to create war like situation in Pakistan with support of arch rival (India) to counter that threat and also to have direct check on nuclear arsenal. “In case of unrest in the Middle East, the Americans as usual will blindly doubt the insecurity of Pakistan Nuclear Assets.”<sup>531</sup> USA has always shown its concerns towards nuclearization of Islamic States and propagated that they can fall in the hands of extremist Muslims who can use them against Western Powers for any motives (terrorist activities). Israel has always tried to sabotage the Pakistani nuclear program but miserably failed; now it is trying again through the Americans who have staged the Osama type event to put pressure on Pakistan and create a serious threat to its nuclear installations. “The US has shown concerns about the safety of Pakistani nuclear assets and some reports have even suggested that if things were to become volatile in Pakistan, the Americans will physically move in to secure the nuclear assets.”<sup>532</sup>

## 9.10 Effects of Stability in the Gulf on Pak-GCC Economic Cooperation

**Oil Imports.** Pakistan depends on the GCC for its energy requirements. The shared strategic concerns and cultural ties enabled the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Emirate of Kuwait to offer oil concessions in the forms of credit and deferred payments to

<sup>529</sup>Imranullah Khan, Ibid.

<sup>530</sup>RafiqueAdnan,Ibid.

<sup>531</sup>Farah Naaz, Ibid

<sup>532</sup> Melisa Iqbal &TeresitaSchaffer,Ibid.

Pakistan, particularly whenever Pakistan confronted acute shortage of foreign exchange reserves during the 1980s and 1990s. Cordial and personal contacts of Pakistan with the Arab leaders are additional advantage to Pakistan in the region and Arab countries usually offered a helping hand to Pakistan in the hour of need. So Pakistan's leaders and people accord high regards to their relations with the Arab world that are based on common perceptions and shared-cultural values. Crude oil prices have been rising for some time but the fears of the spread of the political unrest have accelerated the rate of increase. "The price of crude has already crossed the crucial \$100 a barrel mark with the Libyan crisis in full bloom."<sup>533</sup> Any further spread of the unrest into GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, will have huge impact on the health of Pakistan who is already running significant current account deficits, and experiencing high rates of inflation exacerbated by rising food and energy prices since late 2010. "The economic hardship, particularly high food prices and unemployment, could become a catalyst for serious political turmoil in Pakistan."<sup>534</sup> The recent rise in global demand for energy and the resulting spike in energy prices have illustrated just how important Middle Eastern energy exports are. The possible future causes of major interruptions in supply and failures to maintain and expand export capacity and will adversely affect already deteriorated Pakistan energy crisis.

**Work Force.** Pakistan is one of the countries which provides skilled work force to the Gulf countries. This constitutes an important source of foreign exchange for Pakistan. "The GNP in terms of foreign exchange helps Pakistan economy in sustaining a reasonable rate of economic growth."<sup>535</sup> The remittances from the Middle East contributed as much as 75% to the overall balance of trade and financed 35% of the merchandise imports and non-factor services. It warrants that any instability in Middle East will cause reduction on remittance from workers and will affect Pakistan's economy negatively.

**Trade.** Gulf has a significant market for Pakistani products. Most of Pakistan's trade with the Middle East is with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries because of Pakistan's heavy reliance on oil import, close geographical proximity with the

<sup>533</sup> Ahmad Rashid Malik, Ibid.

<sup>534</sup> International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Ibid.

<sup>535</sup> Farayal Leghari, Ibid.

Gulf, commercial security and diplomatic ties besides linkages between Pakistan and GCC. United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are the focal points of Pakistan trade in the Gulf. Middle East is highly crucial for Pakistan's ever-increasing economic necessities and interests. Economic relations between Pakistan and the Middle East have gradually developed and strengthened over the past six decades from 6 percent insignificant share of Pakistan's total global trade with that region in 1950 to as high as 24 percent in 2004. "This made the region highly vital for Pakistan's foreign trade."<sup>536</sup> GCC textile imports alone are over US\$ 5 billion at present. With increasing oil prices and sound management of oil revenues, GCC is expected to emerge as a hub of services industries comparable to Singapore and Hong Kong. Therefore, "interaction with GCC's economy has enormous advantages for Pakistan."<sup>537</sup>

### 9.11 Pak-GCC Military Cooperation

Pakistan needs help from Saudi Arabia for continuing its peaceful nuclear programme and acquiring latest military equipment. A number of Pakistan army and air force personnel were deputed to several countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. "A much smaller number of naval officers also served in UAE training local naval forces."<sup>538</sup> The main role of Pakistani officers was in training of local security forces although they also manned complicated equipment such as radars. The recent Arab spring and subsequent incidents and their basic motives have given a chance to Gulf countries to come further close to Pakistan. "Pakistan through its military and bilateral cooperation has always tried to shield these countries from various external and internal threats. The GCC is now looking towards East and recent joint military exercises of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Al- Assam IV) are one of its examples."<sup>539</sup> Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are leading members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Saudi Arabia has always supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir and encouraged both the countries to start confidence building measures. Both the countries were at same wave-length at the time of Afghan

<sup>536</sup> See meeting of the Chairman World Jewish Congress, Jack Rosen, with President Pervez Musharraf at Islamabad on 11 November 2005, *Dawn* (Islamabad), 12 November 2005, *The Nation* (Islamabad), 12 November 2005.

<sup>537</sup> "Innovating Pak-Gulf Relations", Ibid

<sup>538</sup> Qamar Lt Col Nadim, Ibid

<sup>539</sup> Muhammad, Tahir Sher, Ibid.

War and remained close allies fighting against communism during 1980s. “During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Pakistan on request, sent troops to protect the Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia rescued Pakistan in May 1998 (nuclear test) and promised to supply 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help Pakistan cope with likely economic sanctions in the aftermath. In turn up to 1980 almost 15000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia to defend the holy land.”<sup>540</sup>

## 9.12 Extremism and Terrorism and Effects on Pakistan

In the hot spot disputes of the world, Muslims are being isolated and discriminately treated in the conflicts. Ineffectiveness of UNO and double standards of the West have further aggravated the security of Pakistan. Jihadis were projected as heroes and then became terrorists. An air of mistrust exists between Muslims and the westerns due to extremist activities by some terrorist groups. This distrust has effected Pakistani trade and strategic partnership with World dominating allies for which India is now getting advantage. The preceding paras have amply highlighted the rosy picture of the Pak-Gulf cooperation and the impacts of instability in the Gulf on Pakistan. However, there is a negative dimension to this relationship as well. In pursuit of their regional hegemonic designs and spread of their version of Islam, Saudi Arabia and Iran have significantly impacted upon the internal socio-cultural fabrics of Pakistan. The prevalent sectarian violence in the country is an outcome of the proxy war between both these countries. Attacks on Mosques and Imam Bargahs is now becoming a regular feature. This poses grave security concerns for the Pakistani Government machinery. The ongoing cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran has aired a societal divide on the basis of sectarianism in Pakistan, where Shia and Sunni minorities in selected areas feel threatened from the major sects in those areas. The Saudi Arabia-Iran standoff has put Pakistan into a very fragile situation. Pakistan on one hand feels indebted to Saudi Arabia for its continuous unabated support on regional and international issues since its independence. While on the other hand, she cannot use full potentials of Iran to meet its energy demands. Saudi influence over Pakistan coupled with the American pressure is so over-arching that Pakistan feels hesitant in developing relations with Iran to meet its energy requirements.

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<sup>540</sup> Bruce Riedle, Ibid

Pakistan till to day is feeling the after effects of prolonged American involvement in Afghanistan. Terrorism has spilled over from tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to KP Province, Baluchistan and even the settled areas like Karachi and almost all parts of the country. It is believed that the terrorists operating in Pakistan still work under the influence of the Gulf States in terms of monetary assistance. The sole purpose being change of government system in Pakistan from prevailing democracy to a Sharia based government system. Moreover spread of Wahabi version of Islam in Pakistan as a counter-weight to Iran backed Shia version also supplements Saudi interests in Pakistan. In the longer run, all these developments have broken the social fibre in Pakistan with a clear divide between liberal and conservative youth. A large number of population dwelling in the urban areas in Pakistan favour enlightened moderation focused on the rights of women, progress and development, economic growth in line with cultural values. Conversely a large section of population is in favour of strictly construed version of Islamic Laws akin to what was being practiced by the Taliban Government in Afghanistan in pre 9/11 environment. This liberal-conservative divide in Pakistan is a looming threat for internal stability in the country. Its outcome could be even worse than the Arab spring. If the terrorism is not rooted out from the affected areas in Pakistan, the chances of a civil war cannot be ruled out.



**ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS**

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### Part - III

#### Recommendations

##### 9.13 Need for a New Gulf Security System to Ensure Stability

In light of findings and conclusions with regards to stability regime in Gulf, certain recommendations are proffered as under: -

**A local power equilibrium** needs to be crafted to preserve Gulf's stability. No single local power should be able to defeat a combination of the other local powers, and that the local powers should be reasonably satisfied with prevailing status quo. The GCC's defensive integration needs to be pursued to enhance their military capability to deter any regional aggression. They should have an increasingly larger role in regional security. In recent past, the call for deployment of Peninsula Shield GCC forces to protect Bahrain from internal threat tested this concept. However the lone action by Saudi Arabia against Yemen in border conflict negated the spirit. The local GCC forces should acquire such military capability to tackle any local issues. But this necessarily will mandate transformation of dysfunctional armed forces in the spirit of broader transformation.

**Multilateralism.** A new Gulf security system shall require international support to survive and thrive. Major power centres such as US, Russia, China and EU shall have to adopt a consensus formula for multilateral cooperation based on a common minimum agenda of security cooperation.

**Iran.** The most important aspect in bringing stability in the region is to address the Iranian nuclear issue. "Without appearing to appease Iran or taking the region to the brink of a major regional war, the power centres will have to carve out a niche charter that addresses concerns of all stake holders."<sup>541</sup> "This may mean reducing foreign military presence (that appears threatening to Iran) as a CBM and evolving a greater role for GCC forces in ensuring regional stability."<sup>542</sup> However in order to even take off, US needs to commence a dialogue process with Iran, rather than engaging it in media trial and indirect pressure. Any new Gulf security system that does not accommodate Iran's valid security


<sup>541</sup> "Navy defends Iran interests in the Persian Gulf: Ibid.

<sup>542</sup> "Regional states should maintain Persian Gulf security: Iran MP" PRESS TV, Ibid.

concerns is bound to fail. Needless to say that for this purpose, US needs to undertake extensive dialogues with Israel to tone down its anti-Iran rhetoric.

**Recommended Course for Iran's Nuclear Issue.** It was rightfully perceived that increased sanctions from the international community will bring Tehran to the negotiating table and possibly lead Iran to comply in ceasing nuclear weapon procurement. If the United States and its allies implement a naval blockade or quarantine, Tehran could see this as an act of military aggression. Use of military force through an air campaign would only delay Tehran in securing nuclear weapons. There are some advocates, who state a military air campaign coupled with crippling sanctions would promote Iran nationalist support toward regime change. Another option is to allow Israel to act unilaterally; however, this action would eventually draw the United States and its allies into conflict to stabilize the region if Tehran decided to retaliate. Allowing Iran to possess nuclear weapons exhibits the United State's willingness to accept Iran as a regional hegemonic power, creating an imbalance of power in the region, and an uncertainty of whether a nuclear Iran could be trusted due to Tehran's irrational behaviour and ties to extremist and terrorist groups. The present shift in the U.S strategy towards Iran is the best course to curtail Iran. Iran may be given a right to develop its nuclear programme for peaceful purpose with stricter control of international community through periodic inspection.

**Confidence Building Measures (CBM):** The improvement from ongoing CBMs has been an outstanding characteristic of endeavours to create stable relations amongst previous antagonists. Such CBMs have taken numerous structures. A certain confidence measures particularly military, and in the other fields of academic, cultural, financial and different sectors are required. Need for application of CBMs in the Gulf may be propitious and vital. Recent political changes in Iran, and the hope of other changes in the region show that the likelihood of genuine dialogue may be excellent notwithstanding the continuous efforts over a long period of time. CBMs can only make progress when there is certainty of support being provided from relevant organizations and stakeholders. It can be concluded that all sides will have to adopt an approach where they perceive other side as friend instead of foe.



**Non Offensive Defence (NOD):** Another measure to provide stability to the region can be the building up of NOD. As the Gulf region is the locus of several conflicts, one should look for a stable situation in which all three corners of the triangle, i.e. Iran, Iraq and the GCC, might feel secure, preferably even without external assistance”<sup>543</sup>. In this Non Offensive Defence, i.e. a “simultaneous build-up of offensive and upgrading of defensive capabilities in fact possible to strengthen one's defences while building down offensive capabilities, simply because the defensive form of combat is inherently the strongest”<sup>544</sup>.

#### 9.14 Recommendations Specific to Pakistan

Pakistan and Gulf countries share common history, cultural, religion and strong civilizational bonds that translate in many common challenges, which both share at national, regional and international levels. Some of the challenges are counter terrorism, energy security, trade, and political harmony. The only thing need to be done is to re-evaluate the existing status of relationship and to endorse each other's efforts to boost up the existing level of mutual dependency for better results. Dependency is a common phenomenon, but even a common man would not like to become dependent.

**Pakistan-GCC Security Bloc.** Being the sixth largest army in the world and sole nuclear Muslim states, Pakistan proposed to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) “the setting up of a formal ‘security bloc’ to combat any external or internal security threats in the region.” <sup>545</sup> The creditable policy initiative also stressed the need to have a “strategic partnership which would also ensure food safety; further economic integration. Functional security would be epicentre of the proposed security bloc.” <sup>546</sup> Extended military cooperation would be essential for GCC's ongoing socio-economic prosperity and production. Pakistan can provide common military/security bloc to GCC which would be paradigm shift in the region. It would be curial for the GCC short and long terms geo-political and geo-strategic interests. The existing Peninsula Shield in the GCC

<sup>543</sup>Farah Naaz, Ibid

<sup>544</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>545</sup> Pak-Gulf Defence Ties, Ibid.

<sup>546</sup>FarrayalLeghari, Ibid.

would be further strengthened and streamlined. The Middle East the land of sacred shrines and shining stars of today's imperialism drive, hub of diversity, dignity and hope of ongoing global economic recession is under transformation. "Emerging geo-political and geo-strategic security concerns loom large and demand immediate solutions. The projected security bloc between the Pakistan and the GCC would be useful for all the participatory countries."<sup>547</sup>


**Sino-Pak-GCC Defence Cooperation:** Subsequent to the success of Pak-GCC security bloc, Sino-Pak-GCC strategic defence cooperation will be the next step towards improving stability regime in the region. Increasing geostrategic partnership between Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia has been causing concerns to the Americans as well the Israelis. It was Pakistan's idea to create a Pakistan-GCC Security Council to collectively combat internal/external threats. The Sino-Pak-GCC strategic defence collaboration is the need of the hour and must be developed and made more effective to counter the dangerous game being played in the Middle East and Pakistan.

**Energy Security:** Energy Security is the mantra of every country around the world. Oil and gas reservoirs are on the decline around the globe. New alternative / renewable energy resources are making serious inroad. Mutual cooperation in solar, wind, biomass, geothermal and nuclear energy etc. could be considered in order to compete with the increasingly required energy demands and also to reduce carbon foot-prints. The energy mutual cooperation would provide ample opportunities to Pakistan-GCC. "It would gear-up the onward march of socio-economic prosperity in the days to come in the region. United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are seriously cooperating with Pakistan to overcome its energy deficits."<sup>548</sup>

**Trade Agreements:** Middle East is just next door to Pakistan, but there are no Free Trade and Preferential Agreements (FTAs & PTAs) signed between these countries so that Pakistan should promote trade hitherto blocked by the typical trade policies of the past. Pakistan-GCC trading links could have further expanded provided PTA & FTA were signed between them. However, negotiations are already underway between Pakistan and GCC. "If agreement was signed, Pakistan can have a better market access

<sup>547</sup>Rafique Adnan, Ibid.

<sup>548</sup>International seminar on Pak-Gulf ties in Islamabad, Ibid.



for its fresh agricultural products such as vegetables and fruits including dairy products because one of the focus areas of GCC is cooperation in agriculture.”<sup>549</sup>

**Calls for Action by Security Council into Middle East:** Pakistan should call for action by the Security Council in order to avoid escalation of tensions in the region. Pakistan should fully support the fulfilment of legitimate aspirations of peoples. An effort be made that interference in internal affairs of sovereign states and regime change should be taken against the ethos of international good neighbourliness.

**Geo-Strategic Initiatives:** Pakistan needs to craft its foreign policy very carefully. Pakistan cannot afford to have an unfriendly USA, a hostile India and an antagonistic Russia at the same time. Moreover, relations with Iran vis-à-vis the Gulf have to be developed cautiously. Developing trade relations with Iran to include communication infrastructure and oil pipelines is in Pakistan’s vital national interest. While doing so Pakistan needs to be vigilant not to antagonize the international and regional players namely the United States, the GCC states and the world community at large. A strategy has to be devised for engaging Middle East as well, to encourage foreign direct investment and to prevent a sense of rivalry/ competition that will naturally ensue, once these economic interests are threatened by economic development of Pakistan. Besides all this, Pakistan has to be very prudent to anticipate and counter any alliance formed in the garb of fight against terrorism. A volatile Afghanistan is not in the interest of Pakistan at all. The future of Pak-Afghan relations will be clear after the drawdown of the United States from Afghanistan, and establishment of future Afghan government. However, Pakistan should employ all available diplomatic means to ensure a limited influence of India in Afghanistan in future. Any Afghan government established under the influence of India would mean death to the politico-diplomatic efforts put in by Pakistan over last few years. A role played by the GCC in carving out a future government in Afghanistan with reduced Indian influence will be in the longer interest of Pakistan. Opening up of Taliban office in Doha/ Qatar, and facilitation of the US-Taliban dialogue was a very positive development through back channel diplomacy by Pakistan. Such initiatives will prove to be very beneficial in longer run while streamlining the future of this region.


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<sup>549</sup>Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik, Ibid.

**Policy Making Process.** The organizations need immediate attention are:-

1. **National Security Management Institutions:** At this point of time, Pakistan does not have any institution responsible for policy formulation at strategic level. So much so, that Pakistan has not even documented its strategic guidance. One of the reasons which can be attributed towards this lapse is the involvement of Pakistan Army for providing the required guidance to all other departments and institutions. Today Pakistan's political government does not have the acumen and visibility, which is mostly provided by the think tanks and transformed into strategy by a well-organized institution like National Security Council. This practice is followed by most of the advanced countries in the world. As a matter of fact the Army should follow the strategic guidance provided by the political government evolved through the National Security Council based on the input provided by the think tanks and intellectuals. NSC should have a permanent secretariat, manned by specialists in the various fields. It should work the year round and produce policy options for the Chief Executive and the NSC to consider and approve on national security matters.
2. **Policy Planning and Research Wing:** This should be expanded and officers of quality acumen be posted to it. Posting to this wing should be considered a high priority career appointment. It should produce foreign policy strategies based on the external environment.

**Cross-Border Security Symposium:** With the planned drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan and reduced involvement of the US government in Afghan affairs, leaders of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan should announce a new drive to seek solutions to mutual national security concerns affecting all three countries. In this context, the symposium aimed to provide an opportunity to explore shared unity of vision in tackling mutual threats to regional security, in particular focusing on regional trade, energy and migration issues. There is a need to improve relations and to foster trust. An evaluation of current cross-border security measures should be undertaken in order to make existing mechanisms more effective. A list of respective national priorities to be drawn up reflecting each country's national concerns and common security threats. Opportunities should be explored for a dialogue between religious scholars on all sides aimed at reining




in militants in the border regions. Some recommendations to check the menace of extremism are as under:-

1. The establishment of joint border co-ordination centres supported by shared intelligence.
2. The introduction of new technologies for border control including biometrics.
3. The introduction of a viable immigration and visa system.
4. Co-operation between all sides aimed at stifling flow of funding to insurgents.
5. A trilateral de-radicalisation programme.
6. The establishment of a joint counter narcotics unit.

**Expatriate Pakistani Community:** Presently Pakistani community abroad is mostly involved in low profile jobs only. They need to be organized to operate effectively in the various countries where they are in major concentrations. Such groups should actively engage local opinion and policy makers to bring about favourable affects for Pakistan.

### Concluding Remarks


Summarily this research concludes that the security regime in the Gulf States is unstable with serious implications, not only for Pakistan but for the entire Middle East Region at large. Changing geo-political environment in the backdrop of evolving world order, varying interests of international powers, quest for power/ survival of the regional countries, the Arab Spring and nuclearization of the region are the visible factors contributing towards insecure stability regime in the Gulf. A prudent analysis of the prevailing security environment with an insight into the near future reveals that chances of improvement of situation exist. With the rise of Chinese interests in the region and diminishing influence of the United States, it is very likely that the existing world order will transform. This will bring a ray of hope for the Gulf region. The critical problem for the Middle East countries in the shape of presence of Israel at their door step, however is expected to bother the stability regime in the Gulf for quite some time in the near future. However, hope still exist as the diminishing U.S. influence may reign in the Israeli intentions in Gulf. Another major reason for instable security regime in the Gulf is the quest of power and influence amongst the regional players, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. Neighbouring countries have also a share in the pie, notably Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and India. The stability of a country can be supplemented by presence of strong



armed forces to thwart external aggression. Military development in the Gulf region indicate that the GCC States have realized this short coming. Acquisition of military hardware and military cooperation with international and regional powers is a strong indicator that the GCC states might be able to adapt to the changing dynamics of military power in near future. This in turn will be guarantee of their own internal and external security.

With passage of time the Arab Spring which started quite dramatically seems to be withering away. The ripple effect is over. The Gulf States were quick to realize the shortcomings in their political and societal infrastructure. The adoption of strategy of quick reforms coupled with stringent counter measures proved to be useful in countering the spill over effect of Arab Spring into GCC States. However, increased awareness, access to information and revolution of social connectivity warrant that likelihood of repetition of the Arab Spring phenomenon cannot be ruled out. The measures taken by the GCC States can be termed as short term, however, there is a dire need that these states address the weak links in their socio-political apparatus for internal stability in the longer run.

This research mainly focused on the stability regime in the Gulf area over the past and the prevalent geo-political environment with futuristic predictive assessments. However, there are many avenues of research open to scholars with regards to future stability regimes. In scholar's personal views, this research will be very useful for the students of international relations to gain sufficient background about the past and prevailing stability regime in the Gulf area, with a view to predicting the shape of events for future in the region.



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
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
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
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
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
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